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CROSS CURRENTS

*A QUARTERLY REVIEW
to explore the implications
of Christianity for our times*

DI LASCIA • LEBRET • DE CASTRO • O'BRIEN
JACOB • SUAVET • CARPENTER • SCHEUER

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EDITORS

Joseph L. Caulfield Sally S. Cunneen Alfred di Lascia
Eugene Fontinell Erwin Geissman

Assistant Editors: John F. Bannan John J. Figueroa
James J. Greene Arthur O. Klanderud

Contributing Editor: James Collins

Managing Editor: Joseph E. Cunneen

Address: 3111 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y.

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EXAMINATION OF CONSCIENCE FOR ADULTS

L. J. LEBRET & T. SUAVET

The following examination of conscience points out many sins, deviations, and omissions which are not usually mentioned, but which none the less block off or diminish the freedom and liveliness of the soul. It is intended to show up the sins of grown men and women.

IN REGARD TO MYSELF HAVE I

through mediocrity

chosen to accept my mediocrity, and given up trying to improve.
excused myself from guilt because a sin is habitual, or caused by social pressure.

This examination of conscience appears in the MISSEL BIBLIQUE DE TOUS LES JOURS, published by Editions Tardy for l'Action Catholique Rurale (Paris, 1955). It originally appeared as a pamphlet, EXAMEN DE CONSCIENCE, by Fathers Lebreton and Suavet, Editions Ouvrières.

The Missel Biblique is remarkable on other counts as well. New translations of texts from the Bible were prepared for it, with the double aim of precision and directness. It includes most of the Psalms, those very great prayers, as well as vespers for the Sundays of the year. It proposes material—biblical, liturgical, and personal—for a life of prayer integrated with life in today's world. Explanations precede the texts of the Sacraments; they are compact, complete, and lucid. Sacramentals and blessings fitted to ordinary occasions of laymen are given. Not only prayers for the dying, but also prayers for the time between death and burial, precede the Requiem Masses and vespers.

habitually failed to live up to my capacities.

let myself remain infantile—intellectually, practically, politically, or spiritually.

kept myself ignorant of important currents in thought and action today.

acted because of whims or caprices.

used time ineffectively.

organized myself so intensely that I'm no longer capable of spontaneous generosity.

lost time in purposeless pursuits.

through ambition

loved money.

desired wealth.

desired deference or honors.

deprived myself or my family of needed things, to show off with luxuries.

envied the way others live.

been more ambitious than able.

had any ambition not entirely directed toward serving man and God.

through weakness

lacked courage to defend truth or justice.

betrayed myself, even a little, for advancement, money, or good opinion.

toadied to those who have power, or to the rich.

through lack of balance

gone beyond my strength, without a grave reason; damaged my equilibrium.

lacked self-control.

lost my temper with things, or persons, uselessly.

through disorder and lack of planning

used goods or a good improperly.
 done poor work, habitually.
 made commitments casually.
 not thought ahead to the consequences
 of my carelessness, or of my lack of
 knowledge and preparation for my
 work.
 caused or risked causing serious or fatal
 accidents.
 been weak in making and holding to
 decisions.
 lacked perseverance and logic in carry-
 ing things out.
 left work half-done, without serious rea-
 son.
 failed to see ahead.
 not provided ahead for delays in carry-
 ing out plans, which might cause fail-
 ure and trouble for others.
 been discouraged by difficulties or set-
 backs.
 failed to take time for being alone, for
 reflection, for recollection.

through pride and vanity

been vain, praise-loving, proud, smug.
 taken unto myself the respect given my
 position.
 indulged in allowing my feelings to be
 hurt.
 acted out of ambition or the desire to
 be noticed.
 believed I'm always right.
 failed to recognize my limits and accept
 them.
 talked with self-importance.
 talked knowingly about what I don't
 know.
 made snap judgments and comments,
 to give the impression I know all
 about a subject.

against my body

neglected to give my body either nor-
 mal care, or care prescribed by a
 doctor.

been preoccupied with care of my body,
 and wasted time on it.
 misused food, alcohol, or any intoxicant.
 not slept enough.
 lost myself in vulgar pleasures.
 fled vulgarity in favor of the material-
 ism of excessive refinement.
 let my work suffer because my best ener-
 gies have been spent in pleasure.
 fallen in with current prejudices about
 sex; dismissed the gravity of sin in
 this matter.
 tried to duck responsibility by imagin-
 ing I just can't help letting myself go.
 found a troubled, over-stimulating at-
 mosphere pleasant and natural.
 looked for sexual pleasure outside of
 marriage.
 in marriage, looked only for my own
 sexual pleasure, and avoided the nat-
 ural consequences of my act.

IN REGARD TO OTHERS, HAVE I

against charity

been unable to say honestly that I love
 my neighbor as I love myself.
 loved others selfishly; wanted to mono-
 polize others' affections; been jealous.
 considered no one but myself.
 failed to take a passionate stand for the
 betterment of all the human race.
 lacked initiative in work for the com-
 mon good.
 never felt real anguish for the misery
 of others.
 passed by, indifferent to others' troubles.
 had contempt for anyone, consciously or
 unconsciously, that is: failed to regard
 someone as a man; not treated him
 as man; not realized that I must con-
 tribute to the development of other
 men.
 had habitual contempt for others: less
 educated people, people of different
 racial, national or economic groups.
 in any way stifled the personal develop-
 ment of another.

sought to be respected without respecting others.
 often kept others waiting.
 forgotten or not kept a date.
 not kept my promises or engagements.
 been difficult for others to reach, and too busy ever simply to put myself at their disposal.
 not paid entire attention to a person speaking to me.
 talked too much of myself, and not given others a chance to express themselves.
 failed to try to understand others.
 slipped from understanding for others' problems into tolerant softness toward my own weaknesses.
 been too selfish, or concerned with popular opinion, to do a favor.
 failed to do all I can to make myself fit for greater service.
 out of selfishness or pride, expected to be served.
 been able but neglected to lessen someone's distress.
 failed to help a person in danger.
 seen only those whose friendship might prove profitable.
 abandoned my friends in their difficulties.
 said hurtful things.
 done harm, by remarks (false or true) that blacken others' character; or simply by excessive chatter.
 betrayed a trust; violated a confidence; involved myself in others' affairs by indiscreet words or attitudes.
 "pulverized" my opponents.
 given scandal by my manner, my remarks, my gestures.
 given scandal by the split between the life I lead and the principles I advertise as mine.

against truth

told lies.
 let fear, shyness, timidity, keep me silent when I should have spoken.

called myself Christian, without making my life a witness to the New Testament.

avored positions that contradict Christian doctrine (abortion, divorce, sterilization of the unfit, etc.).
 upheld, and tried to justify, afterwards, a position I took without reflection.

against justice

caused murder, directly or indirectly; especially, in cooperating by mention, advice, or act, in an abortion.
 failed in active concern for the problems of my society.
 used legalities as an excuse for inaction.
 not made it my business to tackle the causes of human ills, especially inhumane social or economic rigidity.
 ridiculed those who are so concerned.
 let my judgments of men be formed by public opinion or what the newspapers say.
 used the need or misery of another as an opportunity to exploit him.
 done as I pleased because I thought my position would let me get away with it.
 blamed "economic laws" for evils due to my own indifference or my own cupidity.
 kept too long, or forgotten to return, what I've borrowed, especially books.
 paid my debts late.
 considered what I've acquired as absolutely mine; held the defense of my acquisition dearer than justice.
 failed to support those who work to defend justice and the common good.
 failed to speak out in groups I belong to, and let selfish interests have their way.
 taken the easiest and most comfortable way for myself, without having earned it.
 kept for myself more than I need.
 "earned" money without working for it.

in family matters

made my family and its affairs my sole preoccupation.

sacrificed my family to my other work.
failed to be a full partner and source of strength to my spouse.

taken for my own use an unfair share of what our family has (clothes, car, entertainment, free time).

failed to respect the individuality of another, even a child.

expected more of the children than I have courage to do myself.

taken it for granted that parents deprive themselves to give their children luxuries.

hardened myself against my parents, spouse, family; refused to express affection for them.

made little of my elders' experience; prided myself on being better educated than they, forgetting they made my education possible.

talked idly and indiscreetly about the faults of those close to me.

IN REGARD TO THE CHURCH have I**by thought**

thought of the Church as a sect or party rather than as the mystical body of Christ.

thought only of the visible church; especially, forgotten the suffering church, the souls in purgatory.

reduced the Church's work to administering the sacraments; dismissed the function of the Church as teacher.

reduced the Church's work to policing morality or even to protecting the established order of things.

never read or reflected on the New Testament.

ignored the papal teachings since Leo XIII.

criticised these teachings without having read them.

drawn from these teachings only their conclusions, without grasping their evangelical inspiration.

drawn from these teachings only what supports positions I've already taken.
confused tradition with hardening of the arteries.

doubted that the Church can effectively drive home New Testament thought to the modern world.

not held myself responsible for my part in the inadequacy of Christians.

thought of Catholic churches abroad as rivals, or as objects of curiosity, rather than as sister churches.

thought of non-Catholic Christians as enemies rather than as separated brothers.

by words

held the Church and the clergy to be identical.

spoken of the clergy as "them" instead of "us."

spoken or acted in the name of the Church without her authorization.

criticised irresponsibly the hierarchy or the clergy or Christian group effort of any kind.

criticised the decisions of the magisterium, seeing only their effect on my own affairs or circle; forgetting that the Holy Father speaks to the whole world.

by acts

with my special situation or my private notion of religion as a pretext, exempted myself from the laws which apply to all the faithful.

with adaptability as a pretext, been unfaithful in matters of discipline, and let authentic Christian values lapse.

used my claim to Christianity to get temporal favors.

tried to put church organizations or organs to the service of temporal interests.

spread out in public the Church's internal problems.
 called in non-Christians to settle problems between Christians.
 sought to bear witness to myself rather than to the Church.

by omission

not contributed to Catholic action or to missionary work.
 not tried to make the Church still more pure, more vital, more widely radiant.
 kept away, on principle or from negligence, from the ordinary daily life of the Church and its special outward manifestations.
 failed to do a fair share in contributing to the Church for her material needs.
 neglected to pray for the Pope or the clergy.

TOWARD GOD have I

not moved on up from thoughts of nature and human life to the thought of God.
 waited for God to manifest Himself, instead of looking for Him among the contradictions of actual life.
 not tried to penetrate, as far as I can, the nature of the divine plan.
 not tried to make real the part of that plan which depends on me.
 not relied on God to do the rest, after I've done all I can.
 not believed in God as Him who, in reality, runs the world.

not seen and loved God in other persons.
 not loved others in God.
 neglected to meditate on the Trinity.
 not thought of Jesus Christ as my close blood-brother; given up trying to make Him my model.
 not made an effort to bear with Him the sins of the world, especially those of my own social group.
 centered the Cross on my walls but not in my life.
 talked about Christ, without really trying to live the Gospels.
 been less than wholly taken up in the love of God.
 not found time to pray.
 measured out my time for prayer stingily.
 prayed just to obey the commandment, or as a habit.
 prayed mechanically.
 failed to turn to prayer when in trouble and aware of my impotence.
 built my life excluding God, then expected Him to intervene.
 prayed only to ask, never to adore, never to thank, never to act as a member of the mystical body, never to love.
 thought of spiritual life as something to do only after everything else has been taken care of.
 been satisfied with myself for having achieved a little spiritual life; not made myself persist, go further.

Translated by MARIE PONSOT

THE BLACK BOOK OF HUNGER

Manifesto for the Creation of a World Association
for the Fight against Hunger

JOSUÉ DE CASTRO

*Hunger and the Economic
Disequilibrium of the World*

IN THE CONVICTION that we must all bring our personal contribution to the harmonization of the fearful social forces which are today in conflict, we offer to all men of good will—but especially to intellectuals and scholars—this document that we have called a *Black Book* because of the dark demographic stains of hunger which defile enormous surfaces of the world map. In our opinion this hunger constitutes the most grave and pressing problem for today's leaders because it contains a burden of dangers and threats as explosive as that of nuclear arms. Lord Boyd Orr has already energetically affirmed that hunger is more dangerous than the atomic bomb for the future of humanity, and in his timely book, *The War on World Poverty*, Harold Wilson wrote: "For the majority of humanity, the most urgent problem is not war or communism or the cost of living or taxes: it is the problem of hunger. This is because hunger is at the same time the effect and the cause of poverty and destitution in which 1½ billion people eke out of existence."

One of the most permanent and active factors of our fearful social tensions is the economic disequilibrium of the world and the social inequalities

which result from it. One of the greatest perils for peace, if it is regarded as "the tranquillity of order," has its source in the profound economic inequality between the countries that are sufficiently developed and those that are underdeveloped. The 19 richest countries of the world enjoy more than 70% of the world revenue, but comprise only 16% of the world population. On the other hand, the 15 poorest countries of the world, where more than half of humanity lives, receive less than 10% of the world revenue. These figures are sufficiently eloquent to demonstrate the bad distribution of the world's wealth, wealth which is concentrated today in the hands of a small minority, while enormous human masses live in absolute destitution.

This frightful economic inequality is the fundamental cause of the innumerable other inequalities which affect human groups, which were formerly attributed to racial and climactic factors. It is the economic inequality which is the reason that, in the majority of the underdeveloped areas, the probable life span is 30 years (27 in India), while it is near 65 in the well-developed areas of Europe and North America. The same economic factor weighs decisively on the probabilities of life for children born in the world of the rich or in the world of the poor; in one, infant mortality is nearly 220 per 1000, in the other, 30 per 1000, seven times less.

A U.N. publication of 1952 on the *Social Situation of the World*, shows with precision and a great wealth of details the violent contrasts which exist

Josué de Castro is former president of the council of the United Nations' Food and Agricultural Organization and is the author of THE GEOGRAPHY OF HUNGER (Little, Brown).

between the countries of abundance and those of destitution. Whether it is a question of production, sanitation, education, or consumption, in every area the fragility of the under-developed countries is made evident. The most striking characteristic, the darkest and most constant aspect of the economic and social situation of these under-developed countries, is the chronic and widespread hunger in which the masses of their people exist—"the great masses of the disinherited," in the striking phrase of Tibor Mende—who, from one generation to the next, receive as inheritance their share of hunger and misery.

The under-developed regions are virtually peace-time concentration camps; the statistics of the specialized organizations of the U.N. reveal the frightful fact that in mid-20th century at least 2/3 of humanity are living with inadequate nutrition, i.e. in a state of chronic hunger. Of the 2½ billion people who inhabit our planet, more than 1,700,000,000 have not yet succeeded in freeing themselves from the iron circle of hunger. Lammenais was right when he said that hunger is the whip and the chain for the slaves of our civilization.

According to the results of the second world study of nutrition, completed by the F.A.O. in 1952, 28% of the world population receive a sufficient caloric content—more than 2700 calories a day—while 12% consume from 2200 to 2700, and 60% do not manage to get 2200, which means that these people are living in a state of almost chronic fast and are being consumed in a kind of auto-destruction.

More serious than this caloric deficiency, this hunger of energy, are the qualitative deficiencies, neglects or specific wants, beginning with the hunger for proteins, which, according to recent research conducted by specialists ap-

pointed in various under-developed regions, has been shown to be the most wide-spread of all the nutritional deficiencies and one of the most common illnesses of our time.

The official data of the F.A.O. show us that only 17% of the world population manage to receive the daily ration of proteins considered sufficient, or more than 30 gr. of animal proteins, while 25% consume from 15 to 30 gr. and 58% have a ration of less than 15 gr. The deficiencies in various other principal essentials of nutrition—acids, fats, mineral salts and vitamins—is shown in the most varied forms in the destitution-diets of the under-developed populations.

Already in 1939 there was published a document showing the extension of pathogenic effects of hunger under various forms, and signed by 600 doctors in Cheshire, England. These practitioners declared that, even in England, a country considered as one of the best developed in the world, their mission as defenders of public health had almost been undone in all that concerned the prevention of illness, because of the state of nutritional deficiency in which the majority of the population who were under their care were living. This document concluded: "The illnesses principally result from the use, during a whole life-time, of an erroneous nutrition." The Soil Association has just distributed another dramatic document, entitled *Testament for the Land*, which shows that irrational exploitation of the land is enlarging the areas of hunger in the world in an alarming manner.

Even today more than 66% of the world population live on a diet of chronic hunger because of pauperism and economic misery; this in turn is the cause of the weakness and the biological usury which so alarmingly places the poorest groups in a situation of inferiority in

relation to groups that are rich, healthy and well-nourished. The high mortality rate in these areas is due to the generalized and endemic infestation of their populations with what are called "mass diseases," such as tuberculosis, worms, impaludism, and gastro-intestinal infections. But it has been proved that susceptibility to and mortality from these diseases depends on the degree of organic resistance which itself results from the conditions of nutrition. In the last analysis, hunger determines the virulence of all these evils. Again it is hunger which supports and nourishes pauperism, by hindering the productive capacity of the "under-developed" peoples. Chronic malnutrition and the incapacity for work which is its result is one of the principal factors in the feeble productivity of the agricultural worker of the Far East, which in 1935 was estimated at 1/13 of the average productivity of the North American farmer.

That is why, out of 60 million deaths annually, 30 to 40 million should be attributed to malnutrition. In this way we see that hunger is the greatest manifestation of that world pauperism which has been brought about by a faulty economic progress and aggravated by the vicious circle of destitution: weak productivity due to lack of creative energy, and weak consumption due to the lack of a productivity which would succeed in creating a reasonable buying power. The sinister role of hunger in the political and economic chaos of our time makes it a phenomenon deserving of more attention by specialists in social problems, who are especially concerned with the sentiment of revolt to which hunger gives rise among starving people as they see the relative opulence of rich nations.

Nevertheless, hunger has always existed, and poverty has always lived right next to wealth and luxury. In the last

analysis, all the ancient civilizations have only been "small islands of wealth and culture emerging from an immense sea of poverty and slavery,"—to use the striking phrase of Kenneth Boulding. How are we to explain then that this social disequilibrium which has always existed has today become the source of the social revolution of the under-developed and destitute people against the wealthy and industrialized nations? The explanation consists in the fact that these destitute people up to a point did not know the social reality of the world and their own situation in this world panorama. When they took stock of this reality they awakened to the struggle, and this has driven them to demand satisfaction for the essentials of life. Lord Boyd Orr was certainly correct when he claimed that "hunger, which is the worst manifestation of poverty, is also the fundamental cause of the Asian revolt against the economic domination of the European powers, a revolt which cannot be subdued by bombs and cannons as long as these people are persuaded that their hunger and destitution are sufferings to which they are not necessarily condemned." Prime Minister Nehru, speaking of India, was still more categorical when he declared that what was new in his country was not misery, but the consciousness of it which the Hindu people have achieved today, and the impatience they feel to free themselves from it.

This coming-to-awareness has transformed the poor man into a member of the proletariat. It has made a resigned beggar a proletarian revolutionary against social injustice; it has given birth to the proletariat. As a result of the diffusion of information by modern means today, these human masses have realized that hunger and destitution are not necessary for the equilibrium of the world. Thanks to the progress of science and technics, there has arisen today, for

the first time in history, a type of society in which destitution can be suppressed, and with it, hunger.

If this has not yet taken place, it is because apart from mass production, our civilization has hardly concerned itself with a mass consumption which would give the necessary equilibrium to a humanized economy. In an economy ruled by the law of supply and demand, far from corresponding to the real needs of human groups, this demand only corresponds to the needs they can pay for.

The real truth is that the "under-developed" peoples have already perceived the profound contradiction which exists between the moral precepts of equality, fraternity and humanism preached and recommended by the theorists of western civilization, and the brutal and cynical struggle for gain among the mercantile groups which dominate the world's industrialized powers.

It is useless to want to justify this state of things by accusing nature, protesting with Malthus against nature's miserliness in the face of the limitless reproductive capacity of the human species. Scientifically all that is out of date. It has been shown that nature is not niggardly and that her resources are more than sufficient to nourish human kind effectively for many years to come. What is pitiful is the human condition, or rather the inhuman condition of our civilization, which rests on the inhuman exploitation of colonial wealth through the processes of a destructive economy making possible—at cut-rate prices—the obtaining of raw materials indispensable to the prosperity of its industrialism. When we realized, thanks to the statistics of the F.A.O., that during recent years the world's food production has increased by 3% while the world population has gone up about 1.5%, we conclude that Malthus has been entirely contradicted by the facts, and that his

nightmarish speculations were without scientific basis. Indeed, Professor Harold Bonner's book, *Hungry Generations*, categorically demonstrates that Malthus has simply justified exploitation and social injustice; that is why his theory was for so long "the political bible of the rich, the egoists, and the sensualists,"—to use Southey's bold phrase.

When present-day agronomical studies prove the existence of enormous soil reserves which are still to be exploited, as well as the existence of technical resources which would make possible the agricultural exploitation of arid, semi-arid and even sub-polar zones, it becomes simply ridiculous to speak of the Malthusian dilemma. On land so dry that it almost never rains, the Israeli today are cultivating plants which develop and depend only on moisture from the dawn dew. In the U.S.S.R. geotechnics has transformed the coarse and unusable lands of the "Hunger Steppe," in the heart of Central Asia, into a great agricultural area of more than a million acres. It is possible today to transform, on an economic basis, the salt water from the sea into water for irrigation, and this will permit the incorporation of a large band of desert extending over millions of acres into productive land. All this only represents possibilities which are open for the extension of cultivated areas. Equal possibilities are offered through the progress of science in increasing the soil's yield, i.e. its productivity. Thanks to modern technological processes, the United States has augmented its production of foodstuffs since the last world war to such a degree that it has achieved over-production and the development of enormous food surpluses.

In the under-developed countries a discerning application of certain farming techniques which are capable of helping those particular areas, would be

able to increase the actual yield from 30 to 50%. This can be foreseen without taking into consideration the possibilities of radio-activity, from which we can rightly expect amazing results in agriculture. Thanks to the application of radio-active materials, new methods of applying certain kinds of manure have been discovered which permit a greater utilization of plants and imply an astonishing economy in the cost of production.

Public opinion in hungry nations can no longer be satisfied with repeating the neo-Malthusian recommendation to control natality as the only means of saving humanity. There does not seem to be much difference between the attitude of some Polynesian primitives who attribute volcanic eruptions to bad spirits in nature, and seek to appease their divine anger by sacrificing animals who are thrown into the volcanic craters, and the pseudo-scientific attitude of those who attribute hunger to the wickedness of nature, and in order to appease it, order the sacrifice of human life under the form of genocide, regular abortions or birth control.

In this phase of the history of humanity when the development of science makes a world of abundance and happiness foreseeable, it is easy to understand the state of mind in the under-developed countries, and especially among the Asiatic peoples, who revolt against this neo-Malthusian policy that some want to impose on them as a new kind of slavery—a slavery imposed on their races who are considered as inferior. We cannot fail to understand the just revolt of these poor peoples in the face of insinuations which are made to them to cease to reproduce themselves in order that equilibrium is maintained between the natural possibilities and the vital needs of the world's populations. First of all, these miserable people have no interest

in maintaining the status quo in which their participation in the banquet of the earth has always been reduced to a few crumbs fallen, from time to time, from the well-appointed table of the rich. Secondly, it doesn't seem reasonable to them to try to re-establish equilibrium precisely at the expense of those who have up till today suffered the most from the consequences of disequilibrium. Thirdly, this disequilibrium is a social consequence of the defects and errors of our present economic arrangements, which have been imposed by the great powers who have up to now economically exploited the world. It is up to these mentors of the world's economy to find a remedy for the crisis, and not to make the burden fall again on those very peoples who up to now have been dominated by the economic force of the big powers. The celebrated economist Colin Clark has well expressed this state of mind among the colonized and under-developed peoples when confronted by neo-Malthusian economy: "Should man be considered as an end or a means? Is economics made to serve man, or is man to serve economics?" Then he adds, "We should not hesitate one second in giving our answer. No political leader, no matter how powerful he is, no economist, no matter how learned he thinks himself, has the least right to interfere in the matter of the birth of children. No, things should proceed in exactly the opposite direction. It is the fathers of families who have the right to demand from Prime Ministers and economists that they organize the world in such a way that their children will be able to obtain enough food to nourish them."

Our Western civilization is in the process of collapsing into a terrible contradiction: having spread idealism and colonial exploitation simultaneously across the vast world, it has furnished the oppressed peoples the raw material

of their current revolution, a revolution which is almost a product of such a contradiction.

It is in the face of this flagrant contradiction that in 1952 Pope Pius XII pronounced the following words: "The great misery of the social order is that it is neither profoundly Christian, nor really human, but exclusively technical and economic, and that it does not rest on what ought to be its basis and the solid foundation of its unity." These words surely constitute a striking denunciation of the insincerity of our civilization, its desire to be comfortable, and its universal cynicism. A typical example of these attitudes is given by the neo-Malthusianism both in the area of economics and also in the ethics of our mercantilist and mechanist civilization, which nevertheless is called Christian and fraternal. This is a civilization which after creating the present world crisis by its impudence, inhumanity and lack of foresight, today recognizes that the wealth of the world is in the process of being used up, confesses its bankruptcy and advises those peoples who have lived on the borderlands to restrict their natality in order to spare the remainder of the spoils, and to leave the exclusive benefit from them to those groups which are today privileged. But times have changed. The hungry peoples have passed from resignation to revolution, and that is why the peoples of abundance ought to pass, without losing any more time, from hypocritical explanations to realistic action.

It is necessary to say some frank and rather "impolitic" things, and to say them strongly enough to break the closed circuit of our social contradiction, which is maintained and survives only thanks to the silence of complicity and the human respect of the interested dominating groups who manipulate the instruments which fashion a false pub-

lic opinion. We have decided to say things of this kind in our *Black Book*. They need to be said, they need to be shouted aloud throughout the world. Along with Abbé Pierre, that non-conformist who refuses to accept the world's destitution, let us have the courage to say things which ought not to be said, things "which will not please stony hearts and full bellies and easy consciences, but will certainly please all those who are hungry and thirsty for justice."

THE BATTLE against hunger constitutes a sort of cold war which is in danger of congealing the whole vitality of our civilization if we are not capable of conquering it in a decisive manner. According to Toynbee, twenty-one civilizations have been born, flowered and disappeared in the course of history, each of them having burst forth as a product of human effort responding to the challenge of social modifications which had rendered antiquated other styles of life. The challenge of the battle against destitution could lead us to a new and more harmonious type of civilization, one less frenetic than ours today. In order to attain this new era of abundance and peace, it is necessary, above all, that a few men, who in this hour of transition, hold within their hands the power, and with it the destiny of the world, should be endowed with enough political maturity, wisdom and good will to inaugurate the great effort of international creation to which they are called by the force of circumstances.

We must recognize that we have done very little to promote true economic and social development of the "backward" countries or to combat the hunger and destitution which reign in the world. Certainly, no formula has been more echoed among economic theories for world salvation than the expression,

"Economic development." The "economic development" of under-developed countries has become the favorite of international congresses, and many look on it as a sort of panacea capable of curing all ills. But there is a great distance between debates of an academic character and the needed action which would bring about genuine economic development.

Although the responsibility for the economic development of each country is part of the national order, it is obvious that without vast international co-operation, it is very difficult, in less developed nations, for this development to proceed at a rhythm which would aid in the political and social equilibrium of the world. The meager rise of their savings and the need to invest their reserves in consumer goods in order to satisfy the essential needs of populations which are impatient to raise their living standards, make it extremely difficult for them to emerge from their economic morass by their unaided efforts. No matter how great their efforts, they are annihilated by the almost unbreakable obstacles thrust in their way by the instability of markets for their raw materials and the difficulty of securing credit for the technical equipment of their economy.

Without massive investments in these regions, it will be impossible to stimulate an adequate economic development, and the world as a whole will continue to present an economic panorama of under-development with all the risks, fears, and sufferings that this social frustration implies for humanity. Although it is obvious that the world cannot remain in this present state, the great powers have not tried to collaborate—as had been hoped—in a substantial improvement of this situation. Let us analyze more in detail what has taken place in the recent past.

The development of under-developed areas cannot be achieved without increased capital, both public and private, furnished by the richest areas of the world. Nevertheless, in the post-war period this afflux has become, proportionately, weaker and weaker. According to U.N. figures, the average annual contribution of foreign capital invested in under-developed areas has not reached 2 billion dollars, whereas to raise the level of productivity in these areas a minimum of 15 billion is needed. Besides the insufficiency of capital, the inadequacy of trained technical assistance points in the same negative direction. It is true that specialized U.N. organisms like F.A.O., UNESCO, WHO, UNICEF and others fight boldly against hunger, destitution, illness and ignorance among enormous population masses. But their efforts are practically annulled by the paltry character of their resources as compared to the work that needs to be done. Let us simply recall that the total budgets of all these organizations is less than \$200,000,000, a ridiculous sum compared to what the great powers are spending on arms. The proof that the great powers have not yet admitted the postulate that world security depends above all on the banishment of hunger and destitution is revealed by the fact that they refuse to support the project presented to the U.N. by a group of poor countries, providing for the creation of SUNFED, a special organism to promote world economic development. The creation of this international foundation for economic development found no support in the individualistic politics of the great powers who blindly insist on guaranteeing their defense by means of force. Only the surplus of fearful military investments is allotted for the aid of the under-developed countries, and most of the time even this is diverted from its

purpose because there are political strings attached (c.f. the agonizing series of articles on the subject in *The New York Times*, September, 1953.). Instead of an action in depth, more superficial and spectacular projects are substituted; and various plans have been conceived, like the Technical Assistance Plan of the U.N., the U.S.'s Point IV, the Colombo Plan of the British Commonwealth, etc. The results of these incomplete and insufficient initiatives have not been very encouraging. On the contrary, they have been so insignificant that the journalist Tibor Mende, in his book on Southeast Asia, unable to conceal his disillusionment, asks how it can be explained that "so many efforts of good will have led to such meager results." An apparent effort was made to industrialize these under-developed areas which up till now subsisted by virtue of primary activities—farming, grazing, mining—and a low level of production has been achieved. But an industrialization which is achieved so slowly and in so limited an economic sector only ends by arousing the suspicion that those who claim to be helping expansion are more concerned with restricting it. Here we have another symptom of the myopia of the dominant economic groups.

Nevertheless it is possible to progress from a colonial-type economy to a co-operative world economy with reciprocal interests without the colonizing country going bankrupt. Nothing justifies the fear the industrialized countries feel in the face of the progressive industrialization of the world's under-developed countries. In an important document called *Toward World Plenty*, we read the following: "The industrialization of the over-seas world has often been feared in countries like Great Britain and Japan whose economies depend on the import of food and raw materials. This fear has no foundation. The importa-

tion of manufactured products by a given country does not diminish when it develops its industry, but rather tends to grow. Industrialization makes the country richer and thus increases demands. What industrialization implies is not the diminution of world trade, but its transformation. The importation of simple consumer products—shoes, cloth, etc.—will disappear, while a new expansion of trade will open up in machinery and the products of an advanced technology. A country like Great Britain should not fear industrialization, as soon as she prepares to adapt to the needs of a world in transformation and to keep up with progress that has been made through new techniques." Nevertheless, this has not been the attitude shown by the big powers.

And what happened at the U.N.? Almost the same thing. Both in its central organism and its specialized agencies men of exceptional ability are working hard, completely devoted to the betterment of humanity. Unfortunately, these men have neither the power nor the authority which would allow them to take decisions. Decisions depend on assemblies of national delegates, who place egoistic national interest above the higher interests of humanity. To resolve a problem of such scope, something more is needed than an international organism. We need a supra-national organism, freed from those sterilizing injunctions of what is called, without much basis, the "national interest" of each country. We would need to organize a World Government for which humanity is not yet prepared, although it is proceeding towards it with great strides. For a long time we had the illusory impression that governments could measure up to the particular demands of the struggle against hunger. This impression was formed with the creation of the F.A.O.—founded as a specialized or-

ganism by the U.N. at the end of the last war in order to help poor nations, and those devastated by the war, to triumph over the threat of hunger. Moved by the menace of universal hunger, the great President Roosevelt called the Hot Springs Conference in 1943, from which came the idea of the creation of an international organism. But we soon realized that, to fulfil its mission, the F.A.O. would need to possess adequate powers, far wider than those granted by the foundation's charter. The attempt of its first general director, Lord Boyd Orr, to obtain these powers through a World Food Council, had no success, and the F.A.O. suffered its first setback almost as soon as it was born. We do not mean to say that it is not accomplishing a valuable task. But this work is insufficient to resolve the problem. The technicians of this international organism feel their hands are tied when it comes to attacking the basic problems which make up the fundamental obstacles to a liberation from the scourge of hunger. They hesitate to influence the assemblies because they do not want to antagonize the delegations of the great powers, who almost never show any interest in getting involved in this complicated question of international food distribution.

During the four years I held the presidency of the executive council of the F.A.O. I struggled to implant in this organization some principles of action which seemed essential to the full realization of its objectives. For four years I saw for myself the difficulties that one met in overcoming the obstacles set up by the particularist interests of countries and economic groups. Problems like that of agrarian reform and the creation of an emergency food reserve, which required the modification of established structures, did not succeed in breaking the barrier of accumulated prejudices

and fears. The case of the creation of an "International Reserve against Hunger," which was only a restatement, on a scientific and technical basis, of the old biblical project of Joseph in fighting famine in Egypt at the time of the Pharaohs, is an excellent example of the timidities and hesitations of the F.A.O. The project was discussed for almost six years, examining the smallest details in successive meetings. During this time famines burst out in various countries—Yugoslavia, India, Pakistan. Before concretizing this project, as President of the F.A.O., I met with President Truman of the United States. Although it was obvious that it was necessary to create an emergency food reserve in a world where hunger and over-abundance co-exist side by side, the project has not received strong enough support from the great powers for it to be transformed into reality. Here is a proof of the lack of profound action from the organizations which are concerned with this world problem. Without it, the contribution of the F.A.O. is limited to the heroic effort of its technicians and its directors.

In the face of these facts, when I abandoned the presidency of the Council in 1955, I gave a talk in which I said:

Far be it from me to minimize the work of the F.A.O. But in all sincerity I must say—and please excuse my frankness—that I feel disappointed when I look at the work we have done. I am disappointed because, in my eyes, we have not yet developed a realistic food policy, which takes into account the desperate needs of the world as well as our objectives. We have not been bold enough, we have not had the courage to face up to the problem and look for solutions. In my opinion, we ought to have the courage to contradict certain opinions in order to meet the demands of present circumstances, and to resolve the problem in the

interests of humanity. It was to serve humanity as a whole that the great President Roosevelt created the Organization of Food and Agriculture of the United Nations.

This explains the fact that after ten years of intense work by the F.A.O. and other international organizations, hunger continues to rage across the world in proportions almost identical to that prior to World War II, when there was almost no policy for international co-operation in this area. It is true that, as we have emphasized, the world production of food has appreciably increased. Unfortunately, this increase has been achieved in well-developed areas and not in under-developed zones. Rich and industrialized countries have been the ones able to increase their agricultural production, not countries with a primitive system of agriculture, and which lack the tools that are indispensable for intensifying the cultivation of the land. Indeed, instead of narrowing, the gap between the hungry nations and those blessed with abundance has grown even greater during the last few years. In the Far East, Latin America and Oceania, food production is 5 to 10% less per person than before the war, while North America, Russia and Western Europe show a net growth. In certain countries where international aid has favored a degree of economic progress in terms of a significant increase in industrial production, the crisis of food, instead of easing off, has rather been accentuated, and this tends to produce a scorn for the value of industrialization as a sure factor of social progress. The intensification of the agriculture-industry conflict seems the consequence of promoting a speeded-up industrialization in some areas without improving the agricultural structures which keep an archaic and semi-feudal aspect in under-developed countries.

All this makes clear the task of any help which is really aiming at an economic development. It is a job which cannot be laid out in a rigid manner as if we are erecting an unchangeable structure, but needs an adaptability which will work towards a harmonious growth. The deviations, disappointments and failures of so many energetic plans for technical assistance have produced a skeptical attitude, which is expressed in the deprecatory formula about "help plans that don't help." It is fair to say that these plans for assistance do not help in the direction in which they should. Economic planning in under-developed countries is, fundamentally, the problem of the whole science of economics: "To distribute reduced resources among objectives which compete with each other, and to have their efficient utilization in time and space arranged in order." This is the precise definition of the Brazilian economist, Roberta da Oliveira Campos. But, if this is the one general principle of economics, it becomes more imperative in the case of the under-developed countries because of their meager resources, and the absence of savings that can be re-invested to promote the expansion of the economy.

The under-developed countries are faced with a real dilemma: either to utilize their meager resources in order to equip themselves industrially at an accelerated rhythm, while in the process sacrificing the living standard of their population; or to satisfy the fundamental needs of their population who are impatient to raise their standard of living, by investing a greater part of what is available in consumer goods, which will thereby retard their industrialization. This dilemma can be expressed in the formula: "Bread or steel." Bread for hungry and impatient men, or steel

for machines which, afterwards, would help in properly sustaining the surrounding population.

In the socialist countries, the priority has been given to industrial development, and by concentrating enormous resources and gigantic efforts on this approach they have obtained great success in the area of heavy industry. In this way some under-developed areas, like the Socialist Republics of Central Asia, have been able to achieve great economic progress and have been rapidly transformed into highly industrialized zones. But this was done at the price of terrible sacrifices on the part of the local populations, who for long years remained at a low standard of life and could only obtain an indispensable minimum to keep alive, a minimum which satisfied their essential needs but not their need for comforts which would help to make existence more agreeable, and especially not their special needs which pertain to the most elevated satisfactions of the spirit. In the under-developed areas of the capitalist world, it is impossible to work out a policy of this kind because of the uncontrollable aspiration for the progressive improvement of the conditions of life, so that a great part of our savings is drained off for the satisfaction of the ever-growing needs of the people. Unfortunately, since in these countries the greater part of the wealth is concentrated in the hands of a small number of men, we see—thanks to what Nurske calls “the mechanism of demonstrative effect”—a pronounced development of the conspicuous consumption of luxury products which are of little if any value for the economic and social development of the collectivity, and which hurt the development of the economy itself. In this way the product of this badly-oriented so-called economic development is de-routed from its social end and only

serves to procure more luxuries for the rich, and make the life of the poor more difficult.

In order to resolve this dilemma we must construct a new scientific theory of economic development in under-developed countries and place it to the test on the terrain of social reality. This new theory ought to integrate human factors within economics, in order to make economic development the means of offering to all men, not only the basic goods which they lack, but also those goods which make for human dignity and for which their consciences cry out. Although this theory is not yet elaborated, we can already clearly distinguish some of its fundamental principles: no matter what the level of progress in economic development, it will produce practical results only to the degree that one of its basic principles of action will have been to obtain the means capable of satisfying the minimum needs of human life. If in the U.S.S.R. it was possible to transform the economy of the Republics of Usbekistan, Kazakistan, and others, which for centuries remained in an economic bog, it is because public power guaranteed the indispensable minimum of nutrition for the vital equilibrium of their populations, (without—of course—permitting them to surpass this minimum level), aiding them in every way to reach that level below which the human machine becomes unproductive. Nutrition is the first vital need, and it is through it that we ought to begin the work of recuperation which has been so well called the “human ascent” by the priest-economist L. J. Lebreton.

Since even today little has been done to improve the food supply of the under-developed peoples, we consider it absolutely necessary to create an organism whose principles of action make it capable of filling this arduous but decisive task for the future of humanity.

THE NEW LANGUAGES

EDMUND CARPENTER

Brain of the New World,
What a task is thine,
To formulate the modern
... to recast poems, churches, art

Whitman

ENGLISH IS A MASS MEDIUM. All languages are mass media. The new mass media—film, radio, TV—are new languages, their grammars as yet unknown. Each codifies reality differently; each conceals a unique metaphysics. Linguists tell us it's possible to say anything in any language if you use enough words or images, but there's rarely time; the natural course is for a culture to exploit its media biases.

Writing, for example, didn't record oral language; it was a new language, which the spoken word came to imitate. Writing encouraged an analytical mode of thinking with emphasis upon lineality. Oral languages tended to be polysynthetic, composed of great, tight conglomerates, like twisted knots, within which images were juxtaposed, insepara-

EXPLORATIONS is a relatively new periodical edited at Toronto by Edmund Carpenter, an anthropologist, and Marshall McLuhan, a literary critic. Its subtitle, STUDIES IN CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION, suggests the way in which their different disciplines are happily combined in this work. The early issues of the review are unavailable, even in most libraries, but the Beacon Press will shortly bring out an anthology based on Nos. 1-6. The present essay by Professor Carpenter (from No. 7, 1957) should prove a helpful introduction to many of the questions raised by this review.

bly fused; written communications consisted of little words chronologically ordered. Subject became distinct from verb, adjective from noun, separating actor from action, essence from form. Where preliterate man imposed form diffidently, temporarily—for such transitory forms lived but temporarily on the tip of his tongue, in the living situation—the printed word was inflexible, permanent, in touch with eternity: it embalmed truth for posterity.

This embalming process froze language, eliminated the art of ambiguity, made puns 'the lowest form of wit,' destroyed word linkages. The word became a static symbol, applicable to and separate from that which it symbolized. It now belonged to the objective world; it could be seen. Now came the distinction between being and meaning, the dispute as to whether the Eucharist was or only signified the body of the Sacrifice. The word became a neutral symbol, no longer an inextricable part of a creative process.

Gutenberg completed the process. The manuscript page with pictures, colours, correlation between symbol and space, gave way to uniform type, the black-and-white page, read silently, alone. The format of the book favoured lineal expression, for the argument ran like a thread from cover to cover: subject to verb to object, sentence to sentence, paragraph to paragraph, chapter to chapter, carefully structured from beginning to end, with value embedded in the climax. This was not true of great poetry and drama, which retained multiperspective, but it was true of most books, particularly texts, histories, autobiographies, novels. Events were arranged chronologically and hence, it

was assumed, causally; relationship, not being, was valued. The author became an *authority*; his data were serious, that is, *serially* organized. Such data, if sequentially ordered and printed, conveyed value and truth; arranged any other way, they were suspect.

The newspaper format brought an end to book culture. It offers short, discrete articles which give important facts first and then taper off to incidental details which may be, and often are, eliminated by the make-up man. The fact that reporters cannot control the length of their articles means that in writing them, emphasis can't be placed on structure, at least in the traditional linear sense, with climax or conclusion at the end. Everything has to be captured in the headline; from there it goes down the pyramid to incidentals. In fact there is often more in the headline than in the article; occasionally, no article at all accompanies the banner headline.

The position and size of articles on the front page is determined by interest and importance, not content. Unrelated reports from Moscow, Sarawak, London, and Itipik are juxtaposed; time and space, as separate concepts, are destroyed and the *here* and *now* presented as a single Gestalt. Subway readers consume everything on the front page, then turn to page 2 to read, in incidental order, continuations. A Toronto banner headline ran: TOWNSEND TO MARRY PRINCESS and directly beneath this, as a second headline: *Fabian Says This May Not Be Sex Crime*. This went unnoticed by eyes and minds conditioned to consider each newspaper item in isolation.

Such a format lends itself to simultaneity, not chronology or lineality. Items abstracted from a total situation aren't arranged in causal sequence, but presented holistically, as raw experience.

The front page is a cosmic *Finnegans Wake*.

In magazines, where a writer more frequently controls the length of his article, he can, if he wishes, organize it in traditional style, but the majority don't. An increasingly popular presentation is the printed symposium, which is little more than collected opinions, pro and con. The magazine format as a whole opposes lineality; its pictures lack tenses. In *LIFE*, extremes are juxtaposed: space ships and prehistoric monsters, Flemish monasteries and dope addicts. It creates a sense of urgency and uncertainty: the next page is unpredictable. One encounters rapidly, a riot in Teheran, a Hollywood marriage, the wonders of the Eisenhower administration, a two-headed calf, a party on Jones beach, all sandwiched between ads. The eye takes in the page as a whole (readers may pretend this isn't so, but the success of advertising suggests it is), and the page—indeed, the whole magazine—becomes a single Gestalt where association, though not causal, is often life-like.

The same is true of the other new languages. Both radio and TV offer short, unrelated programs, interrupted between and within by commercials. I say 'interrupted,' being myself an anachronism of book culture, but my children don't regard them as interruptions, as breaking continuity. Rather, they regard them as part of a whole, and their reaction is neither one of annoyance nor indifference. The ideal news broadcast has half a dozen speakers from as many parts of the world on as many subjects. The London correspondent doesn't comment on what the Washington correspondent has just said; he hasn't even heard him.

The child is right in not regarding commercials as interruptions. For the only time anyone smiles on TV is in commercials. The rest of life, in news

broadcasts and soap operas, is presented as so horrible, that the only way to get through life is to buy this product: then you'll smile. Aesop never wrote a clearer fable. It's heaven and hell brought up to date: Hell in the headline, Heaven in the ad. Without the other, neither has meaning.

There's pattern in these new media—not line, but knot; not lineality or causality or chronology, nothing that leads to a desired climax; but a Gordian knot without antecedents or results, containing within itself carefully selected elements, juxtaposed, inseparably fused; a knot that can't be untied to give the long, thin cord of lineality.

This is especially true of ads which never present an ordered, sequential, rational argument, but simply present the product associated with desirable things or attitudes. Thus *Coca Cola* is shown held by a beautiful blonde, who sits in a Cadillac, surrounded by bronze, muscular admirers, with the sun shining overhead. By repetition these elements become associated, in our minds, into a pattern of sufficient cohesion so that one element can magically evoke the others. If we think of ads as designed solely to sell products, we miss their main effect: to increase pleasure in the consumption of the product. Thus *Coca Cola* is far more than a cooling drink; the consumer participates, vicariously, in a much larger experience. In Africa, in Melanesia, to drink a Coke is to participate in the American way of life.

Of the new languages, TV comes closest to drama and ritual. It combines music and art, language and gesture, rhetoric and colour. It favours simultaneity of visual and auditory images. Cameras don't focus on speakers, but on persons spoken to or about; the audience *hears* the accuser but *watches* the accused. In a single impression they hear the prosecutor, watch the trembling

hands of the big-town crook, and see the look of moral indignation on Senator Tobey's face. This is real drama, in process, with the outcome uncertain. Print can't do this; it has a different bias.

Books and movies only pretend uncertainty, but live TV retains this vital aspect of life. Seen on TV, the fire in the 1952 Democratic Convention threatened briefly to become a conflagration; seen on newsreel, it was history, without potentiality.

The absence of uncertainty is no handicap to other media, if they are properly used, for their biases are different. Thus it's clear from the beginning that Hamlet is a doomed man, but far from detracting in interest, this heightens the sense of tragedy.

Now one of the results of the time-space duality which developed in Western culture, principally from the Renaissance on, was a separation within the arts. Music, which created symbols in time, and graphic art, which created symbols in space, became separate pursuits, and men gifted in one rarely pursued the other. Dance and ritual, which inherently combined them, fell in popularity. Only in drama did they remain united.

It is significant that of the four new media, the three most recent are dramatic media, particularly TV which combines language, music, art, dance. They convey emotional tones, not merely 'information.' They don't, however, exercise the same freedom with time that the stage dares practice. An intricate plot, employing flash-backs, multiple time perspectives and overlays, intelligible on the stage, would mystify on the screen. The audience has no time to think back, to establish relations between early hints and subsequent discoveries. The picture passes before the eyes too quickly; there are no intervals in which to take stock

of what has happened, and make conjectures of what is going to happen. The observer is in a more passive state, less interested in subtleties. Both TV and film are nearer to narrative and depend much more upon the episodic. An intricate time construction can be done in film, but in fact rarely is. The soliloquies of *Richard III* belong on the stage; the film audience was unprepared for them. On stage Ophelia's death was described by three separate groups: one hears the announcement and watches the reactions simultaneously. On film the camera flatly shows her drowned where 'a willow lies aslant a brook.' Media differences such as these mean that it's not simply a question of communicating a single idea in different ways, but that a given idea or insight belongs primarily, though not exclusively, to one medium, and that can be gained or communicated best through that medium.

Thus the book was ideally suited for discussing evolution and progress. Both belonged, almost exclusively, to book culture. Like a book, the idea of progress was an abstracting, organizing principle for the interpretation and comprehension of the incredibly complicated record of human experience. The sequence of events was believed to have a direction, to follow a given course along an axis of time; it was held that civilization, like the reader's eye, 'has moved, is moving, and will move in a desirable direction. Knowledge will advance, and with that advance, reason and decency must increasingly prevail among men.' Here we see the three main elements of book lineality; the line, the point moving along that line, and its movement toward a desirable goal.

The Western conception of a definite moment in the present, of the present as a definite moment or a definite point, so important in book-dominated lan-

guages, is absent, to my knowledge, in oral languages. Absent as well, in oral societies, are such animating and controlling ideas as Western individualism and three-dimensional perspective, both related to this conception of the definite moment, and both nourished, probably bred, by book culture.

Each medium selects its ideas. TV is a tiny box into which people are crowded and must live; film gives us the wide world. With its huge screen, film is perfectly suited for social drama, Civil War panoramas, the sea, land erosion, Cecil B. DeMille spectacles. In contrast, the TV screen has room for two, at the most three, faces, comfortably. TV is closer to stage, yet different. Paddy Chayefsky writes:

The theatre audience is far away from the actual action of the drama. They cannot see the silent reactions of the players. They must be told in a loud voice what is going on. The plot movement from one scene to another must be marked, rather than gently shaded as is required in television. In television, however, you can dig into the most humble, ordinary relationships; the relationship of bourgeois children to their mother, of middle-class husband to wife, of white-collar father to his secretary—in short, the relationships of the people. We relate to each other in an incredibly complicated manner. There is far more exciting drama in the reasons why a man gets married than in why he murders someone. The man who is unhappy in his job, the wife who thinks of a lover, the girl who wants to get into television, your father, your mother, sister, brothers, cousins, friends—all these are better subjects for drama than Iago. What makes a man ambitious? Why does a girl always try to steal her kid sister's boy friends? Why does your uncle attend his annual class reunion faithfully every year? Why do you always find it depress-

ing to visit your father? These are the substances of good television drama; and the deeper you probe into and examine the twisted, semi-formed complexes of emotional entanglements, the more exciting your writing becomes.

This is the primary reason, I believe, why Greek drama is more readily adapted to TV than to film. The boxed-in quality of live TV lends itself to static literary tragedy with greater ease than does the elastic, energetic, expandable movie. Guthrie's recent movie of *Oedipus* favoured the panoramic shot, rather than the selective eye. It consisted of a succession of tableaux, a series of groups of people moving in tight formation as though they had trained for it by living for days together in a self-service elevator. With the lines, 'I grieve for the City, and for myself and you... and walk through endless ways of thought,' the inexorable tragedy moved to its horrible 'come to realize' climax as though everyone were stepping on everyone else's feet.

The tight, necessary conventions of live TV were more sympathetic to Sophocles in the recent Aluminium Hour's *Antigone*. Restrictions of space are imposed on TV as on the Greek stage by the size and inflexibility of the studio. Squeezed by physical limitations, the producer was forced to expand the viewer's imagination with ingenious devices.

When T. S. Eliot adapted *Murder in the Cathedral* for film, he noted a difference in realism between cinema and stage:

Cinema, even where fantasy is introduced, is much more realistic than the stage. Especially in an historical picture, the setting, the costume, and the way of life represented have to be accurate. Even a minor anachronism is intolerable. On the stage much more can be overlooked or forgiven; and indeed, an excessive care for accuracy of historical

detail can become burdensome and distracting. In watching a stage performance, the member of the audience is in direct contact with the actor playing a part. In looking at a film, we are much more passive; as audience, we contribute less. We are seized with the illusion that we are observing an actual event, or at least a series of photographs of the actual event; and nothing must be allowed to break this illusion. Hence the precise attention to detail.

In theatre, the spectator sees the enacted scene as a whole in space, always seeing the whole of the space. The stage may present only one corner of a large hall, but that corner is always totally visible all through the scene. And the spectator always sees that scene from a fixed, unchanging distance and from an angle of vision that doesn't change. Perspective may change from scene to scene, but within one scene it remains constant. Distance never varies.

But in film and TV, distance and angle constantly shift. The same scene is shown in multiple perspective and focus. The viewer sees it from here, there, then over here, finally he is drawn inexorably into it, becomes part of it. He ceases to be a spectator. Balazs writes:

Although we sit in our seats, we do not see Romeo and Juliet from there. We look up into Juliet's balcony with Romeo's eyes and look down on Romeo with Juliet's. Our eye and with it our consciousness is identified with the characters in the film, we look at the world out of their eyes and have no angle of vision of our own. We walk amid crowds, ride, fly or fall with the hero and if one character looks into the other's eyes, he looks into our eyes from the screen for, our eyes are in the camera and become identical with the gaze of the characters. They see with our eyes. Herein lies the psychological act of identification. Nothing like this 'iden-

tification' has ever occurred as the effect of any other system of art and it is here that the film manifests its absolute artistic novelty.

...not only can we see, in the isolated 'shots' of a scene, the very atoms of life and their innermost secrets revealed at close quarters, but we can do so without any of the intimate secrecy being lost, as always happens in the exposure of a stage performance or of a painting. The new theme which the new means of expression of film art revealed was not a hurricane at sea or the eruption of a volcano: it was perhaps a solitary tear slowly welling up in the corner of a human eye.

...not to speak does not mean that one has nothing to say. Those who do not speak may be brimming over with emotions which can be expressed only in forms and pictures, in gesture and play of feature. The man of visual culture uses these not as substitutes for words, as a deaf-mute uses his fingers.

The gestures of visual man are not intended to convey concepts which can be expressed in words, but inner experiences, non-rational emotions, which would still remain unexpressed when everything that can be told has been told. Such emotions lie in the deepest levels. They cannot be approached by words that are mere reflections of concepts, any more than musical experiences can be expressed in rational concepts. Facial expression is a human experience rendered immediately visible without the intermediary of words. It is Turgenev's 'living truth of the human face.'

Printing rendered illegible the faces of men. So much could be read from paper that the method of conveying meaning by facial expression fell into desuetude. The press grew to be the main bridge over which the more remote interhuman spiritual exchanges took

place; the immediate, the personal, the inner, died. There was no longer need for the subtler means of expression provided by the body. The face became immobile; the inner life, still. Wells that dry up are wells from which no water is dipped.

Just as radio helped bring back inflection in speech, so film and TV are aiding us in the recovery of gesture and facial awareness—a rich, colourful language, conveying moods and emotions, happenings and characters, even thoughts, none of which could be properly packaged in words. If film had remained silent for another decade, how much faster this change might have been!

Feeding the product of one medium though another medium creates a new product. When Hollywood buys a novel, it buys a title and the publicity associated with it: nothing more. Nor should it.

Each of the four versions of the *Caine Mutiny*—book, play, movie, TV—had a different hero: Willie Keith, the lawyer Greenwald, the United States Navy, and Captain Queeg, respectively. Media and audience biases were clear. Thus the book told, in lengthy detail, of the growth and making of Ensign William Keith, American man, while the movie camera with its colourful shots of ships and sea, unconsciously favoured the Navy as hero, a bias supported by the fact that the Navy cooperated with the movie makers. Because of stage limitations, the play was confined, except for the last scene, to the court room, and favoured the defence counsel as hero. The TV show, reduced in cast to the principals and aimed at a mass audience, emphasized patriotism, authority, allegiance, while the New York play, with its audience slanted toward Expense Account patronage—Mr. Sampson, Western Sales Manager for the Cavity

Drill Company—became a morality play with Willie Keith, innocent American youth torn between two influences: Keef-er, clever author but moral cripple, and Greenwald, equally brilliant but reliable, a businessman's intellectual. Greenwald saves Willie's soul.

The recent film *Moby Dick* was in many ways an improvement on the book, primarily because of its explicitness. For *Moby Dick* is one of those admittedly great classics, like *Robinson Crusoe* or Kafka's *Trial*, whose plot and situation, as distilled apart from the book by time and familiarity, are actually much more imposing than the written book itself. It's the drama of Ahab's defiance rather than Melville's uncharted leviathan meanderings that is the greatness of *Moby Dick*. On film, instead of laborious tacks through leagues of discursive interruptions, the most vivid descriptions of whales and whaling become part of the action. On film, the viewer was constantly aboard ship: each scene an instantaneous shot of whaling life, an effect achieved in the book only by illusion, by constant, detailed reference. From start to finish, all the action of the film served to develop what was most central to the theme—a man's magnificent and blasphemous pride in attempting to destroy the brutal, unreasoning force that maims him and turns man-made order into chaos. Unlike the book, the film gave a spare, hard, compelling dramatization, free of self-conscious symbolism.

Current confusion over the respective roles of the new media comes largely from a misconception of their function. They are art-forms, not substitutes for direct, human contact. Insofar as they attempt to usurp speech and personal, living relations, they harm. This, of course, has long been one of the problems of book culture, at least during the time of its monopoly of Western mid-

dle class thought. But this was never a legitimate function of books, nor of any other medium. Whenever a medium goes claim jumping, trying to work areas where it is ill-suited, conflicts occur with other media, or, more accurately, between the vested interests controlling each. But when media simply exploit their own formats, they become complementary and cross-fertile.

Some people who have no one around talk to cats, and you can hear their voices in the next room, and they sound silly, because the cat won't answer, but that suffices to maintain the illusion that their world is made up of living people, while it is not. Mechanized mass media reverse this: now mechanical cats talk to humans. There's no genuine feedback.

This charge is often leveled by academicians at the new media, but it holds equally for print. The open-mouthed, glazed-eyed TV spectator is merely the successor of the passive, silent, lonely reader whose head moved back and forth like a shuttle-cock.

When we read, another person thinks for us: we merely repeat his mental process. The greater part of the work of thought is done for us. This is why it relieves us to take up a book after being occupied by our own thoughts. In reading, the mind is only the playground for another's ideas. People who spend most of their lives in reading often lose the capacity for thinking, just as those who always ride forget how to walk. Some people read themselves stupid. Chaplin did a wonderful take-off of this in *City Lights*, when he stood up on a chair to eat the endless confetti which he mistook for spaghetti.

Eliot remarks: 'It is often those writers whom we are lucky enough to know whose books we can ignore; and the better we know them personally, the less

need we may feel to read what they write.'

Frank O'Connor highlights a basic distinction between oral and written traditions: "By the hokies, there was a man in this place one time by name of Ned Sullivan, and he had a queer thing happen to him late one night and he coming up the Valley Road from Durlas." This is how a folk story begins, or should begin, and woe betide the story-teller whoever he may be who forgets that his story is first and foremost "news," that there is a listener he must grip by the lapel and shout at if necessary till he has attracted his attention. Yet that is how no printed short story should begin, because such a story seems tame when you remove it from its warm nest by the cottage fire, from the sense of an audience with its interjections, and the feeling of terror at what may lurk in the darkness outside. This is a tale, and even when handled by a master like Kipling, it looks and is contrived.'

Face-to-face discourse is not as selective, abstract, nor explicit as any mechanical medium; it probably comes closer to communicating an unabridged situation than any of them, and insofar as it exploits the give-take of dynamic relationship, it's clearly the most indispensably human one.

Of course, there can be personal involvement in the other media. When Richardson's *Pamela* was serialized in 1741, it aroused such interest that in one English town, upon receipt of the last installment, the church bell announced that virtue had been rewarded. Radio stations have reported receiving quantities of baby clothes and bassinets when, in a soap opera, a heroine had a baby. One of the commonest phrases used by devoted listeners to daytime serials is that they 'visited with' Aunt Jenny or Big Sister. BBC and *News Chronicle* re-

port cases of women viewers who kneel before TV sets to kiss male announcers good night.

Each medium, if its bias is properly exploited, reveals and communicates a unique aspect of reality, of truth. Each offers a different perspective, a way of seeing an otherwise hidden dimension of reality. It's not a question of one reality being true, the others distortions. One allows us to see from here, another from there, a third from still another perspective; taken together they give us a more complete whole, a greater truth. New essentials are brought to the fore, including those made invisible by the 'blindness' of old languages.

This is why the preservation of book culture is as important as the development of TV. This is why new languages, instead of destroying old ones, serve as a stimulant to them. Only monopoly is destroyed. When actor-collector Edward G. Robinson was battling actor-collector Vincent Price on art in TV's *\$64,000 Challenge*, he was asked how the quiz had affected his life; he answered petulantly, 'Instead of looking at the pictures in my art books, I now have to read them.' Print, along with all old languages, including speech, has profited enormously from the development of the new media. 'The more the arts develop,' writes E. M. Forster, 'the more they depend on each other for definition. We will borrow from painting first and call it pattern. Later we will borrow from music and call it rhythm.'

Yet a new language is rarely welcomed by the old. The oral tradition distrusted writing, manuscript culture was contemptuous of printing, book culture hated the press, that 'slag-heap of hellish passions' as one 19th Century scholar called it. A father, protesting to a Boston newspaper about crime and scandal, said he would rather see his children 'in their graves while pure in in-

nocence, than dwelling with pleasure upon these reports, which have grown so bold.'

What really disturbed book-oriented people, wasn't newspaper sensationalism, but its non-linear format, its non-linear codifications of experience. The motto of conservative academicians became: **HOLD THAT LINE!**

A new language lets us see with the fresh, sharp eyes of the child; it offers the pure joy of discovery. I was recently told a story about a Polish couple who, though long resident in Toronto, retained many of the customs of their homeland. Their son despaired of ever getting his father to buy a suit cut in style or of the mother ever taking an interest in Canadian life. Then he bought them a TV set and in a matter of months a major change took place. One evening the mother remarked that 'Edith Piaf is the latest thing on Broadway,' and the father appeared in 'the kind of suit executives wear on TV.' For years the father had passed this same suit in store windows and seen it both in advertisements and on living men, but not until he saw it on TV did it become meaningful. This same statement goes for all media: each offers a unique presentation of reality which when new has a freshness and clarity that is extraordinarily powerful.

This is especially true of TV. We say, 'We have a radio set' but 'We have television'—as if something had happened to us. It's no longer 'The skin you love to touch,' but 'The Nylon that loves to touch you.' We don't watch TV; it watches us: it guides us. Magazines and newspapers no longer convey 'information,' but offer ways of seeing things. They have abandoned realism as too easy; they substitute themselves for realism. LIFE is totally advertisements: its articles package and sell emotions and

ideas just as its paid ads sell commodities.

Several years ago, a group of us at the University of Toronto undertook the following experiment: 136 students were divided, on the basis of their over-all academic standing of the previous year, into four equal groups who either (1) heard and saw a lecture delivered in a TV studio, (2) heard and saw this same lecture on a TV screen, (3) heard it over the radio, or (4) read it in manuscript. Thus there were, in the CBC studios, four controlled groups who simultaneously received a single lecture and then immediately wrote an identical examination to test both understanding and retention of content. Later the experiment was repeated, using three similar groups; this time the same lecture was (1) delivered in a classroom, (2) presented as a film (using the kine-scope) in a small theater, and (3) again read in print. The actual mechanics of the experiment were relatively simple, but the problem of writing the script for the lecture led to a consideration of the resources and limitations of the dramatic forms involved.

It immediately became apparent that no matter how the script was written and the show produced, it would be slanted in various ways for and against each of the media involved; no show could be produced which did not contain these biases, and the only real common denominator was the simultaneity of presentation. For each communication channel codifies reality differently and thus influences, to a surprising degree, the content of the message communicated. A medium is not simply an envelope that carries any letter; it is itself a major part of that message. We therefore decided not to exploit the full resources of any one medium, but to try to chart a middle-of-the-road course between all of them.

The lecture which was finally produced dealt with linguistic codifications of reality and metaphysical concepts underlying grammatical systems. It was chosen because it concerned a field in which few students could be expected to have prior knowledge; moreover it offered opportunities for the use of gesture. The cameras moved throughout the lecture, and took close-ups where relevant. No other visual aids were used, nor were shots taken of the audience while the lecture was in progress. Instead, the cameras simply focused on the speaker for 27 minutes.

The first difference we found between a classroom and a TV lecture was the brevity of the latter. The classroom lecture, if not ideally, at least in practice, sets a slower pace. It's verbose, repetitive. It allows for greater elaboration and permits the lecturer to take up several *related* points. TV, however, is stripped right down; there's less time for qualifications or alternative interpretations, and only time enough for *one* point. (Into 27 minutes we put the meat of a two-hour classroom lecture. The ideal TV speaker states his point and then brings out different facets of it by a variety of illustrations. But the classroom lecturer is less subtle and, to the agony of the better students, repeats and repeats his identical points in the hope, perhaps, that ultimately no student will miss them, or perhaps simply because he is dull. Teachers have had captive audiences for so long, few are equipped to compete for attention via the new media.

The next major difference noted was the abstracting role of each medium, beginning with print. Edmund M. Morgan, Harvard Law Professor, writes:

One who forms his opinion from the reading of any record alone is prone to err, because the printed page fails to produce the impression or convey the

idea which the spoken word produced or conveyed. The writer has read charges to the jury which he had previously heard delivered, and has been amazed to see an oral deliverance which indicated a strong bias appear on the printed page as an ideally impartial exposition. He has seen an appellate court solemnly declare the testimony of a witness to be especially clear and convincing which the trial judge had orally characterized as the most abject perjury.

Selectivity of print and radio are perhaps obvious enough, but we are less conscious of it in TV, partly because we have already been conditioned to it by the shorthand of film. Balazs writes:

A man hurries to a railway station to take leave of his beloved. We see him on the platform. We cannot see the train, but the questing eyes of the man show us that his beloved is already seated in the train. We see only a close-up of the man's face, we see it twitch as if startled and then strips of light and shadow, light and shadow flit across it in quickening rhythm. Then tears gather in the eyes and that ends the scene. We are expected to know what happened and today we do know, but when I first saw this film in Berlin, I did not at once understand the end of this scene. Soon, however, everyone knew what had happened: the train had started and it was the lamps in its compartments which had thrown their light on the man's face as they glided past ever faster and faster.

As in a movie theater, only the screen is illuminated, and on it, only points of immediate relevance are portrayed; everything else is eliminated. This explicitness makes TV, not personal, but forceful. That's why stage hands in a TV studio watch the show over floor monitors, rather than watch the actual performance before their eyes.

The script, timed for radio, proved

too long for TV. Visual aids and gestures on TV not only allow the elimination of certain words, but require a unique script. The ideal radio delivery stresses pitch and intonation to make up for the absence of the visual. That flat, broken speech in 'sidewalk interviews' is the speech of a person untrained in radio delivery.

In the results of the examination TV won, followed by lecture, film, radio, and finally print. Two years later, the experiment was repeated, with major modifications, using students at Ryerson Institute. Marshall McLuhan reports:

In this repeat performance, pains were taken to allow each medium full play of its possibilities with reference to the subject, just as in the earlier experiment each medium was neutralized as much as possible. Only the mimeograph form remained the same in each experiment. Here we added a printed form in which an imaginative typographical layout was followed. The lecturer used the blackboard and permitted discussion. Radio and TV employed dramatization, sound effects and graphics. In the examination, radio easily topped TV. Yet, as in the first experiment, both radio and TV manifested a decisive advantage over the lecture and written forms. As a conveyor both of ideas and information, TV was, in this second experiment, apparently enfeebled by the deployment of its dramatic resources, whereas radio benefited from such lavishness. 'Technology is explicitness,' writes Lyman Bryson. Are both radio and TV more explicit than writing or lecture? Would a greater explicitness, if inherent in these media, account for the ease with which they top other modes of performance?

Announcement of the results of the first experiment evoked considerable in-

terest. Advertising agencies circulated the results with the comment that here, at last, was scientific proof of the superiority of TV. This was unfortunate and missed the main point, for the results didn't indicate the superiority of one medium over others. They merely directed attention toward differences between them, differences so great as to be of kind rather than degree. Some CBC officials were furious, not because TV won, but because print lost. Although they understand little of literature and contribute less, like publishers, they have a vested interest in book culture. At heart they hate radio and TV, which they employ merely to disseminate the values of book culture. They feel they should dedicate themselves to *serious* culture. This is why they can't use radio and TV with conviction and are afraid to use it comically, and so they end up with wishy-washy. They are like 16th century scholars who saw the book revolution as simply a means of propagating old ideas and failed to realize it was a monumental change in sensibility, in thinking and feeling.

Nobody yet knows the languages inherent in the new technological culture; we are all deaf-blind mutes in terms of the new situation. Our most impressive words and thoughts betray us by referring to the previously existent, not to the present.

The problem has been falsely seen as democracy *vs.* the mass media. But the mass media *are* democracy. The book itself was the first mechanical mass medium. What is really being asked, of course, is: can books' monopoly of knowledge survive the challenge of the new languages? The answer is, no. What should be asked is: What can print do better than any other medium and is that worth doing?

SPANISH CATHOLICISM: A DOCUMENT

THE REFLECTIONS which follow are the work of a group of Catholics who should be suspected neither of revolt, nor of insubordination, nor of irresponsibility, but who are rather trying honestly to understand the very complex religious and social situation in their native land. This situation is not only complex; it is also somewhat confused, and that is why we believe it well worth while to make some effort toward clarification. In making such an effort, we make no pretense to infallibility; we are simply stating our sincere, thoughtful convictions. Others may think differently than we; we do not deny them the right to say so.

It is our desire that these reflections be an act of charity on our part. It is charity which moves us to speak, the charity which "does not exalt itself, which exults, not in injustices, but in truth." And it is that same charity which makes us ask, even demand, that an attempt be made to refute us, that our theses be discussed, but not, in God's name, that we be insulted. It is time that Spanish Catholics stop wasting their

The following report has been prepared by a group of Spanish priests, workers, and professors. It was to have been presented at a congress of the lay apostolate in Spain last November, but the congress was postponed. The minor cuts that have been made follow along the lines made in the text as it appeared in ESPRIT, September 1957.

The report has the passionate sincerity—and violence—of a Manifesto, and its value is primarily documentary.

In their introduction, those signing the report emphasize that in a spirit of complete fidelity, they accept in advance any doctrinal rectification that the Hierarchy might recommend to them.

time in disputes, "in stupid quarrels, in bitter personal recriminations," as Menéndez Pelayo said back in 1889, and unite in a great effort of sincerity.

The religious condition of Spanish society, as it reveals itself in even a casual examination, constitutes the point of departure for our reflections. This is not the first time that this sort of analysis has been undertaken, and we feel sure that all of those who are interested in this situation will agree with us in calling the situation extremely grave and disturbing. In fact, we are confronted with a society, Catholic in name, whose religious dimension is atrophying, a society which sees each day a little more of its Catholicism draining away. The symptoms of this decadence are numerous, and frequently even conspicuous.

Among the populace this dechristianization betrays itself in religious indifference: a veritable apostasy, already more than thirty years old, among the working class; a massive abandonment, through negligence and ignorance, where the peasants are concerned. External observances, recourse to the sacraments, baptism and marriage, constitute nothing more than an external link to the religious life for a great many people.

As for the bourgeoisie, they are frivolous and apathetic. Concerned neither with authenticity nor religious deepening, they have abandoned themselves to the complacent and inelegant enjoyment of worldly comfort. This class is interested neither in social justice nor in the amelioration of the lot of the people. It lives in a state of luxury at once unjustifiable and insulting; its increasing immorality is developing into hypocrisy; its egoism is brutal and uncivilized.

Catholic intellectuals have hardly any influence among either the populace or the bourgeoisie. These intellectuals seem to be dominated by mediocrity and distrust, which explains why two thirds of this new generation of intellectuals have deserted the Catholic camp. The organizations concerned with the lay apostolate, small and inactive, ridiculous and contemptible in so far as they lack energy and drive, are absolutely powerless. They exist angelically, quite indifferent to social needs and problems.

To complete this schematic and frightful picture, account must be taken of our national malady, the lack of professional integrity, a lack which is total, chronic and universal, a lack which is readily admitted without any sense of shame. Mention must be made, furthermore, of the hopelessness of a nation whose youth is disillusioned, grown old before its time, lacking in enthusiasm for either professional work or public action, and, what is much more serious, devoid of enthusiasm for love as well as for sin.

His Excellency the Archbishop of Saragossa, who must be reckoned as an authoritative voice, has styled our Catholicism as "bourgeois Catholicism." Superficial minds may see in that description nothing more than a commonplace. We are going to demonstrate that this word still retains a very exact meaning.

A bourgeois Catholicism is a Catholicism with the limitations of a structure determined by society, of a bourgeois structure. Bourgeois society has represented a necessary phase in the development of the peoples of the West. But after having exalted the fundamental rights of the individual, the bourgeoisie of the economic domain was transformed into an exclusive possession of all the domains of the social life, including that of religion. The bourgeoisie succeeded ultimately in driving out from

the society which it had created and "informed" all of the non-bourgeois classes. We note in passing the fatal contradiction which lies at the heart of this type of society: all participation in the social life is rendered impossible for a great number of individuals; and this is done precisely in the name of a hypocritical affirmation of the rights of the individual.

AND IF WE ARE NOT convinced that bourgeois society is dead, recall the words spoken in a private conversation by one of the most farsighted men of our times, Pius XII:

The bourgeoisie and liberalism are children of the eighteenth century, children who grew up and became adults in the nineteenth century, only to grow old and die in the twentieth. I myself have seen them die in Germany. And since then, since 1933, it might be said that the European people are making haste to seal their tombs.

From the very first it has been impossible to assimilate the Spanish bourgeoisie into the other bourgeois societies of the West. While the European bourgeoisie has formed modern Europe, for better or for worse, the Spanish bourgeoisie has done its best not to succeed in forging a modern Spain, something which was, after all, possible. Undoubtedly, it did avoid certain fundamental errors committed by the European bourgeoisie. For example, we cannot speak of a Spanish "naturalism," even though a naturalist thought and ethos are considered as "constants" in European modernity. On the other hand, our bourgeoisie has been deficient in almost all of the virtues which have characterized European bourgeoisie, in particular, that which stands at the head of all the others: intelligence.

Within the domain of the movement of ideas, especially of social ideas, an

elementary diagram would show us a Spain divided into two enormous blocs, each confronting the other: the bourgeoisie and the people. The latter, in those ever-increasing sectors where industrialization had brought a state of mass existence, torn away from its secular and unconscious condition of abandonment, began to perceive its own insecurity at the same time that it was learning to resent the oppressive bourgeoisie. All of the excesses and violence which burst forth in 1936 were, therefore, only the inevitable consequences of sustained injustice. The influence of certain social doctrines and of divers political meddlers hastened the evolution, altered its meaning and finally provoked the unbridled fury that we have witnessed.

But the bourgeoisie was totally incapable of understanding that, in this unbridled violence, there was much more rationality than there was madness. Completely ignorant of the people's genuine distress and its significance, restricting themselves to complaints about civil disorders (which they always explained away as certain more or less mysterious orders stemming from subversive forces), the bourgeoisie, it must be recognized, never did perceive the true causes underlying the situation, and never saw in it anything more than a problem concerning public order, whose solution lay in resorting to the Civil Guard.

We are not seeking to determine how far the bourgeoisie has the right to defend, against the disorder and the violence of the masses, its own bourgeois order, which in reality, because it is unjust, is nothing more than a disorder without violence. But there comes necessarily a moment at which revolution attacks values which are not merely bourgeois, but radically human. It is only then that the bourgeoisie has any right to defend itself. The bourgeoisie

turns such an opportunity to its own advantage with all the more haste in that it senses obscurely that this is its only chance to cause its excesses to be obliterated and forgotten.

We might say, schematically, that the bourgeoisie finds its basis of support in a triple affirmation: the affirmation of property as the economic dimension of the individual; culture as the free development of the individual; and the affirmation of religion as the relationship between the individual and God. But these three principles are not specifically bourgeois. They become such only through the fault or imperfection of the bourgeoisie, which makes exclusive and unjust use of them, and forgets their social content.

Now when revolutionary violence is directed against these principles, it is attacking the use to which they are put as well as the principles themselves; their appropriation by the bourgeoisie and, alas, their very existence. Naturally the bourgeoisie—like other men—have the right, and even the duty, to defend these principles. But not their bourgeois interpretation. The bourgeoisie may and should defend these principles, but not their exclusive possession of them, which is unjust. Let us put it even more plainly: the members of the bourgeoisie have the right to defend these principles, but not to defend the bourgeoisie, which, historically, has become a thing of injustice.

But the bourgeoisie does not concern itself about understanding all these things. It identifies its own cause with that of these principles. It knows that this identification is its only chance of survival. If it succeeds, after identifying its cause with God's, it will maintain that it is these three principles which have conquered. They have already made this identification, at the time of the Civil War. And moreover, far from

being victorious, God and the human person were beaten, doubly: in the case of the bourgeoisie, by the victory of exclusivism; and as far as the revolutionaries were concerned, by the defeat of those just aspirations which, although always fused with violence, the whole movement of social revolt contained within itself. We can now understand the immense interest which the bourgeoisie took in identifying its cause with God; that permitted it to confiscate the victory for its own benefit, and to preserve an inalterably good conscience to boot.

We affirm that such was indeed the social significance of the civil war: a victory for the bourgeoisie.

In order to have avoided the bloody crisis of 1936 a truly revolutionary movement would have had to intervene between the bourgeoisie and the masses—a movement which rejected simultaneously the individualistic exclusivism of the bourgeoisie and which affirmed the fundamental value of the individual. Such a movement never did come to the fore. Alongside of the group comprised of those who were ardently fighting for a better Spain, there was another much vaster group of those who were fighting for “their” Spain, the one which had always existed. All of these aspirations became blurred, at times, in the heat of combat, so much so that all sides, with sincerity, were able to look upon themselves as heroes. Numerous, much more numerous in fact than one might have thought at first, were those Spaniards who emerged from the purgative flame no different from when they had entered it. What we might call the bourgeois mind revealed itself to be one of the most intractable of materials. The Spanish bourgeoisie, which before the war was modest enough, even somewhat discreditable, was transformed into a powerful unyielding, capitalistic bour-

geoisie, with the mentality of an exasperated class. It constitutes the major obstacle to any attempt at reform.

The civil war has not essentially altered the terms of the Spanish social situation. It has resulted in nothing more than the confirmation of bourgeois society.

Of course, the existence of a Catholic state is a positive element, which opens to the Church and to a Catholic society possibilities for religious and social action such as had never before existed. Furthermore, it is a matter of fact that very rapidly many initiatives of all kinds were turned to advantage, whether coming from the State, or from various religious and private institutions. It is not a question of casting doubt upon either their worth or their effectiveness, both of which are often quite remarkable. It is clear, however, that such initiative was arrested in its development by an insurmountable barrier—the immovability of the bourgeoisie, a barrier against which any projects for a basic modification of the society stumbled and fell. Such obduracy is first of all the product of a social and economic structure which is excessively bourgeois and capitalistic. During these past twenty years capital holdings have unceasingly been increasing in strength, to a point that no one ever dreamed possible of achievement. But this immobility we have been discussing is also the fruit of a bourgeois mentality, of an all-encompassing conservatism which seems to have taken possession of every vital area of our national life. For a capitalistic structure and a conservative mentality are both characterized by their exclusivism. And both reign supreme over all forms of societal life, including that of religion.

The “crusading” spirit, the military triumph interpreted as a “judgment of God,”—as proof that God approved

everything that we did—(it is not within our province to decide whether the outcome of the war and the victory were providential; it is the totality of History which is providential), all this created a climate, absolutely impervious to any notion that there existed possibilities for improvement. In this atmosphere fundamental values united with the extreme forms of conservatism in an appalling defensive alliance, and became identified in a common cause. The consequences can now be discerned; in particular, one can see with what haste all those who had an uneasy conscience began to exploit the affair.

Immobility and complacency are both sins against life. When they become the law of a society, they render inevitable a revolt of "movement." That is why one can say that there are two Spains confronting one another: the official Spain and the living Spain. The more fossilized the bourgeoisie becomes, the more does the living Spain detach itself from all that it represents, including, unfortunately, certain things of real value.

Before going any further it might be useful, in order to avoid misunderstanding, to state precisely some few points.

In the first place, the reader should beware of interpreting the bourgeoisie-masses, official Spain-living Spain pairings as so many static concepts or as classes. Besides, the fact that the bourgeoisie and the official Spain on the one hand, and the people and living Spain on the other, have fused and become absorbed into one, should suffice to show that we are not defining classes but attitudes, not static concepts but dynamic realities. The living Spain as well as the official Spain has representatives in every social milieu. It is a question of sensibility.

In the second place, our official Spain vs. living Spain distinction must not be

absorbed into what has been called the theory of the two Spains. Our analysis has for its focus the social plane, leaving to one side the political, intellectual and religious aspects of the problem. God keep us from ever thinking that one could, in reality, ever separate these planes; but may God keep us too from confusing them, for they are clearly distinct. And it is that which enables us to distinguish within the living, trembling Spain certain attitudes of varying worth. That a Spain called living is opposed to a Spain called official (because it pretends to be such) does not mean that the first is of one mind. If the official Spain presents itself as a perfectly closed system of identifications—a religious confession linked to a political regime, an economic structure justified by the religious confession, etc.—it is evident that those who question certain elements of the system, and also those who question only the identification which the system establishes among its diverse elements, are to be found in the "other" Spain, which is necessarily defined in terms of opposition to the first.

It is thus that we see being born in this Spain which is real, confused, restless and, in some quarters, somewhat disturbed, something which is capable of becoming the authentic "third force," the only one capable of taking charge of the social totality which the protagonists of our recent history have never adequately represented. This nascent force is a Catholicism which is anxious, awaiting; neither clerical nor anti-clerical, but rather "ecclesial" and ecclesiastic, a Catholicism socially aware, radically social, social right down to its very marrow, fraternally preoccupied with everything that concerns the human and supernatural destiny of those who suffer and who are degraded. A Catholicism which includes a new patriotism, harsh and sincere, a Catholicism which con-

siders itself totally alien to all the identifications which the official Spain has made in the course of its history.

In fact, the appearance of many small groups of priests and laymen professing a faith assiduously purified of any intellectual or social deformity, a faith exemplarily lived in all of its spiritual and apostolic exigencies is one of the most promising manifestations of our religious experience since the war. Before the civil war the typical Spanish Catholic fashioned his religious thought in political combat rather than as a result of a vital and applied reflection on the doctrine and spirit of the Church. The new type of Catholic is characterized by his concern for a serious intellectual formation, by his critical examination of the deplorable identification of Catholicism with the national tradition, by his interest in Catholicism in other countries, by his spiritual rapprochement with the people, and finally by his absolute determination to live the authentic life of Catholicism in all of its original purity, in accord with the repeated directives of the recent Popes.

This new form of religious life is not only the reality in circles which are more or less intellectual. It is springing up everywhere: among the youth, among the workers and even among peasants in the most remote villages. Frequently they are not very clear as to what they really want; but on the other hand they know very well what they do not want, what no longer pleases them since it no longer "convinces" them. It is the mediocrity and the shabbiness of the established order which makes them long for another destiny for Spain. It will be enough to present to them a design with grand ideas for a better world, one which is truly just, one which is neither socialist, nor liberal, nor bourgeois, one which is simply Christian, in order to have them accept it with enthusiasm.

We must recognize that the appearance of this state of mind within the Catholicism of our country has not been particularly well received by "Catholic" Spain. And, as is habitual among us, the criticisms which have been directed toward Spanish Catholicism, focusing on its mediocre intellectual standards, its contamination by the bourgeois spirit, its narrowness, have been denounced—without any declaration or warning from the hierarchy—as dangerous and even heretical deviations. More Catholic than the Pope—once again we see how accurate and appropriate is this phrase—our legions of "enthusiasts for daily excommunication"—another very fitting expression—are hastening to form themselves into a strange and frequently very picturesque patriotic-Catholic-bourgeois front against the courageous attempts at a religious renewal being made by Catholics of this new spirit. Because these latter have been upholding, without restriction, the social doctrine of the Church, they have been called Marxists, communists or fellow-travelers. Because they are aware of the vital necessity for Spain to assimilate modern thought and are consequently studying this thought, they have been denounced as leaning toward heresy. Because they are exercising the religious independence (the "*christliche Selbstkritik*") personally recommended by Pius XII, they have been denounced as pessimists and subversives. To date those doing all of this denouncing have never been able to demonstrate the least doctrinal error, nor even the slightest risk of error.

For some years now we have been witnessing this strange attempt at a definition of Catholic orthodoxy, one to which the hierarchy has remained aloof, an attempt being made by people who are, in the best cases, as well-intentioned as they are badly orientated. Such people are attempting to consolidate their

social positions and to reenforce their intellectual simplism and sentimental patriotism by invoking a Catholic orthodoxy which, in reality, has nothing to do with their Catholicism. Certain other analagous attempts have recently been denounced by the hierarchy in certain countries, particularly in France. We have in these cases nothing more than contemporary manifestations of a permanent tendency known as integralism. And there is one thing that the integralist will never understand, unless he ceases to exist: and that is that Catholicism is sufficiently vast, as Menendez Pelayo said, for all of us to be at home in it.

WE HAVE ATTEMPTED up till now to remain within the "natural" domain of history and sociology. These things we have been decrying could have been pointed out by anyone, including an atheist. (In fact, the spectacle is even more provoking and scandalous for one who looks upon it from the outside.) But we are Christians, and this rapid summary of profound questions cannot really satisfy us. How can we Catholics express the unbelievable scandal of a society which styles itself Catholic and which designates as an odious, anti-Spanish plot anything which differs from it; a society which is constantly strengthening its own position and which is daily suppressing the liberties of others; which has created and developed a climate of suspicion by hurling insults and furious accusations against all who stand in its way, whether they be outstanding Spanish Catholics, Catholic personalities or movements outside of Spain, an organization promoting the apostolate, even an archbishop?

In short, what would be our reaction as Catholics to this frenzy of inviolability which seems to have taken possession of our traditional Catholicism in every area of reality—social, intellectual, poli-

tical, economic, and especially in that area concerned with the relations among the various classes of society?

It is our belief that these features of our Spanish Catholicism find their origin in a phenomenon of collective pride, the true name for which is "presumption." The Spanish people have succumbed to the temptation which lies in wait for every man, that of accommodating religion to his needs, instead of transforming himself in order to satisfy the exigencies of religion. But all religion, once reduced to the measure of man, becomes idolatry. And we Spaniards have become idolaters. We have been brought up in the adoration of our religious history, reared in the conviction that God simply has to recognize enormous merits in us. The Spanish have been given the mentality of a chosen people.

Furthermore, this presumption that we are discussing is clearly and directly opposed to the virtue of Hope. Is it an exaggeration to say that at the very depths of our collective mentality there is a greater hope in Spanish Catholicism than in the Catholic Church? It seems clear to us that a great number of our compatriots continue to think that Catholicism would be compromised the moment it lost the support of the bourgeois order, and that—to make use of an expression still far from archaic—the throne is the basic prop for the altar. There is a lack of Faith and of Hope in Christ, in the Church, the Mystical Body of Christ and the living Christ, in the functions of the Holy Spirit.

Naturally, presumption causes man to lose his humility, to lose his awareness of what he really is, to lose a consciousness of sin, of his miserable condition. The proud conscience turns away from itself and then from all reality. It is sure of its own perfection; perfection as an interior exigency has disappeared.

This attitude of conscience, when translated into terms of reality, implies the most violent contradictions. In effect, the social realities which are the projection of all these vices and impurities have been given the same value as the authentically virtuous realities. Such a situation can only result in a scandal with incalculable social consequences. It is such a scandal that we are presently witnessing in Spain. And it is not easy to render an account of the gravity of such a situation. We might say that the more exclusive and sealed off is the system of identifications, the more "ardent" the integralism, the more violent will be the reaction of those who see this scandal. But also as the protest becomes more violent, the Judaic conviction that it is defending the cause of God will be strengthened. The evolution is not terminated, the list of sins is not complete. Justice and charity are being increasingly mistreated. Such prospects are enough to make one's head swim.

THE EXAMINATION of conscience is finished. Let us now seek out ways for amending this situation. In the words of the Holy Father, "It is the whole world, even in its foundations, that must be rebuilt." If these words mean anything they mean a completely new beginning, the reconstruction of the world on new bases. And how could it be otherwise, since bourgeois society has imposed its structure on all domains, on social and economic relationships, on the political mechanism, on our modes of thought and even on man's attitude toward God?

Therefore, in place of a social structure which makes money the supreme value, we must substitute a social order in which money resumes once more the function assigned to it by Christian theology, that of means. Pius XII, and in

Spain itself the present archbishop of Saragossa, have already well defined the general lines of this new order. There are those who will pretend that we are utopians. But the economists will answer that capitalism has not always existed, and that the transformation of the present economic regime is not only a possibility but a necessity, and that this transformation is inevitable. The only problem is in knowing whether we shall impose the new order or whether the new order shall be imposed on us. It is not a question of suppressing capital or organized industrial planning, but rather of destroying the present mode of absolute, inhuman domination, and of organizing differently the economic forces and the sources of production. That is the mission of Christian economists. It is up to them to speak out, and if they do not then we shall have the right to doubt their Christianity.

To take one example, we have but to think of that monstrous system of legalized usury which our banks constitute, and ask ourselves the question: where is this extraordinary, day by day, completely excessive expansion leading? Let us remember that these banks are directed by Catholics, sometimes by eminent Catholics. As for the means of transformation that we favor, it is for the economists to define them. Two things, however, are basic: the redistribution of the national income and the reduction of profits. The regulation of salaries is but a temporary and dishonest expedient. When the abuses of capitalism are each day becoming more flagrant, it requires a certain cynicism to come out in favor of day-to-day remedies.

But the transformation of the bourgeois capitalist structure will be possible only on the condition that the first object of attack be the bourgeois mind, which has penetrated Spanish society right down to its very bones and which

is responsible for the egotistical individualism of our compatriots. This fight against the bourgeois mind poses a problem for education. But our whole educational structure, including religious and moral instruction, is bourgeois. We must, therefore, undertake a revision of our pedagogical methods. The desertion of youth is a phenomenon which everyone can see. And this desertion is taking place in spite of the complete disappearance of the sectarianism of former times; and finally, in spite of the general air of discipline in some domains, particularly the intellectual, a discipline suggestive of that to be found in a student dormitory. But this whole machinery of surveillance set up by our authorities over the vast field of culture does not prevent the young people from straying.

What then is the situation? Of course, those whom nothing ever disturbs have recourse to the eternal, reassuring explanations: pride, the senses... in a word, the enemies of the soul. And the enemies of the soul are just as effectively real today as they have been in the past. And they are even more active because, among other reasons, the bourgeois structure of society strengthens them, and because, as far as the youth are concerned, bourgeois education and instruction, which share in the reigning mentality, are for that very reason incapable of combatting or of neutralizing these enemies. The attraction of evil forces is growing because that of Christian life is waning, because the Christianity transmitted to youth is degraded, inert Christianity, from which grace and passion are absent. The whole education of youth, including religious education, is corrupted by individualism and class consciousness. But if such a Christianity is always defective, in the present circumstances it is absolutely intolerable: individualism has now yielded all of its fruits, it is exhausted. The young peo-

ple have behind them a world in revolt, and ahead of them the prospect of chaos. To restore hope to them, we will have to offer them an ideal concerned with the common weal. Only a truly Christian education, focused entirely on one's fellow man, will be able to reanimate this generation. If we should fail, it is the revolution which will give them their social ideal.

Our apostolic task cannot remain outside of and apart from this process of revision. The decay of our organizations devoted to the lay apostolate is an evident fact. The absence of contact with reality, and, as a consequence, the "exercising" of the apostolate only in safe territory, have weakened these groups and threaten to completely nullify them.

It is, therefore, urgent that the leaders of the lay apostolate be endowed with a solid spirituality and with a program of social action which would be the simple utilization of that radical "demagogy" which Christianity includes within itself. But it is not surprising that "demagogy" should frighten our lay apostolate groups, since the majority of them are directed by opulent and convinced bourgeois. And to transform the methods of the apostolate it will be necessary to transform the directors.

Finally, we earnestly desire the elimination of the bourgeois spirit in the ecclesiastical structure, behavior and methods of our hierarchical Church. We are not in the habit of dealing with these subjects. Since they are considered delicate and dangerous, certain taboos have been erected about them. The Christian, however, must be able to distinguish clearly what in the Church of Christ is divine, sacred and, happily, inaccessible to our sinful hands, and that which is human and which, consequently, can decay and be transformed. Well, there is nothing to keep our priests from being bourgeois when the society in which

they are born, raised and now live is bourgeois. There was a time when a bourgeois could have been a saint, just as it was possible for a Roman, a feudal lord, a Renaissance knight or man of letters to be a saint. But when a type of social life becomes incompatible with all possible types of the Christian life, the demands of religion require that this type of life be abandoned. Nor is it seemly that persons consecrated to the service of the Church should be the last to abandon it. Consequently, it is our belief that we have got to rid ourselves of that public deportment (and by that we mean our "official" bearing), any sort of behavior which could be taken as the signs of connivance with the bourgeois powers, with the banks or with industry. It would be a good thing, on the other hand, if the Church should seek to base itself once more on the faithful, on society, upon the members of society, (who after all are the Sons of the Church), rather than upon "societies." It seems to us that any other course of action would give rise to a series of compromises that could hardly be called edifying, and from which we desire with all our hearts to see our Hierarchy delivered. These compromises explain the positive fear that many priests have of communicating to the faithful the social doctrine of the Church, and in particular the recent documents emanating from the Holy See or from the Spanish Bishops, such as, for example, the joint statement of the Bishops. No one is today put into prison for repeating literally the official doctrine of the Church, and this is the extent of the "demagogy" for which priests can be reproached. It is simply that the fear of affronting an unjust bourgeoisie and a dechristianized society goes hand in hand with a bourgeois mentality, which in turn prevents one from seeing things clearly.

It is absolutely indispensable that our priests be convinced that Christianity begins with this approach. It has always been thus, but today more than ever. Our priests must come to realize that their entire apostolic work, their human worth and their personal sanctity will be as nothing so long as the people continue to think that Christianity was founded to be of practical usefulness to them and an instrument of reaping profits for others. Our clergy must be convinced that it is absurd to pretend that the love of God could signify anything more than an affront for all those who are suffering and who are humiliated, so long as a society which calls itself Christian and never ceases to proclaim its Christianity, does not practice a love for men. Our Catholicism is visibly losing ground because it refuses to declare itself in terms of justice and charity. Our Church must take these things into account before it is too late.

ALL OF THE PRECEDING shows us that we must reexamine our ideas. Up until the present, Spanish Catholicism, smothered in mediocrity and in propriety, has stood firm against all efforts at reflection and attempts to return to the permanent reality of the Church. In the last half century the intellectual behavior of our Catholics has been such that the best minds, those endowed with the higher human qualities, have not been able to breathe among us. We do not know the part that personal decision plays in a person's abandoning the Church. Yet it is not strange that in the first half of this century (to say nothing of the preceding century) a Catholic society, a Catholic nation, should see its most powerful minds turning against it. France, Germany, those countries in which religion is contested, are able to present for the same period, in the presence of a non-Christian culture,

a brilliant array of eminent, exemplary, sometimes exceptional men, men who invite comparison with those not of the faith. Not so in Spain. Is not this a formidable indictment of our traditional obscurantism?

Our Catholic hierarchy must assent to a pastorate of intellectual courage. We need to recognize that in this half century in Spain, so far as any intellectual output of value is concerned, Catholics have contributed nothing, and that the Spanish people have contributed nothing insofar as the valuable work of European Catholicism is concerned. We would gladly welcome any exceptions that one might point out to us. Insofar as we are Catholics, we are convinced that this renewal is not only an historical necessity, but a supernatural necessity.

It is this double imperative, supernatural and historical, which has moved our fraternal group of priests and laymen to hurl this stone into the morass of Spanish life, at the risk of having it scooped up and flung back at our heads, instead of adding it to materials for a new edifice. These pages might appear to be harsh and pitiless. We are not, however, defeatists. It is because we love Spain and believe in its Christian possibilities, it is because we believe in a destiny for Spain, and not merely in its rhetorical affirmation—it is for these reasons that we have taken upon ourselves this task of sincerity and of severity. We judge ourselves to be no better or worse than others. We pretend to no magic formula for a brilliant future, one which

would be assured us without any struggle. We simply believe that the march of time, which separates men and distinguishes generations, the difference in the historical situation, has caused us to see things differently. Many things have come to an end. Some were good at a given moment, others were always evil. They are today equally insupportable.

We ask of this world of yesterday that it not obstruct the approach of Christ and His Church to the men of today. And if this world of yesterday calls itself Catholic, then our prayer is even more urgent. In the name of God let not our Catholicism thwart the development of the Catholicism of today and of tomorrow, the only one possible. We have no wish to see the Spanish tragedy repeated. We have no wish to see our brethren identifying injustice and stupidity with Faith in Christ and in His Church, and abandoning an uninhabitable world in which they feel there is nothing to be done. Unfortunately for all, they did not discover in time that if one must put up with the mediocrity of Christians, the necessity for humility does not mean that one has to be stupid.

As for us, we affirm our unwavering decision to remain faithful to the Holy Church of God and of His Son, Jesus Christ, the Church which is Catholic, apostolic and Roman. But we affirm as well our decision, as unwavering as the first, to live and to die outside of that Spanish Catholicism, which, it seems to us, is stricken unto death.

Translated by JAMES J. GREENE

THE SITUATION OF THE EVANGELICAL CHURCH IN EAST GERMANY

GUENTER JACOB

YOU CANNOT HAVE a precise idea of the present situation of the Evangelical Church in East Germany if you are unaware of its over-all history during the last few decades. In fact, even the oldest group of church members, who are the backbone of today's participants, grew up during the period of the Empire and of Weimar. Even if, after 1918, there was no longer in Prussia a monarch who was officially "head of the Church," his disappearance did not yet bring about a profound transformation in the consciousness of the Evangelical Church. Supported by the bourgeoisie, the peasantry, and the nobility, which still dominated the political, economic and cultural life of the State, the Church, even after the revolution, continued to play the part of a national Church endowed with political privileges. The weight of both tradition and numbers contributed to this attitude.

Günter Jacob, one of the confessional pastors who were imprisoned under Hitler, has since 1946 been General Superintendent of the Evangelical Church from Neumark to Niederlausitz. In 1953 he was given an honorary doctorate in the theological faculty of the University of Tübingen.

He is the author of DIE VERSUCHUNG DER KIRCHE—THEOLOGISCHE BEITRÄGE DER JAHRE 1933-44 (1946); DER TÄGLICHE GOTTESDIENST (1948); DAS LICHT SCHEINT IN DER FINSTERNIS (1954); HEUTE, SO IHR SEINE STIMME HOERET—PREDIGTEN (1956).

His article appeared in a special issue of DOKUMENTE, June 1957, devoted to European Protestantism.

There was no longer an alliance of throne and altar at the summit of State power, but in the rural communes, the noble of the castle remained no less the patron of the village church. In spite of the anti-religious polemic waged by the radical writers of the left, the climate of an inherited Christendom, heir of the medieval *corpus christianum*, was maintained in those social strata which had been accustomed since the Reformation to submit to Christianity as the ideology monopolized by political authority.

This traditional Christianity that remained intact after 1918 was a mixture of a bourgeois nationalistic spirit and evangelical attitudes understood in an idealistic sense. This is what explains the gulf that grew up between the conservative Christian groups, in which the Church still maintained positions that seemed to be almost automatic, and the workingman's world which constituted the political left, and which the Christians pharisaically reproached for lacking faith in God and reverence for the fatherland. The fiction of a "Christian country" persisted. Membership in the Church through infant baptism continued to be "normal." Members of the Church were under no obligation to constitute themselves as a Christian community distinct from the civil society which had long ago been secularized and dechristianized. They were still able to feel satisfied with a pious observance of Sunday; they did not think it necessary to form a genuinely adult community of Jesus Christ in the *diaspora* situation which is proper to the Church in the world. In this way the Church re-

remained essentially an institutional Church supported by the State, in spite of its neutrality in principle. A privileged factor in culture and education and the instrument of charitable assistance, the Church was above all the institution concerned with liturgical worship, religious instruction, and the care of souls. Its function was also to give a high tone to patriotic holidays and to consolidate the national spirit at the level of a religious ethics. The "Christian" climate reigned everywhere, and the organization of the Church, with the support of the State, remained solid. But this facade did not succeed in hiding the fragility of the structure. Certainly the cult of national values guaranteed a certain vitality to the Church, but it was a strange sort of vitality.

We were then still under the influence of the period of Wilhelm in which a sort of historic right made the Church the administrator of a millennial cultural heritage. For the most part, Christianity was quite simply the "metaphysics" proper to our country. The acceptance of Christianity went hand in hand with civic loyalty. The presence of pietist currents during this period does not invalidate this over-all picture in any essential sense.

WHEN WE LOOK BACK today on the Third Reich, we are often tempted to exaggerate the struggles which the "Confessional" Church had to undergo.

In fact, until the beginning of World War II, the National Socialist government was skilful enough to camouflage its lust for power and violence by means of "German Christian" slogans. Thus, after the first stage of enthusiasm, Christians had the possibility of adopting a position of neutrality so that nothing essential was changed in the life of the Church. In addition we must not

forget that during the twelve years (1933-45) neither the economic structure nor property relations were fundamentally modified. The material basis of the bourgeois and rural areas—those most friendly to the Church—was not yet penetrated.

It was only among the young that the Nazi anti-religious propaganda led to fundamental ruptures, made in the name of faith in Jesus Christ and his Church. The pastors of the "Confessional" Church were only a minority, principally young pastors serving in rural communities. Certainly, their resistance was not simply a defense reaction in the name of an imaginary "Christian people." To everyone's surprise, it was the fruit of an interior reform which grew out of the intense theological revival after the first World War, whose effects were shown in a struggle with the totalitarian State. The "Theological Declaration" of Barmen (1934) is the key document in which the signers witness to the lordship of Jesus Christ and reject all purely natural knowledge of God. It is the testimony of an evangelical teaching which has been purified of the lukewarmness of liberalism as well as the rigors of orthodoxy.

A preaching which fed directly on the sources of the biblical message, shocking both the representatives of hostile ideologies and the traditional churchgoer, here and there gave rise to a spiritual renewal in the midst of great trials. The "Confessional" Church rediscovered what was unique in Christian life in the midst of a world which was either indifferent or hostile to Christianity, and all this was completely new compared to the tradition of a national Church, or in comparison with the old climate of collective Christianity. It is not by chance that there developed at that time an authentic lay movement. Within the national Church bureau-

crazy, neutral in respect to the State, there began to emerge the kernels of small communities which nourished their existence by denouncing the pseudo-Christian vocabulary of those in power, as well as their ecclesiastical collaborators. This gave birth to the movement of a Church, in fidelity to Scripture and its profession of faith, and in obedience to its Lord, which by contradicting political powers and public opinion, follows Christ on the painful and disgraceful path of persecution, even into prison and the concentration camp. It is in this revival of the "Confessional" Church that the history of the Evangelical Church since 1945 is rooted.

Post-1945: a New Beginning

FROM THIS TIME ON, in the various Churches, responsibility was in the hands of Confessional churchmen who were marked by the theological revival and by the spiritual experience they had gained in their struggles with the Third Reich. Their obstinate resistance during Hitler's dictatorship made possible a new beginning after 1945, based on common opposition to Fascism, with relations of friendship and tolerance, whether with the Soviet occupying force—scrupulously correct in its attitude to the Church—or with the elder Communists who were now installed in the German administration. On July 31, 1945 the Synod of the Confessional Church which met at Berlin indicated to the pastors and the Christian communities what spiritual experiences ought to serve as the basis for a new beginning. "In the effort to arrive at a genuine knowledge of God and in the struggle for the exclusive lordship of Christ in his Church against attacks, whether from within or without, we have rediscovered the Word of God in all its profundity, particularly those pleas for re-

pentance and promises of salvation found in the Old Testament. We have the good fortune of possessing young theologians who are filled with the seriousness of their responsibility in the Church. The clear proclamation of the evangelical message has given birth to the creation of Confessional communities which, with their pastors and their old members, have suffered together during twelve years of struggle. They have experienced together the meaning of a common life as a community of Jesus Christ. In many communities, the liturgy has again become the center of existence. They have rediscovered the meaning of Baptism and the Eucharist, and they have reformed their administration." These spiritual experiences have decisively determined the history of Evangelical Christianity in the East German Republic since 1945.

Obviously in the first years after 1945, the activity of the Church proper was relegated to the second place because of the urgency of the most elementary needs of a population undergoing hunger, cold and destitution. Everywhere the poor were at the gates. This was the blessed hour of spontaneous action of mutual help carried out by the Christian community, itself completely impoverished. The unforgettable symbol of this period is the "basket of bread and charity," which was filled during services with bits of bread and potatoes that one had been able to save.

In the declarations of Synods and in the conversations of pastors with mayors and political officials, or with the representatives of the occupying forces, the Church soon appeared as the advocate of all those whose rights had been denied, and finally of all who had been persecuted. In that spirit of freedom which only the Gospel of Jesus Christ can grant us in the midst of dangers, the pastors and bishops took up the defense

of all—without exception—who were oppressed or reduced to silence.

In the name of the Gospel, they gave testimony of the dignity of man, which was endangered by the grave menaces which the political and economic evolution presented. Without anything that could be compared to political reaction, the Church, simply through fidelity to the biblical message, became conscious of its responsibilities for the renewal of the human community and committed itself to the service of justice and humanity.

Very soon also the Church pointed out dangerous symptoms which existed in certain forms of expropriation, the electoral system, the new school organization, judicial and penal methods, etc.³

From the beginning the Church resisted the temptation to restrict itself to purely internal affairs and to remain content with representing publicly merely the interests of the Church. From the beginning, too, it placed itself in opposition to lying, hate propaganda, and any form of constraint of conscience, even in politics. Despite threats from representatives of the Party, the pastors displayed in this regard an unprecedented unanimity. Their words went to the heart of many oppressed men who were not practicing Christians. Many men then learned to see in the Church the place of truth and fraternity, the space of liberty. Although these words were uttered within the walls of Churches, the echoes of this testimony were also heard in fringe-areas, and even in places far removed from the Church. The historic failure of the Church in regard to the working class was partly expiated during those days, so that the message and the existence of the Church won the right to respect among masses who had long been dechristianized.

As ideological debates grew sharper,

the Church's position was taken with more insistence. It addressed itself endlessly to those who held power and tried to draw their attention to the needs of families divided by the partition of Germany, and to the dangers to peace which the weapons of mass destruction represent. In all this it has not played the role of "a Western bridge-head." It is in a sovereign independence that it has summoned up its powers and made its appeal heard: "Behold the man."

Even in every day preaching, the Word of God has still been addressed to men in the most relevant possible way, with a lively concern for apostolic responsibility. With men who are blown hither and yon by precise temptations, all routine rhetoric had to be eliminated; the biblical texts had to be interpreted so that all could see the meaning of faith in the sole Lordship of Jesus Christ, in the midst of a world which quite different powers claimed to possess, even in the most private areas of existence. For example it was necessary to say from the pulpit in what conditions the peasant in the government cooperative or the teacher in the materialist school was able to live as a Christian. In conformity with its essence and its origins, the Evangelical Church is one which interprets and which preaches the word of Holy Scripture. But there can only be correct preaching in terms of the particular historical situation in which men find themselves, to which the biblical message is proclaimed.

The Soviet Example

THE EXISTENCE of such a Church, in a world dominated by Communist ideology and submitted to the control of a party which aims to direct and control men's lives according to the absolute norms of its conception of life, inevitably produced problems similar to those which had been posed in the Sov-

iet Union in relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian State.

There the space allotted to the Church had been carefully marked out, like a local museum or a "national park." The theses of Soviet authors like O. Fiodorov (*Religion in the USSR*, Berlin, 1947), P. F. Kolonicki (*Communist Morality and Religious Morality*, Berlin, 1953), P. Paviolkin (*Religious Superstition and Its Bad Effects*, Berlin, 1954), and A. P. Gabarin, (*The Origin and Class Character of Christianity*, Berlin, 1955) are perfectly clear. The Christian faith is understood by them as "religious prejudice" or "religious feeling." Moreover, they do not deny to the individual the right to such prejudices or such sentiments in his private and family life. The Church is considered as the institution which should organize worship and ceremonies for the satisfaction of "religious needs," which among many men remain as a survival of the past. In theory they are against taking administrative measures against the Church, or of wounding the religious feelings of believers.

The resolution of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in November 1954, which spoke of "errors committed in the carrying out of atheistic scientific propaganda among the population," is particularly enlightening in this respect. The Soviet leaders indicate their absolute conviction that in the development of the revolutionary overthrow of society and the transformation of its economic underpinnings, the religious ideology, since it is non-scientific or superstitious, must automatically end by losing its material basis. In addition, they know and clearly state that religious manifestations can only be suppressed little by little, to the degree that the annihilation of the exploiting class is achieved, and a Communist society constructed. A patient effort of scien-

tific and atheistic education should contribute to the liberation of man from his "religious aberrations"; nevertheless, during this transitory period, the private religious opinions of citizens must be respected, on condition that they are politically loyal. The free exercise of religious worship is hence guaranteed.

Freedom of religion is understood here as the tolerance of private religious opinions and as freedom of worship. Recently there has been talk of "freedom of faith and conscience." A definition of this is given us in a 1955 article by F. Oletchuk, "What is freedom of conscience?" "Freedom of conscience," the author says, "does not only mean the freedom of belief. It is possible only if a full freedom for anti-religious propaganda is given to all citizens. In this our conception differs from the formal bourgeois conception of freedom of conscience." The problem of the Church, as well as that of any religious society, is considered here as a simple matter of the passing generations.

A Church which, by political submission, would agree to enclose itself within the cultural ghetto which is bestowed on it, and to renounce any reference to public life, is tolerated and respected. Its rites, its ceremonies, its doctrine and canon law, are not attacked as long as they remain within this carefully defined area. But the Church is not permitted to act outside this religious ghetto; a preaching which might have political implications is not allowed, nor is the teaching of youth, nor any social activity. It would seem that the Russian Orthodox Church, which always had been understood as an institution for worship, was able to accept the position which was recognized for it, and to avoid all major conflict with power. From the Evangelical point of view, however, it was necessary to ask ourselves if there was not a betrayal of the Church, both

in doctrine and practice, which had received from its Lord a universal mission.

In fact, in the preparation of the constitution of the DDR, the Soviet solution was not retained because in Germany, the Communist authorities had to deal with the Evangelical Church, totally oriented to the proclamation of the Word, traditionally active in political life. Because of this there are considerable differences between the provisions of the Soviet Constitution and the corresponding provisions of the Constitution of East Germany. Article 41, 2 of the latter recognizes "the right of religious communities to take a position from their own point of view on questions of vital concern for the country."

Nevertheless, an evolution has occurred in the following years, so that more and more there is a tendency to a religious policy modelled on the Russian example. When there is a case in conflict, and the Church appeals to the Constitutional provisions which are still in force, the answer is that the social process is always on the march and the Constitution is subordinate to it. All the conflicts of recent years have taken place in instances where measures were taken to define more carefully the space allotted to the life and activities of the Church, and progressively to restrict this area, e.g., by restricting the possibilities for an apostolate carried on in prisons and hospitals. The aim is little by little to shut up the Church in a ghetto, following the formula practiced in the USSR. In resisting this attempt, the Evangelical Church must not grow stiff in the positions of power it formerly occupied during the bourgeois era, but assume the full responsibility of its mission. That is why, even with the best will in the world, it is impossible to avoid tensions. We find a good example of this situation in the endless negotiations which deal with the obligation of

notifying the police, or with asking prior authorization for any ecclesiastical manifestation in places other than those restricted to worship.

The school, which all children are obliged to attend, is one of the most important areas of public life. But during these last years the school has become a real "parochial" school—of materialism. It is a fundamental axiom of Marxism-Leninism that all science is atheistic, and that consequently, all religious ideology has a non-scientific—and therefore superstitious—character. But today all the disciplines taught at the school have as their content a science understood in radically atheistic terms. An explanation of history from the origins of humanity is given, in complete conformity with dialectical and historical materialism. As for the teaching of natural history and anthropology, it too is based completely on atheism. Because of this there are endless difficulties for all Christian children, and for their parents. The Church has spoken out against the pressure which is placed on children in this way in the name of an ideology which camouflages itself as science, but its protests have remained fruitless. The Church has presented proposals for the creation of Christian schools according to the wishes of parents; they have been refused and are considered as shameful "reactionary" attacks in opposition to democratic school reform. In such a school as now exists, more concerned with a materialistic profession of faith than with teaching, we are far from seeing the "religious feelings" of the child respected.

The conflict reached the breaking-point in 1953. The Christian youth in secondary schools found themselves confronted with a fearful alternative: either to abandon the *Junge Gemeinde*, the Church's youth movement, or to resign themselves to leaving school, and

see the possibility of passing the baccalaureate and pursuing further studies closed to them. Publicly vilified in the newspapers, at school conferences, industrial meetings and in declarations of Free German Youth (FDJ), the *Junge Gemeinde* was described as "an undercover organization concerned with acts of provocation, sabotage, and spying in the service of the United States."

In spite of this, thousands of students resisted this massive attack, and following the example of Christ, did not flinch from the consequences of the testimony given by them to the Christian faith. This witness given by young Christians made a profound impression on a larger public. The ghetto in which it had been hoped the Church would be enclosed had burst.

The conflict ended June 10, 1953, with the retreat of the public authorities. The members of the *Junge Gemeinde* were re-integrated into the secondary schools and the universities. Since then they have not had any struggles as violent. But a constant policy of petty annoyances (refusal of admission to secondary school, difficulties in procuring the baccalaureate, or refusal of admission for higher studies—on the excuse of insufficient political and social activity) have begun to produce signs of fatigue among young Christians. This is accompanied by the decrease in their number, due to the departure of youth for the West.

In spite of this wearing experience, there are among Christian young people living cells of fraternal spirit, which are an example for those who are obliged to come to a decision regarding similar departures.

"The Consecration of Youth"
vs. Confirmation

IN THIS REGARD we must also speak of the propaganda carried on since 1954 concerning "the consecration of youth"

(*Jugendweihe*), supported by the authorities of both State and school. At first promoted by a private organization, the "Commission for the Consecration of East German Youth," in practice it is an instrument to reach children, in addition to the school and the FDJ, in order to indoctrinate them with atheism. Local commissions instituted for this purpose enjoy the support of the party, and even the machinery of the State. They distribute leaflets and send teachers and functionaries from door to door to promote the movement.

There has been constant insistence on the compatibility of this "consecration" and Confirmation. On the contrary, the Church has responded that a choice has to be made between this "consecration" and Confirmation. For this it has been attacked for "medieval intolerance," and it has been accused of attacking freedom of conscience as guaranteed by the Constitution.

The promise, an integral part of the consecration, contains a profession of faith in "the construction of socialism," and "the progress of science." The experience of the last ten years makes it necessary to understand these experiences in terms of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. That is why the Church has not hesitated to judge that participation in this "consecration of youth" would exclude someone from confirmation.

Up to now there have been very few lapses among those confirmed. Nevertheless, the motives offered by parents and children for refusing the consecration of youth were often arguments which only concerned the solemn feast which confirmation had always been in the National Church. Since these ideas were far removed from the true meaning of confirmation, these motives are insufficient for such a serious rejection of State pressure; we must then fear further defections in the future. Funda-

mental splits are here, too, working to some culminating point, for in opposition to conceptions which were prevalent during the time of the National Church, there is today a tendency to restore to confirmation its full significance, which is that of being the young Christian's profession of faith. Parents who are spiritually indifferent will end by giving in. They will not even hesitate to desert the Church in order to avoid the heavy consequences of refusing the pressure for this state-sponsored consecration of youth. But for one who considers things from a spiritual point of view, this growing desertion will not be able to mask the interior regeneration which is being accomplished in the Church. At the very moment in which the National Church is crumbling, the Confessional Church continues to develop and progress.

Faced with an ideological propaganda which is carefully organized both in the school and in the FDJ, the structure of the religious teaching, which is given by the Church for one hour a week, is particularly disturbing. A great deal of dissatisfaction and much irregularity has been noticed in the attendance at this teaching. In the villages, almost all the children are still reached, except in a few "pilot-villages" where the political and economic transformation is already far advanced. In the large cities, on the other hand, the percentage of children reached by the religious teaching falls to 50 or 60%. The intense propaganda which is carried on for the consecration of youth succeeds in convincing children that their professional future or admission to secondary teaching depends on this "consecration." For some time, a large number of children give up their attendance at religious teaching after the lowest grades, with the argument that they intend to take part in the "consecration of youth." Such a

situation shows the degree to which the identification of the Christian community and the national community has become illusory, in a period when the Church is undergoing massive attacks. Here again, there are fundamental ruptures developing, which appear as a set-back or a decline of the Church in the eyes of those who are accustomed to judge everything in terms of a National Church.

This set-back is especially evident in the multiplication of apostasies. In reality such actions were prepared long ago. Many remained attached to the Church by the sheer force of habit, or by motives of filial piety for the parents. At best, they remained attached to the religious customs which were connected to important family events. The day arrived on which necessity required them to make a personal choice, which was full of risks; and these people could only draw the conclusions which their very superficial contact with the Church required.

These ruptures cannot be translated simply into the flow of apostasies which can be statistically verified; they involve at the same time the constitution of poles of attraction within the amorphous mass of the anonymous public which belongs to no Church. Small cells are forming as Christian communities. Once the myth of the "Christian people" disappeared, the community of Jesus Christ, a minority in numbers in terms of total population, organizes its own life about the Word of God and the sacraments.

Thus some ruptures are provoked today by the Church itself. Strengthened by its recent experiences and its rediscovered biblical message, the Church can no longer conceive of itself as a sort of special enterprise which deals—to use Dietrich Bonhoeffer's phrase—in the delivery of grace at cut prices. The Church

has been led to refuse to some participation in the acts of its own life, which has not failed to arouse protest among those who were only fellow-travellers.

The Church has been led to recognize itself as the body of Christ and to challenge the spiritualist interpretation which seems largely dominant in modern Protestantism. The preaching of the word of God and the administration of sacraments are the means of constituting this communitarian body in a visible manner. Consequently, very clear limits should be marked out. Thus the baptism of children will depend on the disposition of parents to educate them in a Christian way. In certain cases, we will be obliged to refuse baptism, confirmation, marriage, and even Christian burial. We are equally obliged to take measures against those who voluntarily refuse to pay a Church tax, and in this way publicly manifest their lack of attachment to the Church. Such a refusal ought to be considered as the symptom of an interior rupture with the Church. One must also take into consideration how such refusals are a threat to the material existence of the Church.

For the first time in the Evangelical Church, we have regularly come to adopt measures of ecclesiastical discipline. It is not so much a matter of defending ourselves, as of marking off, in these new conditions in which we find ourselves, the space in which we can develop a Christian community, faithful to the gospel message. Under pain of allowing its visage to be disfigured, we cannot be indifferent to all manner of compromise with the masses who are indifferent to the Church.

*Signs of Renewal—The Present
and the Future*

THUS, IN SPITE of the symptoms of decline, we are witnessing in East Germany the growth of an authentic Chris-

tian community, detached from the servitudes of the bourgeois period.

For some years too the Churches in the East have experienced a remarkable liturgical renewal, based on Reformation tradition, but also linked at the same time to the liturgical treasures of all periods in the Church. In this way we are trying to free ourselves from all the romantic and sentimental manifestations which were introduced into the liturgy by the 19th century. The sacrament of the Eucharist has again become the center and summit of liturgical worship. In this way the exegetical scholarship that has been acquired during recent years on the nature of the Eucharist in the Church has passed over into sacramental practice. All the biblical aspects of the Eucharist are emphasized, the communitarian aspect of Communion, the eschatological dimension of the Lord's meal, and the holy joy which accompanies it. In the course of recent trials, we have perceived that in times of crisis the community of Jesus Christ cannot live on the rations of spiritual famine which modern Protestantism has doled out. Today in many areas we celebrate the divine office, the morning praises and evening blessing. The liturgical year has been rediscovered. We have done away with home baptism, a practice which had led to "the transformation of baptism into a feast of the consecration of life and individual family happiness" (Gunther Dehn). Sometimes even private confession is practiced.

The new Christian community which is developing in East Germany constitutes itself as the family of Christ. Brought together in various service groups as collaborators with the clergy, laymen assume real responsibilities and burden themselves with specific tasks in their community, sparing neither their time, their money, or their pains. We

have given meaning again to the function of elder; we have created an office of Reader, and we have organized younger groups of men and women for a door-to-door apostolate as well as for the exercise of liturgical functions and charitable aid. Formerly, only the pastor was active, and the community was simply the object of his ministry. This situation is in the process of disappearing. By the obscure services which they render within the community, all these laymen bear before the world which surrounds them a priceless testimony at this present hour. In the critical situation in which the Church is forced to live, Christians seek more and more to bear each other's burdens and to lead more of a common life. This has led to the organization of week-end recreations in community groups and days of retreat and recollection for the active collaborators of the community. Here we are certainly not speaking about original experiences, for everything has to take place within the framework of areas allotted to the Church. Nevertheless, we can at least say that these communities do not breathe a confining atmosphere; they are true cells of a spiritual "armament."

The cells which have been developing in this way have an extraordinary power of attraction. This mysterious fluid was felt in a very special way when East and West met at the *Kirchentage* of Berlin 1951 and at Leipzig in 1954. There people perceived in a very marked manner that Protestant individualism had come to an end.

For its part, the Evangelical Academy accomplishes a great work in the East German Republic, unfortunately limited by the obligation—enforced on the

Church—of only acting in places of worship, whereas it would need to go forth and publish its message to the intellectuals and the workers, both groups who have been deaf for many years to the appeal of the Church. Nevertheless, the Church has not been completely enclosed in its ghetto; people who have been far removed from it, listen to it and are attracted by the evangelical message.

The Church is fully aware of the danger that menaces it, while all the ruptures which we have described continue to go on. There is the danger that the faithful might accept the ghetto situation, and constitute themselves as a pious conventicle, interiorly separated from the real and present world. There is the danger that in the enclave which is the Church, it will curl up like a hedge-hog.

Those who see more clearly into the present situation know that the history of the last ten years is that of a *transition*, marked by terrible catastrophes, crises, and setbacks. The spiritual judgment perceives the interior regeneration which is produced in the Church despite the phenomena of apparent decline. The Evangelical Church of the East, formerly a National Church, is on the way to becoming a Church of personal and voluntary membership. The question of the future, which remains open, is therefore the following one: will the Church succeed in surmounting the temptation to escape to the limited area of existence where it is tolerated? Will it commit itself resolutely and consciously to the transformation which has already been begun?

Translated by F. X. QUINN

NOTES ON METAPHYSICS

PIERRE SCHEUER

I. Metaphysics and the Sciences

A. Object of Metaphysics

Like any other science, metaphysics is defined by its object.

The object of metaphysics is *being as being*. This formula, *being as being*, *ens qua ens*, has been interpreted in many different ways. We believe that it should be understood in function of the difference existing between the intellect and the senses. The Schoolmen teach that the intellect attains being *formaliter* (formally*), whereas the senses perceive being *materialiter*, *sub concreta quadam et materiali ratione* (material-

* The many technical Latin terms used in the French article are translated between parentheses for the convenience of the reader who is not familiar with this terminology. *Tr.*

Father Pierre Scheuer, S.J., who died last year in Louvain, Belgium, has had a profound influence upon the Jesuit philosophical School of Louvain (Maréchal, A. Grégoire, Defever, Isaye, Hayen, etc.) by his teachings and his personal contacts. His only published work in the field of philosophy is the following "Notes de métaphysique," which appeared first in *NOUVELLE REVUE THÉOLOGIQUE*, numbers 5, 6 and 7, 1926. The editor introduced Fr. Scheuer's article with the following words: "These notes, which are purposely concise and technical, have been composed by Fr. Scheuer in order to summarize some important parts of the philosophy course which he has been teaching for many years; they intend to emphasize the essential point of view of metaphysics." After more than 30 years this article seems to have lost none of its actuality.

ly, under a sort of concrete and material aspect). Hence, the words *ens qua ens* (being as being) have only one legitimate meaning: being as determined intelligibly, or as formally present to the intellect, or as determined by the intellectual activity, in fine, being as an *intelligible object*.

The other sciences too, physics and mathematics, have being as their object, but being as determined *in* and *by* the sense faculties, as a *sensible object*.

Metaphysics, mathematics and physics correspond to three ways of considering a *body*, the proper object of our knowledge, and to three kinds of concepts:

1) *Physical concept*: a body is that which influences our interior and exterior senses. Thus the concept of red object means "this something" which affects my sight, and which is known only because of this *sense* determination, *external* to the intellect.

2) *Mathematical concept*: a body is that which is drawn or constructed in the sense intuition of space, according to a law of unity deriving from the intellect, for example a triangle or a sphere. A mathematical concept is much less material than a physical concept, since its determination does not come *ab extrinseco* (from without), but *ab intrinseco* (from within), that is from the intellect itself. Yet it remains, at least in part, *external* to the intellect.

3) *Metaphysical concept*: a body is that which is composed *in ipsa ratione substantiae* (precisely inasmuch as it is a substance). This is a merely intelligible determination. It is *intrinsic* to the intellectual notion of being. The Scholastics teach that it differs from the notion of being only *secundum clariorem expressionem unius eiusdemque realitatis*

objectivae (because it expresses more clearly the selfsame objective reality).

The main differences between the *metaphysical* concept and the *scientific* concept (in accordance with modern terminology we shall thus designate both the physical and the mathematical concepts) may be reduced to the following:

1) The first one is purely intellectual; it is simple. The other is blended, sensitivo-rational, composed. The *phantasm* belongs intrinsically to the *physica* concept of which it constitutes the material element, whereas it has only an extrinsic relation to the metaphysical concept. Yet that relation is necessary; for metaphysical activity is possible only by virtue of a reflection upon a first activity, which is directly exercised on the phantasm.

2) The scientific determinations are *extra rationem formalem entis* (not contained in the formal notion of being). The being which is the object of the sciences is univocal being; on the other hand, the being which is the object of metaphysics, is *ens analogum* (analogous being). Hence:

3) Scientific knowledge is a *passage from potency to act*. In modern language, it is synthetic. Starting from the phantasm, which is *potentia intelligibile* (intelligible in potency), it rises to the concept, through which the phantasm becomes *actu intelligibile* (intelligible in act). Metaphysical knowledge is a passage from imperfect act to perfect act, from the implicit to the explicit, from the *exercitum* to the *signatum*. It is *analytic*.

4) There is finally a difference in objectivity: metaphysics is *noumenal*, science is *phenomenal*. There is nothing frightening in these words, which we shall explain and justify later.

In summary, we may say that the classical division of science into three groups, metaphysics, mathematics and

physics, does not derive from a diversity of objects, but from a diversity of the modes of knowledge of which human nature is capable because of its essential composition. As a bodily substance, man is endowed with sensation. Sensation reaches being, but not as being. As a spirit man is capable of a knowledge which reaches imperfectly but very really the intimate being of things, the thing as it is in itself. Inasmuch as he is composed of body and spirit—of matter and of a subsistent form which, after having actuated matter, extends, as it were, above and beyond the body—man is capable of a blended, sensitivo-rational knowledge. That knowledge shares at once the imperfection of sensation and the perfection of spiritual or metaphysical knowledge. These different modes of knowing are real. They should be carefully distinguished and systematically taken into account.

These explanations introduce no novelty, but merely a greater *precision* concerning a point which the ancient Schoolmen did not clearly elucidate. In their time the sciences had made so little progress that the problem of the nature of science and of metaphysics could not be considered in its whole amplitude nor solved with the necessary accuracy.

Uncertainty and vagueness concerning the object of the different sciences entails confusion in their methods. Whoever fails to distinguish that which is specifically metaphysical from that which is specifically mathematical or physical, will study metaphysics after the manner of a physicist or of a mathematician, and, conversely, physics after the manner of a metaphysician. He will demand from physical theories the absolute objectivity which belongs only to metaphysical theories, and, by way of compensation, he will attribute only a

value of probability to the most vital and essential metaphysical truths, such as, for instance, that of matter and form. He will use indiscriminately induction and deduction. The results of such errors are unavoidable: they lead straight to scepticism, agnosticism and positivism.

It would certainly be desirable that, in teaching philosophy, more attention be paid to this essential form of human knowledge. In epistemology especially the difference which exists between the cognitive value of sensation and of intellection should be forcefully emphasized; for the theory of human knowledge depends upon this difference.

B. Characteristic Properties of Philosophy

Metaphysics is that knowledge whose immediate subject is the human spirit. But *operari sequitur esse* (as a being is, so it acts). *Cognitum est in cognoscente ad modum cognoscentis* (the object known is in the knowing subject after the manner of the knowing subject). It follows that the characteristics of metaphysics are strictly proportional to the ontological characteristics of the human spirit, which is at once a substance independent of the body and the form of the body. Therefore we say that metaphysics is:

1) *One* in its object *unitate simplicitatis* (with a unity of simplicity); its only function is to develop the immanent content of the notion of being. It is true that this development takes the form of a plurality of truths, but these truths are not distinct from each other in the way in which physical or mathematical truths are distinct. *They include each other*. From this very *circuminsession* of the metaphysical truths, from this utter simplicity of metaphysics, which should be embraced in one single glance in order to appear in its

overwhelming evidence, derives the main difficulty of this science, which puts it beyond the reach of most human minds.

2) *One* in its method, or strictly systematical, for the analytic development occurs under the guidance of only one principle, the principle of identity. That principle expresses the simple, hence always identical activity of the intellect.

3) *A priori*, that is, having content independent of the data of experience, and capable, by itself, by its principle, of reaching certain truths about things as they are in themselves. Kant's error consisted in denying this proposition.

4) *Total and completed*. We claim that metaphysics exists in its totality, *in actu exercito* (implicitly) in every thinking man. Its content is inseparable from the nature and the exercise of thought. A metaphysician discovers nothing, his only job is to analyze and to make explicit. The sciences, on the other hand, are capable of indefinite development. The reason for this is that the matter of the sciences differs from their form, whereas metaphysics, like the spirit, finds its matter in its very form (being as such).

5) *Extrinsically dependent* on sensation. Else it would be angelic knowledge. The human form depends on the body, because it is a part of the body, but it is *independent within this very dependence*. This combination of dependence and of independence is the principle by means of which we should be able to solve, in a strictly analytic way, without added hypotheses, without violence and without metaphors, all problems referring to the relationship between empirical reality and the human intelligible.

6) *Immanent, per modum formae* (in the manner of a form), to scientific knowledge, as the soul is immanent to the body. As far as its form is con-

cerned, scientific knowledge is but a deficient participation of metaphysical knowledge. It seems to us that this proposition constitutes the first principle of the philosophy of science. Its truth is evident from the history of the sciences and from the discussions about scientific philosophy which, over the last twenty years, have filled a whole library. The sciences tend to take on the metaphysical form. They find the principle of their progress in this internal finality. As examples we may mention the arithmetization of geometry and Einstein's relativity which is, after all, nothing but the attempt of a genius to substitute intelligible for sensible space; such substitutions, although foredoomed to failure, are never infertile.

This whole doctrine derives ultimately from these two propositions: 1) *Substantia hominis resultat ex materia prima et forma subsistenti* (the substance of man is a composite of prime matter and of subsistent form); 2) *Operari sequitur esse* (as a being is, so it acts).

We have especially emphasized the *a priori* character of metaphysics, for no one overlooks with impunity the sovereign rights of the first science.

II. Metaphysics and Knowledge

A. Apriority and finalism of the intellect

In order to remove every misunderstanding, we shall define our (strictly scholastic) position, by comparing it with the doctrines which err by excess and those which err by defect.

ERR BY EXCESS: Ontologism and the theory of innate ideas. The intellect would, of itself, be in possession of an *objectum quod* (an object which), hence also of an *objectum quo* (an object by means of which), of a mode of knowledge, of which it is incapable on account of its ontological nature. On-

tologism ignores the composition of *essentia* (essence) and *esse* (existence), or the condition of creature; the theory of innate ideas ignores the composition of *matter* and *form*.

According to the Scholastics there is only one datum which is inborn (a priori, independent of the senses and of experience), the intellect itself. *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu, nisi intellectus ipse* (there is nothing in the intellect which has not first been in the senses, except the intellect itself). Hence by itself the intellect possesses: 1) its *formal object quo*. The senses offer some matter for knowledge, but it is not from the senses that the intellect receives the power of knowing *sub ratione entis formaliter* (formally under the aspect of being); 2) an *objectum quod* (an object which), i.e. its real existence. It is not owing to the senses that the human spirit knows and recognizes itself as a spirit in its spiritual operations. But the human spirit knows itself only in a manner which agrees with its ontological condition of an informing form. Since, as a spirit, it is in a way nothing but the prolongation beyond the body of that which is the *actus corporis* (act of the body), its operation too (*operari sequitur esse*—as a being is, so it acts) can be but the prolongation of some bodily action (*quaedam prolongatio ad phantasmata*, says St. Thomas—some kind of prolongation into the phantasms).

It follows further: 1) that the first operation of the intellect can only be the physical or the mathematical operation; the metaphysical operation constitutes a *second* moment; 2) that, since the *second* presupposes the *first*, there is no metaphysical act without a phantasm as a starting point (*materia ex qua*, not *materia circa quam*—starting point, but not subject matter); 3) that its formal object is undetermined although it con-

tains *omnia* (everything). Hence the necessity and the possibility of human metaphysics.

Every activity is directed by an internal finality which strives towards the complete realization of the formal object (*finis in ordine causarum recte dicitur prima*—in the order of causes the end is rightly called the first one). Thus an oak, from the very first acorn stage, tends towards the full realization of the idea of oak. And since the *quercitas* (the quality of being an oak) is a universal which transcends the individual, the oak tries to realize it beyond the limits of its individuality. Hence generation, according to the profound remark of Aristotle. Likewise the intellect, because of its inborn internal finality, tends 1) to inform the sensible by making it *actu intelligibile* (actually intelligible); 2) to complete this work through a totalization of experience. Hence the above mentioned tendency of the sciences to assume the metaphysical form; 3) since being transcends the sensible, to penetrate beyond the sensible into the internal determinations which the senses cannot reach but which they conceal (metaphysical finality); 4) to rise all the way to the pure intelligible, which alone fully realizes the formal object, the *ratio entis*.

We arrive now at the heart of the theory, at its crowning point. *The formal object of an activity is nothing but the form of the agent in act.*

To act is to communicate one's form (*agens agit simile sibi*—an agent produces effects which resemble it). God was able to create only by imposing His resemblance. If material elements become an oak, they do not do it by themselves; the *quercitas* (quality of being an oak) is imposed upon them. Likewise the intellect *assimilat sibi* (makes similar to itself). If it unifies all knowledge, the reason is not that it has *observed*

and *empirically* verified this unity. Being one, it cannot but unify. St. Thomas says, *Intellectus intelligendo facit omnio esse quodam modo unum* (in knowing the intellect in some way unifies all things). The intellect unifies either by way of identity or by way of relation.

The doctrines which ERR BY DEFECT are also two in number. First critical philosophy. Kant admits the internal finality of the intellect. He admits that *natura sua* (by its nature), it is perfectly objective, having as its object *ens ut sic* (being as such), what he calls the transcendental object. "To reduce the phenomenon to the object" means to reach the sensible *sub ratione entis* (under the aspect of being) or *facere phantasmata actu intelligibilia* (to render the phantasms actually intelligible). But he has ignored or tacitly denied the thesis of the formal object as we have just outlined it. He does not admit that *intellectus assimilat sibi* (the intellect makes similar to itself). That is his *whole* error.

The second doctrine which errs by defect is that of Locke. There is no longer a formal object by which the intellect differs from the senses, therefore neither is there any longer an internal finality. Intelligence is only a functional and mechanical activity.

Now we must admit that too frequently textbook philosophy sounds very much like the philosophy of Locke. The idea of finality, considerably obscured by the harmful influence of cartesian philosophy and of the empiricists, has met extreme opposition among so-called traditional thinkers.

B. The principle of identity

How does it happen that the intellect, while assimilating the objects according to *its own* laws, reaches nevertheless the being *in itself* of these objects? Nay, that

the objectivity of its knowledge increases with its immanence and its independence of the objects known? The answer is given by the principle of identity.

Of course, metaphysics can find no higher principle. *A priori*, we can say nothing about being except that it is being. This formula is not tautological. There is between the two uses of the word *being* the functional difference which separates the subject from the predicate. As subject *ens supponit pro re ut est in se* (being stands for the thing as it is in itself); as predicate *ens supponit pro re ut est intelligibiliter apprehensa* (being stands for the thing as it is known by the intellect). Real being is identically intelligible being. There is no difference between being as it is in itself and for itself, and being as it is *in* and *for* and *by* thought. Saying that reality must conform to thought is the same as saying that thought must conform to reality.

Since it is the very form of judgment, the principle of identity is affirmed in every cognition. The question of its objective value cannot be raised, not even by way of methodical doubt.

But shall we admit it as a first fact, as a necessity of which we are prisoners, and which we cannot deny without giving up our quality of thinking beings? Should it not be rationally justified?

This question, the subtlest and the highest which can be raised in metaphysics, comes down to this one: How is knowledge possible? We shall not treat it here. Suffice it to point out briefly the principle of the deduction. The identity between the real and the intelligible is possible only if: 1) the intellect itself is intelligible; 2) it is *quodammodo omnia, sive actu, sive potentia* (in some way everything, either actually or potentially). This second point can be established only by means of the principle; 3) *actus est illimitatus* (act

is unlimited), which itself supposes the principle of identity. And thus we seem to be forced into a vicious circle. We are not, however. For we reach an ultimate point where the real and the intelligible are absolutely identical, a reality which is an idea. That is the *Ego* in its exercise. For every thinking being the *Ego* is the first concrete principle. In the *Ego* he discovers himself as the active identity of the real and the intelligible, as an infinity which comprises *suo modo omnia* (everything in its own way), a way which is very different for a divine, an angelic and a human spirit. Pantheism has misused this doctrine, but it does not derive from it. Aware of its potentiality, the *Ego* or the spirit claims all reality only according to the way in which he possesses it.

Thus metaphysics turns out to be more than a simple system of abstract truths. It is, in our created being, that last and hidden point, at which, through a distant participation, something lives of the *Thought which thinks itself*. This explains why, discouraged by the scantiness of *notional* concepts, every metaphysics worthy of its name endeavors to transcend them and to achieve itself in the profound silence of mystical introversion.

III. How to Build Metaphysics

A. Division of Being

It should be possible to derive the whole of metaphysics from the principle of identity, beginning with the division of being into its main degrees or modes. We shall restrict ourselves to a simple outline of the deduction.

Every being must verify the intelligible, in itself, by identity. This identity may be adequate or inadequate. In the first case the being is *Esse* (the infinite Being); in the second case it is *habens*

esse or *participans de esse* (possessing existence or sharing existence). It will necessarily comprise, besides its existence, another element, opposed to existence and determining it. This ontological element is called *essentia* or *forma* (essence or form). To our mind this inference is quite evident. I may say: a being which is not *simpliciter* (simply) *one*, contains really, besides unity, the opposite of unity, that is, multiplicity; else it would be *simply one*. Likewise a being which is not *simpliciter esse* (merely existence) comprises, besides existence, something which is the real opposite of existence. Else we must explain finite being as comprising both being and non-being, or conceive it qualitatively, as a circumscribed figure, whereas the infinite Being would be assimilated to a boundless plane.

We believe that all Scholastics admit this inference. They agree that the finite can be intelligibly conceived only as composed of two opposed principles. Perfectly identical with the intelligible, the divine Being or *Esse* is perfectly identical with itself. It is pure simplicity. Inadequately identical with the intelligible, the finite being is imperfectly identical with itself. As *essence* it is not itself as *existence*. It is composed.

But there is no agreement about the problem of the *real* composition. We affirm it. Why? Because, by virtue of the principle of identity, the necessities of thought are the necessities of the real. Saying that the finite is composed as intelligible, but that it is not composed as real, means, of course, denying the identity of thought and of being. Furthermore, since they are opposed principles, *essence* and *existence* may be unified by way of synthesis, not however by way of identity. Having said this, we admit the evidence of the arguments of our opponents. As they understand it, the real distinction is absurd. By *exist-*

ence they mean that by which the essence is *extra statum possibilitatis* (outside the state of possibility). Is this really the opinion of St. Thomas?

—If we use a similar deduction, the form likewise shows a differentiation. It is either *pure determination* or it is not. In the former case, it is *determinatio in se* (essential determination), simple essence. In the latter case, it is united to an opposed principle, which is therefore absolute indetermination. We call it *materia prima* (prime matter).

All the perfections founded on *esse* (the act of being) are realized in the finite being, but they are combined with the opposed imperfection. Likewise all the perfections belonging to the form as such are to be found in the material substance, but in combination with the opposed determinations. With the help of this rule, the ontology of created being and of material being can be elaborated with great facility. A body is *at once* one and multiple, active and passive, *hoc determinate* (this determined object) and at the same time *aliud* (the other), that is alterable, etc., etc. Starting from this simple idea, *the synthesis of opposites*, one demonstrates for example that a body is necessarily *quantum* (quantified) and continuous, that quantity possesses two forms, and only two (time and space), and one discovers without difficulty all the other Thomistic theses...

Note. We did not try to prove the intrinsic possibility of the three modes of being, but only the necessity of their division, that is, *if division there is*, it can only be this kind of division. *Potentia et actus dividunt ens et omne genus entis* (potency and act divide being and every kind of being). We reject as illusory every attempt to demonstrate an intrinsic possibility. God's possibility is not distinct from His *esse* and, as for the creature, its possibility anterior to

its existence is but God's eminential *esse*. So that to know the creature's possibility without knowing its existence would require the intuition of the divine essence.

B. *Ontological Perfections*

Besides the metaphysical concepts of the degrees of being, there remains a whole series of ontological concepts (unity, activity, life, intelligence, will, etc.) which can proportionately belong to all degrees. An exact science of metaphysics must: 1) distinguish the concepts which are properly metaphysical (metaphysical in the sense defined above) from the discursive concepts (whose matter is sensible); 2) draw up their table; 3) inquire into their origin; 4) deduce them, i.e. demonstrate analytically that they belong to being as such. Carrying out such a program would easily fill a whole volume.

Let us merely point out the order in which we arrange them: 1) activity or life (metaphysically being can be conceived only as activity or active identity); 2) the two functional forms of activity, which are the intellect and the will (activity requires a subject and an object. It is different according to whether it proceeds from subject to object or from object to subject); 3) the other concepts whose plurification is due to the refraction of being through the forms of sensibility.

The principle of identity is subdivided into two secondary principles, which regulate the attribution of the ontological concepts.

1) The principle of proportionality or of analogy: *The ontological perfections are common to all beings, to each according to its degree.* (Demonstration: they are but different aspects of being, being is common, hence...). Of course, perfections which include a determined mode of being are not com-

mon. Aseity, for instance, belongs to God, because He is *Esse*. Hence it belongs exclusively to Him.

According to this principle we are ourselves, in our own being, the first principle of metaphysical explanation. We are, each one of us, the only being which we know from within, in itself. What we discover within us we apply above ourselves by extension and below ourselves by restriction.

The principle of proportionality seems, at first sight, paradoxical and opposed to common sense. Does it not entail panpsychism? Shall we say that a mineral possesses life, intelligence, etc.? We must first remark that words should keep the meaning which they have in everyday usage. We shall not say that a mineral possesses life, because life means the perfection of immanence, at least in that degree which is found only from plants upwards. Likewise the use of the word *knowledge* starts only with the animal, and that of the term *intellect* only with the human soul, etc. We only say that, since all beings are only being, and since being is common to all of them, there is in none of them an ontological perfection which is totally heterogeneous to the other beings. Aside from all terminological discussions, we must affirm that there is in the atom something which is to the intellect what the being of the atom is to the being of a spirit. This formula is above reproach and contains nothing paradoxical. God is only life, spirit, intellect and love, yet He sees in Himself, as a very imperfect participation of Himself, the being of the atom. Would that be possible if the atom were entirely heterogeneous, entirely *alterius rationis* (of another sort) than life, intellect and love? The principle of analogy destroys the basis of agnosticism and provides us with the only means of escaping it. It opens the way to that real

intelligence of beings which understands the lower ones by means of the higher. The most material determinations are, in their intimate core, nothing but participations of thought and love. That which is entirely irreducible to the spirit, for instance, local movement or extension as such, is introduced into a being by prime matter. But this irreducible element can be separated only by abstraction; in reality, it is synthesized with a formal element.

The principle of analogy is frequently used by St. Thomas.

2) The principle of the identity of the being with itself, or the principle of essence: *in one and the same being the different ontological perfections are all realized in the same degree or with the same coefficient.* (Demonstration: they are identical with being, hence identical with each other). For instance, the unity of a body, suffused with multiplicity, is a mixed perfection. Hence all the other perfections of the body will be blended, in the same proportion with the opposed imperfection. It would be absurd to imagine a material substance endowed with freedom, since freedom means activity without passivity, hence a simple perfection. Material unity has different degrees, it becomes more perfect in the plant, in the animal. The other perfections rise simultaneously to the same level: the elementary properties of matter become life, sensation, etc. The heuristic and directive value of this principle is obvious.

Our two principles are not very new. Their systematic application entails certain advantages. They are sufficient for the solution of all metaphysical problems. We do not believe that a single exception could be brought forward. As they reconcile methodically the demands of the two elements of being, act and potency, they keep away from incoherence and they steer a middle course be-

tween opposed errors. Besides safety, our method presents the further advantage of great simplicity. It introduces unity, it uncovers the hidden springs of the workings of metaphysics. By ridding the mind of the discomfort which it experiences too often before the obscurity and the apparent complication of philosophical teaching, it contributes powerfully to instill solid and wholesome convictions.

IV. A Few More Words About Sense Knowledge

SINCE WE HAVE promised only a few notes about the principles and the method of metaphysics, we do not feel obliged to develop their applications to questions of detail. A few words only about sense knowledge, in order to remove some misunderstandings.

The sentient subject is material. Hence the perfection "objectivity" cannot belong to sensation in the manner of a simple perfection. Therefore it will be combined with the opposed imperfection, that is, with subjectivity, in the same way in which, in a material substance, unity is combined with multiplicity, interiority with exteriority, spontaneity with determinism, etc. But just as the body is really *one*, without possessing the unity of a spirit, sensation is really objective, without possessing the objectivity of intellectual knowledge. The intellect reaches that which is being *through that which it is in itself* (*ens qua ens*); the senses reach that which is being *through that which it is outside itself*, through that which it is in the sentient subject (*ens materialiter sub concreta quadam et materiali ratione*—being materially, under a concrete and material aspect). The difference between the two ways of knowing only repeats, in other words, the difference between a substance which is com-

posed of opposed principles and a simple substance.

Sensibility too possesses its formal object, its *id quo* (that by means of which), which cannot be simple like the object of the understanding. It is necessarily composed like the sentient subject itself. (*Operari sequitur esse*—as a being is, so it acts; the formal object is but the form in act). What is it then? Materiality, time and space. The senses do not only apprehend that which is spatial and successive, they apprehend *spatialiter* and *successive* (in a spatial and successive way). They apprehend *composita composita* (the composite in a composite way), whereas the intellect apprehends *composita simpliciter* (the composite in a simple way). *Time and space are the a priori forms of sensibility.*

What is so monstrous in this formula that it is everywhere branded as the abomination of desolation in the sanctuary of philosophy? It states a doctrine unanimously admitted by all Scholastics: 1) *Sensatio est ORGANICA* (sensation is ORGANIC); 2) *cognitum est in cognoscente ad modum cognoscentis*—that which is known is in the knowing subject after the *manner* of that subject).

But is the objectivity of knowledge not jeopardized by this doctrine? Is space still real? etc., etc. Nothing is jeopardized. We draw a distinction between intellectual knowledge, whose objectivity is a simple perfection, and sense knowledge whose objectivity is a mixed perfection. Space is real. If it were not real, at least in the sentient subject, that subject would not have a spatial mode of knowledge. We only say that the intuition of space as found in an animal is not quite the same thing as that intuition as found in a pure spirit. There is a difference in mode. This is demonstrated for instance by the absolute impossibility of reconciling the sense intuition of the *quantum* (that which has

quantity) with the metaphysical notion of life. Bergson's whole philosophy, whatever lack of precision it may show on some essential points, has no other purpose than to pass from sensible to intelligible space.

In man sensibility is not separated from understanding. The sensible qualities become the matter of an intellectual activity, through which they acquire an objectivity which they did not possess by themselves. *Intellectus agens facit phantasmata intelligibilia actu* (the agent intellect makes the phantasms intelligible in act). The intellectual causality immanent to the sense level may in every respect be compared with the causality of the vital principle within an organism. The result of the penetration of the sensible by the intelligible is what Kant calls the *phenomenon* (sensitivo-rational knowledge). From the point of view of its composition and of its cognitive value the phenomenon is to the angelic noumenon what man is to an angel. It is to the noumenal and metaphysical concept which belongs properly to the human spirit, what man, as composed of soul and body, is to the human spirit. — The metaphysical concept (in all its modalities) is to the angelic noumenon what the human spirit is to the angelic spirit, etc., etc. Possessing the definition of the angel, man, the human spirit, the animal, etc., we possess *ipso facto* the solution of all gnoseological problems. The operation is nothing but the essence *in act*. We should use the ontological or metaphysical definitions as a foundation, and, instead of relegating them into some corner of memory, proceed from them to the study of the properties, by means of the principle of identity. Nowadays there are Scholastics who call in doubt the composition of matter and form, who are waiting for new experiments

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF THEOLOGY

ELMER O'BRIEN

II

SPEAKING OF CONTEMPORARY efforts toward a union of the Churches, Victor White is led to remark that "the days would seem to be happily passing when it was cheerfully supposed that dogmatic differences were of no account; when reunion all around could be attained by beating up the milk of human kindness into butter and serving it on a good and lordly dish . . . It would seem to be now more generally realised that the unity of the Church cannot be established on a basis of empty-mindedness dignified with the name of broad-mindedness nor a genial putting up with what we regard as other people's eccentricities dignified with the name of tolerance."* He has in mind, I take it, the situation in his own British Isles because over here—to our shame we must confess it—the picture is rather less pretty. A friendly fuzziness on doctrinal matters seems still, in all too many instances, to be the accepted first and final stages of the ecumenical process. But there is comfort yet. A minority awareness that this simply will not do does exist even over here. It has already given rise to a type of theological endeavor quite unknown, in its rigor and restraint, to the last generation and quite full of promise for our own. I mean, of course, the effort upon the theological level at mutual understanding (not, it should be noted, mutual *agreement*) among the different denominations and obediences. A purely prefatory sort of thing, the beneficent results it produces

This is the second and concluding section of a survey which began in the Summer issue.

always seem disproportionately slight when compared with the labor it demands of the participating theologians so that the temptation is recurrent and strong to have nothing more to do with it. Now, however, the best general historian of contemporary theology writing today, Dr. Horton of Oberlin, has provided a volume which should do much to lessen the labor and allay the temptation as well.¹⁴

One may be genuinely unsympathetic, as I confess myself to be, with his immediate and avowed purpose: the provision of a textbook in Systematic Theology in which the ultimately normative is not Scripture and/or Tradition but "the Christian consensus" of the Churches (the theologians?) before which the student must make his decision. Thus: "If the student finds he is at odds with this ecumenical consensus, he must decide whether he is thinking superficially and provincially, or whether the Flock of Christ in this generation is crowding sheeplike into some broad trail that leads to destruction." One would prefer a programme somewhat more respectful of human understanding and its inherent obligations.

Yet as a transcript of what is variously held these days on man's knowledge of God, on God's nature, on the God-world and God-man relations, on the Church and the means of grace, etc., it is difficult to imagine a more helpful or better piece of work coming from the hands of one sole scholar. Because of his long and intimate knowledge of the theologians whose thought he transcribes, Dr. Horton has been able to translate into a common and easily intelligible vocabulary ideas which to many of us, because of the highly per-

sonalized terminologies of their authors, seemed hopelessly contradictory or diverse; it now appears that they were nothing of the sort. A giant step towards mutual understanding has been made more nearly possible by this small book.

In an even smaller book that is characterized by a theological maturity unusual in ecumenical writings on this continent, Fr. Tavard makes a reasoned and eloquent plea for just such an understanding, specifically on the part of Catholics.¹⁵ To achieve this understanding, he is aware, must inevitably be a long and laborious business, not less because of the defense mechanisms (adopted through generations of subjection to hostility and suppression) which seems to have become, here and there, somehow identified with the Faith itself. He does not minimize the importance of the theologian's rôle in the ecumenical enterprise: his chapter, "Prudence Today," points to the theological awakening in this century as one of the factors which have contributed to the birth of a "hopeful though realistic" ecumenism. But he does emphasize, as he considers past essays at reunion against their historical backgrounds, the necessity that such attempts somehow "proceed from the totality of the Catholic public opinion, or at any rate find in that public opinion a slant through which it will become intelligible to the average Catholic mind." One of the weaknesses of the Abbé Portal's efforts, he holds, was that in the search for tangible results they were too remote from the *de facto* awareness of the generality of Church members. It is a strong argument, forcefully stated, for an integrated Catholic ecumenism that we have here: research, yes, and personal exchange on the theological level, but all such fragmentary and erudite efforts situated within an informed, pray-

erful living for unity by the totality of the Catholic community.

Dom Cary-Elwes, in his frank and friendly essay in popular ecumenism,¹⁶ has the non-Catholic chiefly in view but his attitude is the same. Everywhere, as incidental reference is made to the Catholic's rôle, there is revealed a like awareness of the need for a totality of effort instinct with prayer. It is accordingly easy to dismiss, quite as in reading Fr. Tavard's book, the occasional factual errors which in no wise modify the valid general orientation.

From the outset he makes a point which, it has become increasingly clear of late, must be made explicitly and without equivocation and often: "union in love" if it is to have any Christian meaning must be "union in truth." Recently the World Council of Churches has been using a procedural device which, in the eyes of many, might well end in destroying the search for genuine union. It emphasizes much a "wider ecumenical process" of renewal of life through contact with other Churches, of spiritual cross-fertilization, of learning to render a common witness to the world—or, in a word, "union in love." Within it is had the more limited ecumenical process of doctrinal discussion. Now no one will deny the value of such an atmosphere for the pacific consideration of doctrinal issues. Nor, on the other hand, should anyone deny that this atmosphere of Christian fellowship is becoming the paramount value of the ecumenical effort, to be maintained at whatever cost. At the cost of doctrine? There are, unfortunately, indications in that direction. But the love that would bind all Christians together must be the love that first binds them to Christ, the exigent and exacting love of Him who is Truth. There can be "union in love" only to the extent that there is "union in truth."¹⁷ And that "union in truth"

is achievable only to the extent that, under the Spirit, one squarely faces and accepts the doctrine of Christ. Is the World Council, despite its study groups, becoming an obstacle to that indispensable unity in truth? When I read anything by its General Secretary, Dr. Visser 't Hooft, I am inclined to think "No." When I talk with anyone of the rank and file who has assisted at its assemblies, I am forced to think "Yes."

All this has taken us rather far from Cary-Elwes' book. He considers the prospects and dangers within the more immediate context of the Churches of the British Isles. But the point he makes is universally valid and one envies the skill that allows him to make it with such persuasive power. Other, more subsidiary matters are considered in turn: toleration, the Sacraments, the spirit and methods of reconciliation, etc., with the whole impregnated by an appropriate Benedictine *pax*. A rather rare thing these days in ecumenical writing, no offense is given to either the intelligence or the sensibilities of any reader, whatever his religious commitments.

Fr. Bouyer, as is his wont latterly, is less careful about giving offense in what he calls a "plain account of the way in which a Protestant came to feel himself obliged in conscience to give his adhesion to the Catholic Church."¹⁸ Sensibilities may be offended by this book, and indeed some already have been. But intelligence, never. For this is an adult essay in historical and speculative theology that is singularly impressive and thought-provoking even when, as sometimes happens, it is not altogether convincing. It is his basic contention that the essence of Protestantism lies, not in denial, but in affirmation—in the assertion of certain positive values of Christianity. In that perspective the principles themselves of the Reformation must be interpreted, principles that we see

lived in present-day Protestantism, that we see accorded the central and essential position in the writings of the Reformers themselves. In that perspective those familiar principles—the sovereignty of Scripture, justification by faith—are seen to be authentically Christian, faithful to the data of revelation and corroborated by Catholic tradition both before and after the Reformation. Whence, then, schism and even heresy from principles such as these? In their speculative development by the Reformers negative elements foreign to biblical teaching were introduced from the very outset, presuppositions of that nominalist theology in which the Reformers, as Catholics, had been schooled. "Actually not one of the errors the Church was led to condemn in their teaching was of their own creation... they were so many theses of nominalist theology which had up to then escaped condemnation simply because they did not leave the sterile playground of scholastic dialectic. The Reformation, however, to its misfortune as much as the Church's, brought them out into the pulpit and the public square." From its second generation onward, Protestantism's positive principles were recurrently smothered in this speculative system of a decadent mediaevalism. The present internal conflicts of Protestantism cannot, accordingly, be resolved by a simple return to Protestant orthodoxy for that would only accentuate them the more. They can be resolved solely by return to the Church; "the Catholic Church is necessary to the full flowering" of the Protestant principles of justification by faith and the sovereignty of Scripture. So, at least, concluded Pastor Bouyer, Lutheran, having set himself to explore the depths, the full scope, of his religious heritage. So attests, now, Père Bouyer, Catholic. No sentiment of revulsion turned him from the religion fostered

in him by a Protestant upbringing followed by several years in the ministry. He has, he says, never rejected it.—This is an excessively schematic presentation of a highly nuanced and informed discussion and one would, I fear, be justified in concluding from it that on Bouyer's showing all that is necessary for such a "full flowering" is a different theological system. So the book simply must be read.

Fr. Bouyer considers the ecumenical problem exclusively in relation to Continental Lutheranism and Calvinism. Good discussion of various aspects of the problem in relation to Anglicanism is provided in the collection of articles by Fr. St. John.¹⁹ How early some of them are one may conclude from the scant attention accorded the question of Anglican orders and the laconic remark that "Anglo-Catholics are troubled comparatively seldom on this score." The "Plan of Church Union in North India and Pakistan" changed all that as any one who so much as reads the daily newspapers must be aware by now. Hence the special interest that attaches to Prof. Sykes' fresh investigations of the Anglican tradition regarding episcopacy that were made while the controversy was at its height.²⁰ His final position is the same as that of his previous studies, but perhaps more winningly expressed. In concluding he quotes the Preface to the Book of Common Prayer: "It hath been the wisdom of the Church of England to keep the mean between the two extremes of too much stiffness in refusing and of too much easiness in admitting any variation from it." And then he adds, "It has been the argument of these lectures that the same principle has been true in respect of polity; and that the Anglican tradition has espoused a *via media* in regard to episcopacy, constructed by its defenders against the two extremes of Rome and

Geneva. In accordance with this tenacious adherence to the mean, the Church of England has nowhere formulated any theoretical or theological doctrine of episcopacy; but has contented itself with the assertion of the historical ground of the continuance of a three-fold ministry since the Apostolic Age . . . Its representative divines have so interpreted [the formularies] as to require episcopacy where it may be had without sacrificing purity of doctrine, and not to unchurch those churches deprived of it by ineluctable historical necessity." Of course, it all depends upon what poles you choose as the extremes between which the *via media* is made to lie. (Rather puckishly Fancy murmurs, "What if, say, there had never been a Geneva?") And surely the author writes off too easily those with whom he does not agree: defenders themselves of the *via media* but of one which lies between poles other than those of his choice, they are dismissed as having deviated into "too much stiffness in refusing or too much easiness in admitting" and are not, therefore, to be numbered among "representative divines."

Prof. Sykes may or may not have properly assessed the continuity of Anglican thinking on the question. But he seems to have expressed with uncanny accuracy the authoritative Anglican thinking of the moment. While his book was in press the Bishops of the Church of England unanimously accepted as valid the orders of the non-episcopal Church of South India. Some would say, however, that here at least a "theoretical or theological doctrine of episcopacy" was formulated and, I suppose, to that extent Sykes was caught short.

In a volume similarly written before and published after the Bishops' statement, Mr. Williamson (who up until then had believed himself a priest of the Anglican communion) attempts a

pacific and positive contribution to union.²¹ "The [Eucharistic] Prayer as Augustine prayed it in that first Communion he celebrated in the ruined church of St. Martin in Canterbury in 597 is, word for word, the same prayer as has been said this particular morning at Catholic altars all over the world. Thus the Canon today is not only the prayer of unity within the Church. It is the potential point of unity for all those separated from the Church. The sects which have sprung up since the Reformation could all unite in saying the Canon... The Great Prayer which, more surely than any other prayer in the world, is the way to Him." Knowing the Canon, he says, one "can detect the false arguments of those opponents of the Faith who have tried and still try to perpetuate disunity." To lessen the unfamiliarity of non-Catholics with the form in which the Mass is now celebrated in the Roman Rite, he prefaces his exposition with a few paragraphs on the meaning of the vestments and the gestures of the celebrant. The exposition itself is a model of reverent simplicity interlaced with all manner of historical lore and theological comment.²² But one may wonder whether the hope that lies behind it is altogether justified. Is not the Mass and all it means precisely one of the chief bugbears of the non-Catholic? Let us say, rather, "It was." For the situation, slowly and in a fashion scarcely perceptible by any but the most informed observers, is changing. For a long time now Fr. Ellard has been just such an informed observer. He writes: "Now that Mass modifications are being rigorously studied by the scholars it becomes clear that reform inevitably entails making some external aspects of the Mass more closely resemble non-Catholic worship; such changes will be hailed by our non-Catholic brethren. On the other hand, by

the beneficent working, over large areas, of what is styled the development of faith, the basic attitude of non-Catholics is now reducing the distance separating their service from the Mass. If Catholic externals seem to be tending toward external aspects of non-Catholic worship, happily the incomplete Eucharistic beliefs of many non-Catholics, here and there and everywhere, are growing toward the fuller reality already possessed by Catholics."²³ The greater part of this book can serve as documentation of the first assertion; the chapter which follows the passage quoted documents the second.

Covering much the same ground as Fr. Ellard but according more attention to the theology itself of the Mass, Fr. Murphy underlines as well from time to time the relevance of liturgical reform in the Catholic Church to the problem of unity.²⁴ He is, however, most circumspect in his optimism as the chapters, "Converts and the Liturgy" and "Trent and Latin," make abundantly clear. Indeed, many good things, temperately said, are to be found in this far-ranging study. But perhaps it is legitimate to surmise how much would be gained if his analysis of the notion of sacrifice took as great cognizance of Pre-Reformation thinking as does his presentation, say, of the principles of liturgical reform. The understanding of sacrifice, it goes without saying, is close to the very heart of the matter and the positions rather hastily assumed by theologians of the Counter-Reformation in terms of the Reformer's denials leave much to be desired. And the positions assumed by so many contemporary theologians in terms of the positions assumed by their battling ancestors leave, perhaps, even more to be desired. A genuine *ressourcement* here, if anywhere, seems in order.

Aid in that direction has been pro-

vided latterly, notably by Fr. Palmer.²⁶ Now we have as well, in English that is not altogether fortunate, Fr. Daniélou's Notre Dame lectures of a few years ago.²⁶ To matter of quite incredible richness and beauty they join the sober insights of a scholar perfectly at home in Scripture and the Fathers. The Exposition of the sacraments of initiation as efficacious *signs* could hardly be more luminously or persuasively presented.

The chief weakness of Fr. Leeming's generally magnificent attempt to restate the general doctrine of the sacraments within a wider and more realistic perspective derives from his neglect of studies such as these.²⁷ The good things he does say seem to have been born of a singularly felicitous impatience with the narrowness of the conventional theology manuals rather than from any acquaintance (beyond the ability to cite them at the foot of a page) with recent pertinent work in Biblical and Patristic theology. There is a certain "wholeness" of such theology that the speculative theologian must initially (and throughout) expose himself to under penalty of otherwise distorting or impoverishing the realities of which he speaks. One of the more heartening signs of the times is precisely just such an awareness on the part of some of the more influential Protestant biblical theologians. Oscar Cullmann, of course, was—and is—the leader herein, but the work in general of the Neuchâtel group grows apace in extent and quality. And in practical consequences. The Calvinist monastic foundation of Taizé, with its rich liturgical life and its concern for Church unity, is its direct outgrowth. Such things as Clark's monograph²⁸ would have been inconceivable a few decades ago. It all seems to fit together with the assertions, upon other grounds, of Fr. Ellard reported above.

III

OTHER, EVEN MORE influential Protestant biblical theologians move in other directions. Most notable among them, of course, is Prof. Bultmann, the second and third volumes of whose biblical theology have now been made available in an excellent one-volume English version.²⁹ Here the reader may behold in full career the process of "demythologizing" to which reference has already been made.³⁰ Here, interspersed with positively brilliant observations and interpretations which no serious student of the New Testament can afford to neglect, is an arbitrariness calculated, I should think, to set one's hair quietly a-curl. To the Johannine writings the author gives extended attention, disproportionately extended, some might conclude, remembering the scanty treatment he accorded the Synoptics in the earlier volume. But he is simply being faithful, in his fashion, to the principles of demythologizing: the Synoptic Gospels provide no basis for the interpretation of the mythic in the New Testament message since their "historical" (*historisch*) value is negligible and their "historic" (*geschichtlich*) value is nil;³¹ and they are themselves encrusted in mythology. The Gospel of John escapes, largely, such deficiencies: its perspective is Post-Resurrectional so that its "historic" value is considerable and John has already begun the process of demythologizing right there. As Bultmann continues the process, with both Gospel and the first Johannine epistle, much is made to fall by the way. References to sacraments are eliminated as interpolations because the theology of John has no need of sacraments. References to a future judgment are eliminated as probable editorial additions (the shadowy, omnipresent "ecclesiastical editor" is perhaps a too great favorite with the

author) because John's is realized eschatology. And so on. "Thus it turns out in the end," he writes, "that Jesus as the Revealer of God *reveals nothing but that he is the Revealer*."³² Is revelation, then, totally without content? Or is it perhaps somehow present in the faith revelation evokes? In Bultmannian terms, what happens in the believer's "decision for God against the World"? We are told that the believer is offered union, impersonal and indirect (on this Bultmann insists), with a Revealer who reveals nothing but the fact that He is the Revealer. This, unless I have misinterpreted the author egregiously, is the abiding good news of John. The rest of the volume, on "The Development Toward the Ancient Church," is marred, I fear, by an arrant arbitrariness almost as great.

It can be singularly instructive to compare, as is now possible for the English reader, the methods and results of Bultmann with those of Stauffer,³³ to contrast the erratic brilliance of the one with the pedestrian realism of the other. The erudition of Stauffer is no less great than that of Bultmann; the amount indeed that is compressed within a paragraph as simple sentence falls upon simple sentence never ceases to surprise. But with Stauffer erudition takes precedence over insight and seems everywhere immediately relevant to the purpose at hand, the interpretation in biblical terms of the biblical text, the interpretation of the historical event in terms of historical context.

Or, again, one might now profitably compare the principles upon which Bultmann works with those of Cullmann, who is, you might say, a rather more spontaneous and lively Stauffer. They may be viewed, first of all, in operation in his Hewitt Foundation lectures.³⁴ A minute examination, philological and historical, of the successive eval-

uations of the State by Jesus, Paul, and the Apocalypse forces the author to affirm the existence of a doctrinal constant on the subject in the early Church (whatever the seeming contradictions) and provides a pretty confirmation of his theology of history which years ago he plotted out more generally in his *Christ and Time*. The apparent contradictions in early Church-State doctrine which have this last while so exercised biblical scholars have, he holds, a double source: the State itself and the Christian situation. Thus, according as the State abides within its limits or no, it is described by primitive Christianity as servant of God or as instrument of Satan. And, since the Christian situation is one "of fulfillment but not of completion," there is the acceptance, in principle, of the State as such and there is the criticism, in principle, of every State. The author, it would seem, is especially happy in his emphasizing of this tension between the "now" of fulfillment and the "one day" of completion as a characteristic, from the beginning, of the New Testament situation. Certainly Bultmann's contention that this idea of tension is a late solution "born of embarrassment" is possible only because he has already eliminated the early textual witness to the "one day."

The interested reader may find a more or less explicit statement of Prof. Cullmann's principles of biblical interpretation in the collection of his essays garnered from a variety of German, French, and English periodicals, for there is reproduced therein his "The Necessity and Function of Higher Criticism" of 1949.³⁵ In this paper he returns to a subject he first broached in public back in 1929. Then, it will be recalled, he came to the aid of Karl Barth in the latter's defense of the legitimate scientific nature of "theological exegesis" against the contention, then very much

in vogue, that only philological and/or historical exegesis was scientific. In the years between the prevalent temper has changed so that a defense of philological and historical exegesis seemed in order, and it is that he provides here. And the balanced judgment which on both occasions felt forced to spell out how it is not a question of *either-or* but properly of *both-and* is pleasantly present throughout the entire volume.³⁶

Obviously it is easier to shine when you have opted for one or the other.³⁷ And yet two of our own American scholars have managed to shine brilliantly while maintaining the *both-and*, and that in the area, I should imagine, where the temptation is greatest to have a pyrotechnic go at one or the other—the Old Testament. Fr. Vawter limits himself to a chapter by chapter explanation of Genesis.³⁸ Fr. McKenzie presents the religious and spiritual values of the entire Old Testament as grouped about various basic themes (Revelation, History, the Mystery of Iniquity, etc.). Each of them moves through the complexities of his matter with the accomplished ease of, say, an old gentleman walking his dog. It is all very amazing and all very wonderful. And consoling, too; for these are obviously two men with many another book in them.

NOTES

* Thus in his *God the Unknown* to which detailed reference has already been made in the first part of this survey, p. 279.

¹⁴ Walter Marshall Horton, *Christian Theology, An Ecumenical Approach* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955), pp. xii-304, \$3.75.

¹⁵ George H. Tavard, A.A., *The Catholic Approach to Protestantism* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955), pp. xv-160, \$2.50.

¹⁶ Columba Cary-Elwes, O.S.B., *The Sheepfold and the Shepherd* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1956), p. 259, \$3.25.

¹⁷ The eminent ecclesiologist, Gustave Weigel, has pertinent things to say on this point in his "A Catholic Primer on the Ecumenical

Movement," *The Thomist Reader*, I (1957), 18-70, especially pp. 56-59.

¹⁸ Louis Bouyer, *The Spirit and the Forms of Protestantism* (Westminster: The Newman Press, 1956), pp. xiii-234, \$3.75.

¹⁹ Henry St. John, O.P., *Essays in Christian Unity* (Westminster: The Newman Press, 1955), pp. xix-144, \$3.00.

²⁰ Norman Sykes, *Old Priest and New Presbyterian* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1956), pp. viii-266, \$5.00.

²¹ Hugh Ross Williamson, *The Great Prayer, concerning the Canon of the Mass* (New York: Macmillan, 1956), pp. xi-164, \$3.25.

²² To it one will want to add the sober theological analysis of four phrases of the Canon (*memores, offerimus, plebs sancta, socia exultatione*) by the master in these matters: J. A. Jungmann, S.J., *The Eucharistic Prayer* (Chicago: Fides, 1956), pp. vii-55, \$1.25.

²³ Gerald Ellard, S.J., *The Mass in Transition* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1956), pp. x-387, \$6.00. Rather more than I have indicated above is to be found in this chatty, erudite book: discussions of lay-priesthood, church architecture, art, choral speaking, etc.

²⁴ John L. Murphy, *The Mass and Liturgical Reform* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1956), pp. xii-340, \$5.95.

²⁵ Paul F. Palmer, S.J., *Sacraments and Worship, Liturgy and Doctrinal Development of Baptism, Confirmation, and the Eucharist* (Westminster: The Newman Press, 1955), pp. x-277, \$4.75.

²⁶ Jean Daniélou, S.J., *The Bible and the Liturgy* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1956), pp. 372, \$5.25.

²⁷ Bernard Leeming, S.J., *Principles of Sacramental Theology* (Westminster: The Newman Press, 1956), pp. lviii-690, \$6.75.

²⁸ Neville Clark, *An Approach to the Theology of the Sacraments* (Naperville, Illinois: Allenson, 1956), pp. 96, \$1.50. After collating much recent Protestant scholarship on the relation Baptism-Eucharist, the author seeks in a final chapter to situate the sacraments "within a context at once christological, ecclesiological and eschatological" where alone they can have "their full content and meaning."

²⁹ Rudolf Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament, Volume II* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956), pp. vi-278, \$4.00.

³⁰ CROSS CURRENTS, Summer, 1957, pp. 275-277.

³¹ The terminology derives from Heidegger who distinguishes *Historie*, which is "has-been-ness", from *Geschichte*, which is "an occurrence" (Concluded on page 383)

AUGUSTO GUZZO: A STUDY IN A PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

ALFRED DI LASCIA

- La filosofia e l'esperienza*, Roma, Perrella, 1942.
La filosofia domani, Milano, Bocca, 1943.
 (*La philosophie de demain*, preface de R. Le-
 Senne, Paris, Aubier, 1953.)
Germinale, *Discorsi* 1938-1950, Torino, Edi-
 zioni di "Filosofia," 1951.
L'io e la ragione, Brescia, Morcelliana, 1947.
La Moralità, Torino, Edizioni di "Filosofia,"
 1950.
Augusto Guzzo, a cura di A. Plebe, M. F. Sciac-
 ca, L. Pareyson, V. Mathieu, E. Arlandi; To-
 rino, Edizioni di "Filosofia," 1954.
La scienza, Torino, Edizioni di "Filosofia," 1955.
Parerga, Torino, Edizioni di "Filosofia," 1956.

AN ENCOUNTER with a philosopher of major stature ought to be welcome, especially when that philosopher, relatively unknown in one cultural context, has already achieved a widespread hearing in another cultural context. Precisely such an encounter may be experienced by confrontation with the collective work of a man who may be described as one of the most creative phi-

Alfred DiLascia has been one of the editors of CROSS CURRENTS since its founding; his editorial "The Power to be Free" (Winter 1955) was widely appreciated, and his work has also appeared in THOUGHT and HUMANITAS. A specialist in modern Italian philosophy, Professor DiLascia feels that an introduction to the work of Augusto Guzzo may help bring some American readers to the study of a major contemporary philosopher.

Professor Guzzo holds the chair of both Moral and Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Turin. An autobiographical sketch and an indispensable bibliography will be found in the collection of studies published under the title, AUGUSTO GUZZO. (See notes)

losophers of our time: Augusto Guzzo, of the University of Turin.

Before undertaking to present some of the major themes in Guzzo's philosophy we would like to re-affirm what we assume to be the alpha and omega of every reviewer's conscience: that no review is capable of reconstructing, let alone recreating, that singular tonality of thought and style which only the original source can yield. Our simple intention and hope is to provoke an interest in, and arouse a desire for, the actual writings of Augusto Guzzo.

Apart from the accident of language, one possible reason for the relative ignorance of Guzzo's writings in Anglo-American quarters is the peculiar character of his philosophical vision. Being neither exclusively concerned with achieving competence in linguistic or logical analysis, nor pretending to escape from the moral pressure of the *unum necessarium*, Guzzo has been devoting himself, for some four decades, to a vision of philosophy as a total experience, rigorously controlled by the critical exercise of reason, dialectically free yet ethically committed, in fulfillment of St. Augustine's "Ipsum verum non videbis, nisi in philosophia totus intraveris."

Guzzo is presently engaged in the construction of a philosophical anthropology—*L'uomo*—which is to be completed in six volumes, of which three have already been published: *L'io e la ragione*, *La moralità*, and *La scienza*; the balance of the work will consist of separate volumes on *L'arte*, *La religione* and *La filosofia*. This monumental hexalogy is guided by a firm, systematic "outline"

which, Guzzo has written us, is the best introduction to his philosophy.¹ The six-fold articulation of the project is neither a direct empirical transcription of successive phases of the human spirit nor a necessary dialectical unfolding of some Universal Spirit; it is rather a systematic testimony, rationally delineated, of the manifold activities of the human spirit as they are engendered in a free confrontation with the organic texture of reality. Nor does the termination of the sequence with a volume on philosophy signify a dialectical absorption of religion into reason: although the setting is Hegelian, the substance and import of the methodology are quite different: philosophy is the study of all spiritual activities, including itself, and is neither conclusive (though concluding) nor superior to any other spiritual activity.²

Philosophy is envisioned as "a radical critique of life,"³ expressed as a reasoned articulation of the human spirit in act, and the human spirit in act is described as a form perennially posing problems to reason. The function of this enterprise is to define, elucidate, and systematize the vast problematic web of human experience. Experience is at once the exclusive and inclusive source of philosophy: it is exclusive in so far as it is the sole methodological way to human knowledge, and it is inclusive in so far as it embraces the whole ontological range of things. More precisely, experience signifies the concrete relationship between the experiencing self and whatever it is that is being experienced. The "whatever" is the crucial term, for if philosophy is to be rigorously faithful to the manifold realities of human experience, sensitive to what might be called the on-going human enterprise, it must articulate the uncensored richness of the human situation in a strict interpretation of the classical message of hu-

manism: "Homo sum et nihil humani a me alienum puto."⁴ Consequently, neither a rhetorical apologetics nor an abstractionistic reductionism nor a dogmatic excision into the human enterprise can be philosophically tolerated, for none of these things is rationally warranted. It is precisely a consistent and critical execution of this total "humanism" that gives Guzzo's philosophy its breadth of vision and peculiar sensitivity to the human situation.⁵ The resolution (not to be confused with "reduction") of all philosophical problems to an anthropological center, conducted as a resolute, systematic and comprehensive inquiry into the origin, nature and purpose of that peculiar being which is man, constitutes the energizing principle of Guzzo's philosophy. In this respect, Guzzo moves within the problematic setting but not the total doctrinal commitment of Cassirer's *Essay on Man*.

Difficult as it is to capture the interconnected implications of the argumentation, the Proustian richness of Guzzo's conception of philosophy does require some elucidation. Philosophical reflection is described as an intimate experience of the human spirit at work within its own on-going processes, engaged in an effort at re-constructing both process and origin. The experience of spiritual activity and the activity of philosophical experience are so profoundly intertwined that philosophy itself must be seen as an immanent activity of consciousness, engaged in engendering that interior philosophy which Guzzo calls a *philosophia conscientiae*. Philosophy must not be coerced into a spatial straight-jacket suggesting an acrobatic somersault, in which consciousness, by turning upon itself, detaches its on-going processes into antecedent and subsequent moments of what is called an externalized *philosophia de conscientia*.⁶ *Philosophia conscientiae* is described "as

a deepening and, in the literal sense of the comparative, an interiorizing of the spirit within itself, as a process of becoming—in the very act of becoming a problem to oneself—more intimate to oneself than one is when consciousness is simply producing activities.”⁷ In the seminal article “Egologia” in *Parerga* it is argued that “the fulcrum of philosophy” revolves around that living self which “each person organizes into a singular vocation as he makes himself a being *sui et rerum et Dei conscius*, as Spinoza has written.”⁸ Thought is conceived as an activity which is capable of judging each moment of experience “*at the very moment that it is living the experience*,” and any given datum is seen not simply as something given to the human spirit for utilization and subsequent consumption but rather as “*an act given to be known, an insuppressible, internal moment of knowledge*.”⁹

So intimate and pervasive is the unity of experience and thought that Guzzo defines “the function of philosophy not as a ‘knowledge’ of spiritual activity but as a ‘thinking out’ of the conditions which make it possible to produce or re-trace values . . . ,” and so necessary is the philosophical knowledge of the origin of thought and thing that “its purpose is not simply to remain among things observing and describing but rather to trace the course of the waters by seeing how they are formed from the vantage point of the source.”¹⁰ The stress on the interiority of philosophy does not involve an intuitionistic conception of knowledge nor does the search for an ideal origin initiate a genetic fallacy. That reason plays an essential and mediating role in the acquisition of knowledge can be readily seen by studying Guzzo’s contribution to the Gallarate Convention of 1948, *Ricostruzione metafisica*. The traditional intellectualistic, Aristotelian-thomistic meta-

physics of being was ably presented at the convention by Gustavo Bontadini. In his response Guzzo expressed his full agreement with Bontadini’s definition of “the metaphysics of being as a rational mediation of *experience* in search of the idea of *being* or of the absolute,”¹¹ and proceeded to submit a significant clarification by describing the definition as “simply one of the aspects (or, if one prefers, tasks) of philosophy, which is indeed an essential aspect for me, but only in so far as it is co-essential with that inner search of, let us be clear, Augustinian inspiration . . . Metaphysical ‘discourse’ is the ineradicable and irreplaceable expression of the interior itinerary of man to God, completely inseparable from the interior way. I believe that it is impossible to separate the ‘discourse’ from the ‘way’ which it expresses.”¹² One of the most suggestive and comprehensive ways of circumscribing the function of philosophy is by mapping out its methodological programme in a precise and technical formulation: “Philosophy may be systematized as an analysis of the various ontological regions, after the fashion of Husserl; practised as an inquiry into the various activities of the human spirit, in the manner of Croce; or, finally, conducted as a kantian critique of the speculative, practical and aesthetic judgments,”¹³ all the while retaining an ineradicable sense of the problematic. More succinctly still, Guzzo has characterized philosophy as a “hermeneutic of experience.”¹⁴

To return to the announced six-fold programme, we should like to insist that it does not represent a phenomenology of either the motives or acted-out consequences of human conduct but a rational exploration of the nature, possibility, value and significance of human activity. Nor is the rational exploration to be confused with that historicistic jus-

tification of philosophy which Croce insisted upon, and which Guzzo has persistently rejected. Reason is the sole and inescapable instrument of philosophical inquiry and discovery, and hence must be fully deployed in response to "the inner oracle... the interior Delphi"¹⁵ which we are obliged to follow, as if it were the Socratic *daimon*. The logical impossibility of a pure description of human activity rests on the regulative priority of purpose and value; and since all knowledge is an effort at re-constructing purpose, and purpose is an expression of value, the only knowledge worth pursuing is a knowledge of value.

Lest we misjudge this architectonic project because of our empiricist suspicion of system-builders, I should like to point out that Guzzo is neither a novice nor a polymath, although he shares, with the better moments of each, bold speculative vigor and a vast philosophical erudition. In these, as well as in many substantive respects, he is deeply reminiscent of Josiah Royce.¹⁶ The long and disciplined years spent in that historical and critical workshop, indispensable for the formation of a mature philosophical consciousness, have yielded valuable studies, many of which are of singular theoretical import for the development of his philosophy. In fulfilment of his own suggestion that each philosopher should devote himself to those thinkers toward whom he feels the deepest theoretical and temperamental attraction, Guzzo's studies constitute a kind of prolegomenon to his philosophical system. The books on Spinoza, Kant, St. Augustine, Bruno; the commentaries on Plato's dialogues (along with many translations), on St. Thomas' two *Summae*, and Locke and Berkeley form an impressive preparation for his vast speculative enterprise.

GUZZO HAS IDENTIFIED the major sources of his thought in three revealing passages. In the preface to *Il pensiero di Spinoza* he speaks of the inescapable necessity of a philosophical encounter with Plato, Spinoza, and Kant for anyone who "wishes to see clearly within himself and understand the life around him;"¹⁷ in the concluding section of his article "Spinoza" in the *Enciclopedia Italiana* he writes: "Spinozism is one of the greatest experiences of human thought; it can neither be ignored nor set aside for it is impossible to philosophize without coming to terms with it. While it is possible to be either spinozistic or anti-spinozistic, it is utterly impossible to be a-spinozistic. Spinozism is not only one of the many systems which man has excogitated: it is the very delineation of the human mind itself, seen, to be sure, from one side. We can, and perhaps should, resist its unilateral nature, but if we prescind from spinozism we would again be unilateral and, consequently, in error."¹⁸ In "Crise et pérennité" Guzzo refers to his book on Spinoza as "the point of departure of my intellectual experience," and to his reading of St. Augustine as "another fundamental experience, along with the study of Plato," while he records the fermentation of ideas wrought in his consciousness by "the typically Augustinian relation of an immanent transcendence" which he associates with the great French spiritualist tradition in its wide range from "the augustinian metaphysics of Descartes, Malebranche and, in a sense, Bergson" to the contemporary "Philosophie de l'Esprit" of Lavelle and LeSenne.¹⁹ In the Introduction to the seminal *La philosophie de demain* LeSenne presents Guzzo to his French readers as one "who might be called a pascalian without wishing to be anti-cartesian."²⁰ This is a capital description of that peculiar philosophical genius

which insists on joining, in one continuous enterprise, the rationally demonstrable, which is alone convincing, and the actually experienced, which is alone persuasive; it is this genius which finds its supreme exemplar in what Guzzo has called "the pascalian moment of philosophy" (see "Il momento pascaliano della filosofia," in *Germinale*).

While intending neither a catalogue of ideological sources, nor a reduction of the system to a spineless eclecticism, we must round out our introduction by noting the joint Christian and humanistic sources of the rich Italian tradition: Bruno, Vico, Rosmini and, in more recent and intensely polemical years, Gentile and Croce. While rejecting the Hegelian-oriented immanentistic rationalism peculiar to Italian idealism, Guzzo has derived great value from the complex problems which this tradition has raised. If the term "idealism" had not acquired an unfortunate association with visions of disembodied and reified essences projected by the incurable delusions of philosophers engaged in a dialectical struggle with a vanishing world, we would fear no misunderstanding by describing his philosophy as a form of idealism. Although categories cannot capture the complexity of a given philosophical position, their utilization is pragmatically justified provided that they are accurately explained. Hence it is that Guzzo "declares himself obstinately an idealist, not in order to 'rank myself with idealists' and oppose myself to realists, but simply because both the beginning and the end of my thought are idealistic."²¹ This statement is pursued at length in the fundamental paper "Perchè Idealismo?", in which Guzzo explains in rigorous and lucid terms exactly what he means by describing his philosophy as an "absolute idealism."²² This paper is, in our opinion, one of the most penetrating and, though rela-

tively short (50 pages), one of the most comprehensive clarifications of the meaning of idealism yet written. Since compression of the article would constitute a parody of the complex articulation of the argument, we must, though reluctantly, forego a systematic exposition and utilize, instead, whatever phases of the argument might be necessary for the development of our exposition of Guzzo's total philosophy.²³

An excellent insight into his way of philosophizing is provided by his own successful practice of the necessity of a "constructive, indeed *poietic*" methodology for acknowledging, appreciating, and internalizing the strongest possible objections conceivable against one's own thoughts. The objections, however, must not be raised simply because it is "the academic practise, custom or fashion to do so;" for no thought is justified "unless it feels threatened, and unless it is disposed to change opinion, if rationally pressed." If these conditions are not fulfilled, we shall be engaging in "what is known as 'partito preso' (side adopted in advance), which is to say propaganda, preaching but not philosophy; and although propaganda and preaching are or may be very noble activities, they are not an exercise in philosophy."²⁴ It is precisely his mastery of the art of imaginative projection and the science of philosophical reconstruction which enriches Guzzo's thought with a sharp sensitivity to the variety of philosophical problems which have been raised in the course of man's perennial philosophizing. Anticipating a pervasive moral concern and a persistent effort to vindicate the singularity of the person, he speaks of "the truly moral obligation of understanding the intent of a philosophy as well as its literal statement."²⁵

According to Guzzo, man does not possess a "nature" in the corrupt ontological sense of a reified structure, for

he is an historical, creative and free spirit, unfettered by rigid forms precisely because it is his deepest vocation to engender and invent forms. If we should wish to use the philosophical language of form and nature, we would define man as a concrete subject, or form, informing both nature and spirit through and with freely created forms; in technical but highly revealing terms, man is defined as "la forma formante forme formate," and "l'operosità operante operosità operate," i.e. a freely engendered, freely engendering form.²⁶ In polemical opposition to Croce, Guzzo insists on the actual reality of the subject as the unifying agent of the manifold informing activities.²⁷

In polemical opposition against both the totalitarian vision of man conceived as an infinite pure act after the pattern of an Hegelian-inspired immanentistic idealism, and the paradoxical affirmation of man as infinite nothingness, after the complex vision of what might be called absolute existentialism, Guzzo asserts the fully potential character of the human infinite: "Man is an infinite capacity of becoming, yet a capacity which is absolutely definite because his potential is already prefigured in the present which is, according to Leibniz's powerful expression, '*gros de l'avenir*'."²⁸ Systematic reflection on the fundamental human situation of being born (not thrown, as some existentialists claim) without having caused one's own birth provokes the person into that consciousness of self, or *sensus sui*, which alone makes philosophical speculation possible. The *sensus sui*, reflexively exercised, yields one absolute certitude: that, infinite as man's capacity of becoming may be, and vast as the collective historical fulfilment of this potential has actually been, the capacity is radically impotent to account for the possession of such a power.

The more rigorously and consistently that capacity, or power to be free, is asserted, in the minute detail of an existentialist phenomenology, the deeper and sharper does the radical contingency of the human situation appear. Yet, while the exercise of the power to be free is not open to my choice since "it constitutes the very heart of my condition," and while my power is indeed infinite, "I must neither exalt nor belittle myself beyond measure: I must not exalt myself for, though perennial, I am not eternal, and I must not belittle myself because I am neither dispersed nor dissolved in time, but in and through it I endure and persist."²⁹ This theme is sharply etched in the *aperçus*, "Le sentiment du provisoire" in *La philosophie de demain*, as Guzzo extracts, out of the very acknowledgment of the provisional and temporal, the latent dialectical implication of an eternal and transcendent presence, and shows that the attempt to enclose reality wholly within time by an identification of the self with any given moment "is the most serious error of interpretation which man can commit,"³⁰ and hence that it casts an original stain on philosophical speculation.

L'io e la ragione

IN *L'io e la ragione*, which introduces us to the heart of Guzzo's epistemology and consequently to the theoretical foundations of his philosophy, freedom of inquiry is made the indispensable condition for the discovery of truth, and the discovery of truth is proposed as the inner purpose, or to be exact, *vocation* of human existence. In his own terminology the moment of freedom is called "initiative" and the moment of judgment, or discovery, "awareness" ("*consapevolezza*").³¹ That "the true is implicit in knowing" is the theme of the crucial chapter by that title, in which

it is argued that the very activity of inquiring, without necessarily discovering, presupposes the true as the energizing finality of the inquiry.³² And not even a pragmatic insistence on the primacy of the useful can destroy the natural desire, for the opposite assertion, that "only the useful is true" presupposes the *truth* of that statement.³³ That the whole movement of philosophical inquiry is provoked by an ineradicable need ("bisogno") for the true and a concomitant desire for the intelligible is expressed concisely in the following passage: "The conviction that everything has a meaning, and that the human intellect is made in order to know that meaning, is the consequence of every knowing experience, successful or unsuccessful as it may be... it is obvious that not only is it impossible to know without knowing something definite but it is necessary to grasp whatever we do know in terms of knowability, intelligibility or, though the word may be abused and seem equivocal, rationality..."³⁴

In the tradition of those philosophers who present a new philosophy in old terminology, Guzzo is advancing a bold vision of the knowing process conceived as a vast quest, experiential and problematic in origin, provisional in exercise, lacking definitiveness yet thoroughly definite, inadequate as a total experience yet absolutely certain in individual discoveries. We are warned against the perennial threat of two forms of equivocations, each individually damaging to the knowing enterprise. We must neither confuse truth with the quantitative concept of totality—the temptation of both a logicalistic scholasticism and an immanentistic rationalism—nor identify the true with the exact physical contours of nature—the temptation of an absolute empiricism. Our effort should be directed at a warranted utilization of

universal ideas, in pursuit of the actual, and since the actual is always singular and determinate, the only truth that is discoverable is truth that is definite, singular and certain: "An answer (to a given problem) cannot be true outside of a reference to a) a question which has been rigorously determined, and b) a mind which has formulated it."³⁵ In this ontological bondage to particular truths Guzzo discerns a profoundly ethical motive: "Our vocation to the true, extended throughout our entire existence, is affirmed in the humility of particular questions."³⁶ And the humble search for the particular solution rests on the existential priority of the true as the regulative principle of all human effort. A clarification of the normative role of truth in knowledge is to be found in Guzzo's re-statement of the experience of *Veritas as Mater temporis*,³⁷ while in *L'io e la ragione* utilization is made of the Spinozistic formula of an ideologically Augustinian inspiration, *Verum index sui et falsi*, in a polemical thrust against the relentless pessimism of an absolute existentialism which prefers to believe that it is rather *falsum index sui et veri*.³⁸

The problem of truth is a persistent concern throughout Guzzo's philosophical effort, and finds significant clarification in many of his writings. In what is perhaps one of the most incisive commentaries yet written on the *Theaetetus*, the problem of truth is confronted with the full dialectical sensitivity that is required to meet the formidable objections of Heraclitus and Protagoras; and, to choose a shorter and no less convincing and powerful illustration, in one of the many rich 'discussions' appended to *La moralità*, "Strumentalismo, convenzionalismo, pragmatismo," Guzzo works with, through and out of each of these "relativistic" positions to show the presence of truth as the form of the un-ac-

knowledge but absolute and immutable structure of thought. The vindication of the absolute within the very mobility of the relative leads to the joint acknowledgment of relation as the all pervasive trait of being and ontological source of human knowledge.

In the 'discussion' "Successione e causalità" in *L'io e la ragione*, the argument is pressed beyond a simple acknowledgment of reciprocal action or interaction in nature to a vindication of the full range of relation, as relation proper is distinguished from the narrow and "'abstract' simplicity of causal relations which run in one direction and the anonymous complication of relations which produce, in an infinite interplay, a neutral texture wherein everything is determined but nothing determines."³⁹ Relations are neither external modal appendages of substance nor supervening categories imposed by the mind; they are neither unilinear causes isolated out of the web of natural relations nor undifferentiated links within vanishing subjects. Relations are real, pervasive, inescapable, and hence constitute the matrix of being. Yet never are they so possessive of the real as to destroy the structural autonomy of individual substances.

Guzzo accepts the traditional epistemological exigencies, without sharing the doctrinal presupposition, of the omnipresence of being as the necessary if not primary object of the intellect, of judgment as the necessary and proper instrument of understanding, and of fixating the universal essences of things through concept and judgment as the sole warrant of knowledge. But since "nature" in context consists of engendered natures engendering, the traditional doctrine of essence and concept must be either strengthened through re-interpretation, or simply dropped. In fulfillment of a long-range methodological

program, Guzzo prefers to deepen through re-consideration. All things in nature are born into existence, and undergo constant change as they develop, interact and perish; yet never is change so omnivorous as to destroy the underlying pattern, the typical structure, the universal nature. Guzzo takes the word "nature" at its face value, and drives it to its etymological roots of "bringing to birth," "engendering." And since nothing engenders outside of a specific relationship, and since concrete relationship is a link in the total connexity of things, "nature" can be adequately understood only in a relational, i.e. genetic and organic setting. Yet, no single thing can be completely known outside of its *total* relations, and since not all relations can be known because of the empirical unavailability of the primitive relation, all human knowledge is necessarily approximative, inadequate, partial and, in a very precise and far-reaching sense, negative.⁴⁰ Moreover, the spiritual contingency of the human infinite, with its individual psychic structure and temperamental disposition, both culturally conditioned, excites a peculiar kind of judgmental activity, which Guzzo undertakes to explain within the framework of his absolute idealism.

Every human judgment is "*configured according to an individual tonality, in a history of particular experiences all my own, by the evaluative function which acts as its 'regulative' principle.*"⁴¹ The judgment is a selective activity of the mind which, in its search for the true, is guided, conditioned, stimulated, occasioned by an active interest in the discovery of specific purposes, values or, to be precise, ideals; yet, precise and crucial as the qualifying adjectives are, we must stress the possibility and, subsequently, reality of interest as a disposition of mind and will capable of yielding true though inadequate knowledge,

by a two-fold observation. First, that the regulative interest neither causes, determines nor necessitates the act of knowledge and its consequent discoveries, and secondly, that the humanistic and pragmatic vindication of the selective and evaluative function of the judgment is perfectly justified on the one vital condition that knowledge "not be 'reduced' to 'evaluation' with the *arrière-pensée* that not only is evaluation an individual process but that, precisely because it is individual, it must be unstable and, because unstable, arbitrary,"⁴¹ an opinion which Guzzo has frequently and sharply criticized. "Il concetto di 'attualità' del filosofi classici," in *Germinal*, is an historiographical extension of Guzzo's criticism to a facile indictment of the history of philosophy as either a tragedy of comic errors (from an absolutistic point of view or a comedy of tragic errors (from a skeptical point of view). Since every philosophical problem is inescapably conditioned by personal and historical processes, the history of philosophy is a history of philosophical interests; yet, far from interest-guided judgments provoking distorted visions of being, the very fact that such judgments are so singularly conditioned leaves them open to exact verification so that, if they were once true, they will always remain true—provided that they are properly re-constructed, and if once false, they will always remain false; if probable, always probable, if doubtful, always doubtful, provided that the original conditions are re-captured. It is an *idea* conceived by the activity of reason in response to a singular and determinate existent, and is formulated as a "conjecture" or proposal to reconstruct the ideal genesis of the existent by projecting ourselves into "the point of view of its author, human or not," without presuming to read any inscribed divine messages either out of

or into physical objects.⁴² Physical objects provide the necessary but not sufficient stimulation and the contingent, and therefore not necessary, occasion for the creation of cognitive forms, or universals. While it was "St. Thomas who saw clearly . . . [that human knowledge] consists in proposing universals in order to understand the object . . ."⁴⁴ it was Vico, we may add, who understood that he knows best a given object who has either created or invented it, and that consequently the supreme exemplar of certain knowledge is to be found in mathematics. (This theme is pursued throughout *La scienza*).

Far from encroaching on the primordial activity of the Creator, man's secondary powers of creation provide the most tangible evidence that he is a creature, for although he can indeed know and re-create, he is not the author of his own *power* to create. "He is a creature who cannot simply copy things; he must conjecture the character that might have been stamped on them by Him who made them. Although born *after* things have been created, he is unable to understand them unless he places himself mentally *before* they were created, by conjecturing the ideal origin ("scaturigine"), at least as a model or schema. Since man has arrived, as a creature, in a world already made, the more he attempts to reconstruct the processes of its formation the more will he find himself *presupposing* the fiat of the Creator."⁴⁵

The universal must be concrete for, as Hegel has correctly observed, it is impossible to eat fruit in general, but only this apple, this pear, this plum. Since it is impossible, moreover, to experience any indeterminate, undifferentiated whole, the traditional arrangement of such wholes as genera and species on a scale of ascending abstraction and vanishing concreteness, is useless in our

search for the singularity of things. Universals or genera are defined as "seeds" which "create families, heirs, generations, *ghéne*, i.e. lineages (*stirpi*), family stocks (*prosapie*), and not logical genera."⁴⁶ Lest this suggestion be passed off as a literary metaphor and hence unphilosophical, let us look at the technical apparatus on which it rests.

Using Spinoza's terminology, Guzzo shows how the singular existent may be reached through an application of a *conceptus* to a *conceptum*, and describes the *conceptus* as that unifying activity of the mind which "individuates the idea of a given structure and function by assuming the role of a mother-idea whose offspring bear the mark of their origin," and the *conceptum* as the organization, in one logical model or exemplar, of that "same seal, same structure, same function" which the human mind discovers in "the various orders of thinkable experience." In sum, the *conceptus* is the subjective source which individuates, distinguishes, fixates an idea, or exemplar, while the *conceptum* is the objective exemplification of the individuated *conceptus*.⁴⁷

The inexhaustible inner fecundity of the mind, forming *conceptum* after *conceptum*, cannot be restricted to any pre-established logical mold; hence the composite kantian *a priori*, which constructs objects according to a fixed *a priori* structure, is incapable of reconstructing and interpreting the pulsating mobility of experience, (cf. the fundamental 'discussion,' "*Le categorie nella Critica della ragion pura*," in *L'io e la ragione*). The criticism of Kant's "rigid abstractionism," which is equally applicable to all theories of pre-fabricated logical schemata, leads Guzzo to insist on the idea of possible being as that specific "form of truth" by which the human mind gains access to the infinite range of the

possible. The philosophical lineage of this idea is traceable directly to Rosmini who wrote that "the most important of all ideas, indeed the only one that deserves the name idea is the idea of the possible."⁴⁸

Ethically, the universal is a value which acts as a guide for the communal exploration of the total connexity of things. In this respect it is described as "the disposition to establish a universe, the capacity to express value. That universe in which it is not (logical) extension but (ethical) cohesion which matters, and which is established by the universal value of the duty to reason, is precisely the human community..."⁴⁹ In *La Moralità* the ethical import of the universal is brought to bear directly on the specifically moral question of justice; although concepts are utilized in the theoretical elaboration of the nature of justice no single concept is adequate for expressing that which is the human source of justice, namely, "a profound but obscure exigency to be just."⁵⁰

This conception of the value of the universal as instituting and directing a community of inquiring minds, and the subsequent insistence on the essential role of will in both rational inquiry and the community, is reminiscent of the mature speculation of Peirce and Royce on the problem of the logic and ethics of the community. The universal is conceived as a vocation to the true, as a will to know; and is realized as a value which acts as the dynamic instrumentality for the ideal configuration, and subsequent actualization of human purposes. Such is the joint message of Peirce, Royce and Guzzo, which message may be traced, in its remote origins, to an Augustinian inspiration and which rests, ultimately, on Biblical sources.

La moralità

THE GREATER PART of *La moralità* is devoted to a masterful phenomenological exploration of moral attitudes, to a clarification of the traditional concepts of justice and charity, to a fine analysis of political society, and to a rigorous establishment of the subjective objectivity of moral values. Should we wish to isolate one leitmotif out of Guzzo's vast moral philosophy (*La moralità* fills more than 500 pages), we would undoubtedly select his fundamental Christian-kantian commitment to "...our rational nature as an end in itself and to a respect for man as a being endowed with freedom and dignity..."⁶¹ Since the temptation of mistaking the stark simplicity of moral truths for a tautological rhetoric tends to weaken our effort at philosophical elucidation and since mere profession, howsoever genuine, of the moral imperative is insufficient to yield a critical understanding of either its structure or implications, the announced moral imperative must be submitted to a patient and rigorous analysis. The categorical imperative to love man as an end in himself is shown to reach into the interstices of human society as the traditional problem of "the individual and society" is refined into a more precise and intimate relationship between the individual, understood as an "existence, i.e. what a man is to himself," and society understood as "co-existence, i.e. what a man is to others, and others to him." In this fashion the vast interplay of personal motives, interests, purposes and ideals becomes transformed into a deeply personal-social experience which is described as "the reciprocal presence of inner selves." The emphasis on the interpenetrability of consciences brings about a shift in the traditional division of duties into duties towards self and duties towards

others, as the self becomes the indivisible bearer of both "auto-duties" and "hetero-duties."⁶² The insistence on interiority is the keystone of Guzzo's restatement of the four-fold way: as a mastery of self, in temperance; as a conquest of events, in fortitude; as repression of selfishness, in justice; as neighborly love, in charity. Rich as the analysis of these moral relations is, Guzzo's distinctive originality and characteristic way of philosophizing emerges in his treatment of the processes of moral judgment and of the origin, nature and finality of moral values.

The crucial problem of "authority and morality" is treated in the concise 'discussion' by that title appended to the main text of *La moralità*. The issue is joined as we are pressed towards a solution of the problem concerning the origin and warrant of moral judgments: how and when am I to act? at what precise moment in my deliberative process am I to issue a warrant for action? Should authority legislate for me by prescribing every detail of my life, or should I act on my own account and be my own judge? Should tradition or conscience constitute the ultimate court of appeal? As the questions multiply the problems become more complex and the answers more compounded; our own selection of questions for discussion must remain unavoidably one-sided. Rejecting as extremes both an "anti-historical individualism" and an untested traditionalism, Guzzo urges a critical confrontation of traditional teaching and a personal acceptance of that alone which has survived the most rigorous rational test. Anything short of this is not only rejected as unwarranted but is denounced outright as immoral for there is no substitute, in moral matters, for that ultimate court of appeal which is the uncoerced conscience. Yet neither must traditional teachings be rejected in ad-

vance of a critical examination, for "to examine them is an undeniable moral duty;" it is only a supine submission to an un-tested and un-convincing tradition that must be resolutely rejected. To insist on the validity of traditional teaching while "...renouncing both the dignity of accepting that alone which convinces me and the moral probity of assimilating that alone which I have personally verified as true, is a strange acknowledgment of the immoral as something prior to that morality which is presumed to follow from the very teachings which have been recommended to my attention." Unless each person interiorizes a given moral imperative by the joint effort of will and reason, that imperative will remain inoperative and hence 'rhetorical'; if a moral decision is to have any integrity at all, the will must be absolutely sincere and the reason must be exercised in good faith, and to the fullest extent of its capacity. I shall not be held responsible for following what others have suggested nor even for the way in which I have utilized my mental capacities, conditioned as I am by a concrete historical context; but, "...given my natural endowments fully exercised in accordance with my mental light in the historical moment in which I have chanced to be born... (there is He who reads into my heart and demands that I do what I am capable of doing, in good conscience and good will...); in the judgment of the morality of my soul and life I shall not be held responsible for my intellectual achievements, but for my good will, sincerity and goodness in doing whatever the light of my intellect, howsoever feeble, has proposed that I do...; it is not at all pride, but a sense of duty which causes me to follow that inner guide or beacon which has been given to me and which should preserve me from uttering any pharisaical regrets

that I am neither more learned nor more wise." The rational consistency and moral probity of the argument is admirable, for even in the case of positive revelation Guzzo insists that "...if, in clear good faith, I should not be convinced, I would have the duty of seeking more clarity but, in the meantime, it would be a sacrilege to feign (*fin-gere*: perhaps we ought to translate, fake) a faith which I do not experience; furthermore, an *obsequium* which is not rational would constitute an offence, not a homage to God, and hence would be deeply immoral."⁵³

A persistent effort to satisfy the joint demands of idealism and existentialism yields a suggestive theory of value.⁵⁴ The over-riding exigency to be fulfilled is expressed concisely: "The bond between the ideal and the existent is the profoundest philosophical proposition and greatest insight of Plato."⁵⁵ Moral values, like all products of the human spirit, are engendered by the free activity of the person engaged in creating, or inventing forms in the guise of proposals, for resolving the definite problems as they arise in unique historical situations. Yet neither the individuality of their origin nor the temporality of their embodiment necessitate any sort of relativism or temporal dissolution of values in an unintelligible stream of becoming; on the contrary, it is precisely the "subjective" birth and historical spread of moral values which attest to the immanent presence of a transcendent and objective source. Moreover, the moral concern itself is essentially unchanging for it expresses "that fundamental and immutable character of the human situation which demands a fixation of norms as a direct obligation of sincerity and courage."⁵⁶

The search for and fixation of ethical norms raises anew and acutely the problem of "the universality of reason

and the personality of the self,"⁵⁷ and the question is compounded as Guzzo refuses to compromise either the absoluteness of norms or the individuality of ethical decisions. The Augustinian *redi in te ipsum* and the correlative *Veritas mater temporis* act as the joint support of that singular objective interiority which is the alpha and omega of Guzzo's philosophical anthropology. We have already seen how man is defined as an essentially free agent, perennially engendering new forms in response to concrete and singular situations, and how the self is the maker of its own activities although it is not the author of its own powers. We have also seen how the universal is an exigency to search for the true rather than a quantitative measurement of the hierarchical range of its extension.

As logical truth is engendered, or constructed in the process of what is called "the rhythm of thinking,"⁵⁸ without becoming fused with the shifting rhythm itself, so moral truth is engendered, or constructed in the process of acting out the consequences of rationally discovered laws, without losing the absoluteness of its normative form. Guzzo argues at length that the irreducible interiority of moral law is perfectly compatible with the absoluteness of its validity, and that the very connaturality, or as he calls it, *congenerità*,⁵⁹ between the searching conscience and the discovered law, disproves their being either identical or, much less, totally separate. Not only can we assert that the moral law is the inner force at once motivating and supporting single actions, but we may rightly claim that it comes into existence or, to be more precise, is awakened into being "only if conscience searches for it (since) the profound destiny of conscience consists in the search for its own immanent law; this does not at all mean that the law is present to conscience by nature

(naturalmente), independently of that search (*ricerca*) which it voluntarily initiates."⁶⁰ The principle herein announced, that of law as *immanent*, introduces us to what is perhaps the central theme in Guzzo's philosophy.

All human activities are multiple manifestations of the immanent dynamism of mind and will, and they are always singular. Thought is man thinking and will is man doing, and in each activity the energizing source is the inventiveness of man. Yet neither is thought exclusively subjective nor is action primarily external. The objectivity or, as Guzzo prefers to say, universal validity of thought is guaranteed by a conscientious and hence moral practise of the traditional three-fold way of arriving at truth by excluding irrelevant possibilities, negating contradictions, and identifying each thing for what it is.⁶¹ The integrity and moral validity of action is guaranteed by a personal search, test and verification of the rules engendered by the immanent moral law in response to concrete situations, "in the full freedom of that autonomous movement towards the rule (or maxim) which must be acknowledged as worthy of acceptance as norm."⁶² Each person, from the most untutored to the most learned, is obliged to interpret the moral law by "forming his own moral life, as a witness to that unique law which he recognizes and confesses by moulding his own conduct."⁶³ The argument is pursued in *La moralità*, as a distinction is introduced between moral and positive law. Observing that "there is no (necessary) dialectical passage between ethics and law," Guzzo distinguishes between the self-engendered and self-verified norms and maxims of ethics, and the other-engendered and other-positated precepts and statutes of law; in the one case, the motivating power is the interior consent of that "moral auto-legislation" which

proposes "auto-duties"; in the other the animating force is the external command of that "juridical hetero-legislation" which imposes "hetero-duties." As Guzzo suggests that unjust laws may, and should, be righted within a given juridical order, he raises the crucial problem—of great theoretical complexity and practical urgency—of the relationship between law and justice, a problem which has taxed the ingenuity of thinkers and the patience of political men ever since its dramatic and concrete embodiment in the death of Socrates.⁶⁴

The peculiar character and function of the universal in Guzzo's philosophy is especially adequate to express the joint exigency of the absolute and the personal, of the normative (reason), and the inventive (conscience). The immanent dynamism of the universal is one with that constitutive "informing form" which, self-activated as good will, searches out the moral solutions of singular and concrete problems. The formal character—"formalità"—of the moral law consists in a substantive dynamism, for the good will engendered can be exercised only on singular and concrete moral problems. The regulative and excitatory flexibility of the universal makes it eminently responsive to problematic situations as they arise, one by one, at unpredictable times in unforeseen guises, and consequently press for new solutions in the form of new duties. The historical origin of the unforeseen duties neither invalidates the certified truth of traditional duties nor does it prepare new duties for a future dialectical negation. Being historically engendered, moral duties are eternally bound to individual, *hic et nunc* situations, and hence are inescapably relational. Yet it is utterly false to confuse relationalism with relativism.⁶⁵ This is a crucial point in Guzzo's philosophical anthropology, and requires precise elucidation, for it

touches the heart of his philosophical outlook.

In his synoptic article "L'Etica di Augusto Guzzo," Luigi Pareyson has captured both the animating spirit and precise letter of Guzzo's thought as he observes that "the fundamental thesis of *L'io e la ragione* is the assertion that the relativity of the true to single problems resolved does not imply relativism at all. Although the answers are always different because the questions themselves differ, and although no given answer can be applied indifferently to all questions, the solution of every question, if true, is unique, for it is the only rational resolution possible; furthermore, if the solution given to different questions is to be true, each solution *must* be different . . ."⁶⁶ The dominant insistence on the singular as the only reality which man is capable of apprehending, howsoever imperfectly, is carried over into the sphere of ethics, as we have had occasion to see briefly. So deep-rooted is Guzzo's vindication of the singular that he quotes such disparate philosophers as St. Thomas and Leibniz, Spinoza and Locke; for St. Thomas' theory of individuation is convincing and hence rationally acceptable only if it is read in a Leibnizian setting, while both Spinoza and Locke are singled out for their 'most noteworthy' and 'definitive' assertions concerning the singularity of specific acts of will and their insistence on the consequent 'absurdity' of admitting a generic 'power to will' in advance of the actual willing; belief in an antecedent and indifferent 'power of willing,' equiprobably directed to 'either one or the other of two contrary things, or possibly to neither,' is shown to be philosophically unwarranted.⁶⁷ The search for the singular good is so imperative that Guzzo—in his long section on political society in *La moralità*—argues that it is impossible to prescribe the precise function of

the state conceptually, in advance of the occurrence of specific problems, for it is the event itself which will solicit and occasion if not, at times, dictate a singular solution. The exact degree of state guidance, regulation or intervention cannot be legislated in advance, yet no anarchic consequences need follow, for it is possible to accept the traditional pursuit of justice as the proper function of the state, without precipitating a nominalistic dissolution of the political community into a mosaic of disconnected individuals, nor contracting it into an omnivorous Absolute Spirit.⁶⁸

Among the most searching articles yet written on Guzzo's philosophy is a monograph in which Vittorio Mathieu exhibits the indissoluble inter-connection between methodology and substance, problem and system or, again, form and content; he observes that "the fundamental preoccupation of Guzzo seems to be that of holding firm the *two* sides of a given problem . . . and of gaining profit from the dynamic *tension* between the two sides of the question by seeking to retain the relationship (*connessione*) and prevent the terms from falling into unilaterality."⁶⁹ Yet it is not simply the discovered co-existence of two sides of a given problem that rises to philosophical difficulties; it is the disproportion of level that causes "the greatest difficulty of philosophical inquiry." For no anti-nomy or problem would exist if the two sides of a given question were "perfectly symmetrical . . . Hence it is not strange that the study of the relationship between the universal and the particular in man is central throughout Guzzo's speculation, both theoretical and moral."⁷⁰

The subjective interiority of the moral law is bound, as we have seen, to the objective validity of its value. In his attempt to respect both exigencies Guzzo, perhaps unavoidably, leaves his thought

open to possible misunderstanding. Yet the thought is clear as he undertakes to avoid two unilateral extremes, that of an abstract and inflexible codification of moral maxims, with the concomitant subservience to a foreign and "hypostatized universal law," and that of an immediate seizure of the spontaneous pressure of the vanishing moment, constituted into "a law unto itself," and to show that neither a dogmatic moralism nor a skeptical ethics is capable of satisfying the rational exigencies of the integral moral self.⁷¹ Since misinterpretation of these points can be easily provoked by stressing one given exigency without providing a correlative counterweight, and since a prevalent misreading of Guzzo's moral philosophy seems to consist in a charge of subjectivism and relativism, we feel obliged to redress the balance by focussing on certain aspects of Guzzo's theory of the moral self.

Acutely sensitive as he is to the positive exigencies of contemporary existentialism and accepting its re-affirmation of the person as the *locus* of moral values, Guzzo identifies what he calls "the crisis of the contemporary moral conscience" not so much as a failure to search after what might be or is the law of conscience, but as a radical doubt concerning the very existence of such a law. Laudable as the vindication of single existential acts is, the assertion of the self as the sole *locus* of moral values has tended to obscure, if not at times destroy, "the ancient concept of virtue understood as the conscious coherence of conduct; so that, *a fortiori*, modern consciousness no longer grasps that which the ancients understood by 'character' when, in order to instruct future generations, they traced the profile of a great personality as it became sculptured in its virtues."⁷² Yet, as is invariably the case with Guzzo's multivalent "rhythm of thinking," we must deepen the con-

cept of "character" by observing a new relationship.

If we reflect on the fact that "*a person is hypóstasis*" and that *hypóstasis* means "to make oneself a person" rather than simply "to be born a person" and if, furthermore, we do not confuse spiritual personality with the organic boundaries of the individual, we should readily understand that ethical norms can assume a distinctive personality of their own.⁷³ For the validity of ethical norms and their engendered rules consists in their unique capacity of making themselves work by descending into the depths of an individual spirit in the concrete form of an ideal or exemplaristic personality. Bold and subtle as this idea is, it must be firmly asserted that it involves neither a reification of personality nor a hypostasization of ideas. Nor is the concept so bold, although its articulation is indeed subtle, as to be completely severed from traditional speculation. For Guzzo links it with that "miraculous depth in the aristotelian concept, according to which he who is the bearer (in any sense whatsoever) of the law is himself *nómos émpsichos*."⁷⁴ These reflections remind us—and here we are anticipating problems which are sure to be raised in the projected volume of religion—of Solovyev's vision of the dialectical movement of ethical ideals from an incipient asceticism of negation in the East through a predominantly ideal affirmation in Greek culture, to the historical insertion of the ideal into the depths of reality achieved in the revelation of the unique and absolute Person, the God-Man,⁷⁵ Guzzo's own conception of ideas as ideals, and of ideals as patterns to be imitated rather than copied, should make the transition to the Supreme Exemplar both necessary and graceful.

A sustained and thoroughgoing criticism of the internal contradictions dis-

coverable within an exclusively immanent absolute and of the concomitant identification of finite and infinite, conducted largely as a meditated assimilation of St. Augustine, has led Guzzo to a vigorous and unmistakable assertion of the substantial autonomy of the infinite while stressing the interiority of its presence as the energizing source of all natural and spiritual processes.

Guzzo's vision of the ultimate origin of moral experience is articulated in Spinozistic terms (*absolute absoluta*) bearing a heavy Augustinian accent: "The foundation of morality lies in the belief that every absolute value which we temporal beings discover finds its basis and proper measure in that peculiar absolute which we might call absolutely absolute—*absolute absoluta*—in an absoluteness subsistent in itself, self-conscious, the omnipresent measure of every individual and 'personal' value: the *Théos métron* of Plato's *Laws*. Hence it is that a universe created by the subsistent Value consists of values which are progressively formed within particular experiences."⁷⁶

The concluding chapters of *La moralità*, taken in conjunction with "Il momento pascaliano della filosofia,"⁷⁶ anticipate some of the major problems and suggest solutions which will be pursued in *La religione*. The relationship between natural and positive religion, between moral faith and faith in God's revelation, are of ultimate personal concern. The problem is posed directly: we must discover how we can move from the belief that "God should exist" to the certitude that "God does exist and does actively assist us."⁷⁷ The pascalian moment in Guzzo's ethics is enriched by a fruitful utilization of Blondel's methodology as he (Guzzo) undertakes to demonstrate the paradoxical thesis that "it is irrational to be rational . . . (and) it is unnatural to be natural."⁷⁸ A nat-

ural faith in the universal validity or, in any case, stability of moral values presupposes that desire for the absolute and for the certain that is revealed as an awareness, be it implicit or peripheral, that the desire itself must seek satisfaction if it is to be faithful to its own initiative. Hence it is demonstrably irrational to reject as foreign to the human spirit that composite structure of absolute and certain values which positive religion alone can yield. The argument is pressed more stringently; for not only is reason capable of demonstrating the final bankruptcy of its own work, if such work be assumed as definitive and hence un-revisable, but it has an inescapable obligation to investigate which method or methods can best resolve the problem of the relation between faith and reason, philosophy and religion. An orthodox secular morality is radically impotent to resolve the question, on methodological grounds alone; for the only valid method which is technically justified and which is alone capable of making an intelligent discussion possible, as distinguished from the *partito preso* of propaganda and sermon-mongering, is the provisional acceptance of positive revelation as a working hypothesis for conducting a systematic inquiry into the operative nature of natural faith. By postulating the hypothesis of positive revelation human reason can show that natural faith reaches its fulfilment in the truth of positive revelation, without losing its natural and rational autonomy. Positive religion is neither subsumed under philosophy, as it is in the orthodox philosophy of the spirit of hegelian inspiration, nor is philosophy erased by religion, as it tends to be in the fideistic mode. Philosophy and religion, reason and faith are radically different, yet indissolubly related, human activities; this is the great paradox which can be denied only at the expense of the whole

man, and which is the ultimate reason for the whole philosophical quest: "The co-presence in man, indeed the bond, of the infinite and the finite is the enigma, the *magna quaestio* which man is to himself; man cannot escape disturbing himself over this question nor refuse to ask what precisely it means and portends."⁷⁹

La scienza

THE ETHICAL VOCATION to philosophize, in search of the true in the fulness of its organic texture has moved Guzzo to meditate on the philosophical import of scientific knowledge, and to produce a work to which we may apply the words used by Santayana to describe *L'io e la ragione*: "a tremendous book."⁸⁰ *La scienza* is a vast exploration—some 600 pages long—of the history and theoretical implications of the scientific enterprise. Unlike most writers on the history and philosophy of science, with the exception of a George Sarton, Guzzo neither contracts the history of science to the mode of scientific theory and practice dominant in a given, preferably the most recent, period of its history, nor does he dismiss metaphysical speculation under the guise of "scientific objectivity."

No one period in the history of science has offered, nor is capable of offering, a definitive philosophy of science; each period has rather contributed a singular and, if valid, perennially valid moment of insight into the structure and finalism of natural events. Although the nature of scientific knowledge can be understood only *in fieri*, a viable philosophy of science "must not allow itself to be encapsulated in historical forms,"⁸¹ for the scientific enterprise is a perennial quest for a certain, though provisional, knowledge of natural events. The problematic setting of Guzzo's philosophy of science is an extension of his

joint Platonic-kantian insistence on the ineradicable exigency for the certain and on a systematic analysis of the "logical" conditions which make scientific knowledge possible. Supported by a vast and detailed historical documentation of the major problems which have arisen in the history of science, Guzzo has opened a fresh perspective on that complexus of problems which is known as the philosophy of science, and which have tended, in recent years, to be treated in a repetitious and, despite protestations to the contrary, doctrinaire manner.

Meditation on the *Theaetetus* yields a systematic exposure of the self-defeating nature of any attempt to enclose scientific inquiry within either the extra-personal or irredeemably probable, for if science is to be possible at all as a jointly human and rational enterprise, it must aim at single, definite and certain truths, even though the single truth discovered be the *truth* of the possibility of a given degree of confirmation of a proposed hypothesis. The twin conditions of the inescapability of searching for singular truths and of the impossibility of discovering total truth^{81a} find their theoretical justification in "the transcendental apprehension of Kant," and their living reality in that activity of the spirit identified as the *scio* which freely engenders a plurality of "sciences," or single *epistémiai*, in response to concrete, historically situated problems. The inescapable personal-historical origin of singly discovered truths does not relativize the universal validity of those truths, nor does the vindication of scientific certitude transform the scientific enterprise into a monolithic universe. The restriction of the transcendental range of the *scio* to single truths provokes the perennial emergence of unknown situations which are then sought out in a renewed attempt at unpredictable *epistémiai*. Thus the transcendental creation of a plurality

of "sciences" shows that any definitive resolution of scientific problems into a total body of knowledge is humanly impossible, and that any attempt to press science into the role of a faith is condemned to methodological absurdity. Despite a repeated profession to the contrary, science is frequently tempted to claim total jurisdiction over human knowledge or, to be more precise, it is a science masquerading as a philosophy and hence a pseudo-science which attempts this methodological *hybris*. Against "the irreligiously eschatological certitude . . . of an omniscient 'science'," Guzzo acknowledges the presence, in faith and hence religion, of an invincible uncertainty and a profound awareness of "the problematic nature of existence."⁸² Yet both science and faith can legitimately claim access to certitude—although each by way of an autonomous and radically different method—and each can assert its primordial freedom. What Guzzo wishes to expose is the joint negation of accessibility to certitude and of the central role which freedom plays in scientific knowledge.⁸³

Through a patient and critical utilization of the classical scientists—the Pythagoreans, Euclid, Archimedes, Ptolemy, the Alchemists, Galileo, Newton—the free creativity of the scientific spirit is displayed. It is shown that no scientist reacts passively to physical events, and that no mathematician transcribes nature in symbolic notation; the scientist invents problems and proposes questions to nature while the mathematician freely creates symbolic systems and aims at logical coherence and 'elegance.' A faithful reading of the history of scientific discoveries gives the lie to all forms of crude empiricist theories, for nature is not the cause but simply the *occasion* for scientific investigation. Guzzo accepts fully, on his own theoretical terms, an occasionalist theory of knowledge.

Nor should the acknowledgment cause any surprise for it can be easily shown that both Galileo and Newton freely invented their respective systems. Galileo constructed his physics on the model of the new infinitesimal calculus while Newton worked out his rational mechanics by means of the calculus of fluxions, and his theory of light by means of infinitesimals. What may be unexpected is the interpretation of Euclid as a crucial and perennial moment in the history of science.

In the section bearing the suggestive title "The deductionistic superstition" a capital rectification is proposed of the traditional and dogmatic reading of Euclid as one condemned to follow out the necessary consequences of his own postulates. Although Euclidean geometry is just one of several alternative ways of gaining possible entry into the physical structure of nature, it will always remain valid and certain within its self-prescribed purpose. Guzzo shows that Euclid was as conscious as any contemporary "conventionalist" of the freedom required to initiate any set of axioms and postulates, and that he "put forth" definitions as instruments of analysis and constructed postulates as working hypotheses. Even the natural conformity of Euclidean geometry to the physical contours of nature rests on a free selection of plane surface as "the formal object" of the geometer's concern, and on the correlative removal of the mind from the grand curvature of space.⁸⁴

The role of free postulation in the construction of alternate logical and mathematical systems and the function of theoretical constructs in the work of hypothesis-formation in the experimental sciences is too well known in Anglo-American circles to warrant further discussion. What we should rather do is attend to the "anthropological" implications of the scientific enterprise.

The creative activity of the human mind acts as the spiritual support of nature in so far as nature is brought to birth by scientific constructs; before pursuing the argument it should be noted, in anticipation of possible objections, that the human spirit does not bring nature into existence but awakens it to a shared life. Man's creative activity forms and in-forms but does not create nature: such is the firm, howsoever frequently misunderstood, message of Kant, which J. Maréchal has understood so well,⁸⁵ and which Guzzo has pursued with great vitality.⁸⁶ What must be especially emphasized is the utter interiority of man within nature and of nature within man in that relational flow of natural events and spiritual activities which gives reality its pervasive dynamic and dramatic texture. Natural events provide man with occasions for the exercise of his creative activity as he projects ideal proposals for an elucidation of the events selected. The mind awakens nature to birth by suggesting an ideal performance, which it proceeds to induce experimentally; should the performance be verified, the dialogue will have succeeded. The human mind is obliged to provoke nature through experimentally controlled situations if it wishes to reconstruct her ideal genesis: such is the guiding theme of *La scienza*, in which Guzzo speaks of the demiurgic vocation of thought,⁸⁷ which is further characterized as an effort to "produce" things in order to understand what they are from the way in which they come into existence.

Although this theme of knowledge gained by reconstructing the "guisa di nascimento," i.e. the pattern, fashion or way of birth, is already known to us from an earlier discussion, it is important to notice that the work of ideal projection and genetic, experimental reconstruction corresponds to the tradi-

tional modes of deduction and induction; and that, furthermore, the inductive mode, widely interpreted, is indispensable to all forms of human knowledge. The dialogue between the inductive and the deductive mode produces a bond between nature and spirit. In so far as the mind provokes experimental conditions for occasioning the birth of particular events in nature, it is acting "in a realistic manner," and in so far as natural events have been conditioned by the mind, they are behaving "in an idealistic fashion"; yet such "an idealism of nature and realism of the mind" has nothing to do with the unwarranted severance of idealism from realism which takes place when the former is made to signify "ideas attributed to mind and mind alone," and the latter is forced into meaning "nature and nature alone." We are witnessing here what Guzzo describes as an inversion of "... the celebrated succession (of events) by which the romantic philosophers postulated the existence of an unconscious nature prior to the advent of a conscious spirit, for on the contrary, it is a conscious spirit which prepares the conditions for the birth of nature and which nature herself allows to be prepared. Hence, since nature is born whenever and however it is *made* to be born, it shows the manner of her birth as idea in the most concrete, and fullest sense of the word."⁸⁸ In this, and many other passages in *La scienza* Guzzo is pressing forth his regulative insight into man as the nexus of all reality, the mediator between nature and spirit; the human person is a creative spirit who can fulfil his vocation only by doing, by working out his multiple purposes in history, by proposing ideal experiments to nature thereby soliciting a theoretical response, by testing the full consequences of his beliefs; in short, by a continually renewed personal verifica-

tion of his ideals, proposals, beliefs, desires. Veritably, *verum factum est*.

The twin necessity of working out possibilities mentally and working upon nature experimentally brings out an underlying "pragmatism" in Guzzo's anthropology: "To think is to postulate possibilities, to experiment is to actualize... the 'real' must be understood rigorously as that which is experimental, and experimentation must be proposed mentally before it can be instituted and tested; either reason ideates and guides experimental projects, or experimentation is utterly impossible, for it is precisely the experimenting intelligence which activates and realizes what has been experimented." The significant thing about this passage is the connecting link which we have provisionally omitted, and in which the platonic-kantian division of the scientific enterprise into the two worlds of thought and "experimented experience" is found inadequate to express the indissoluble unity of mental proposal and physical verification. For, as the restored passage reads, "This is an entirely different and more radical platonism than that of Plato and Kant, for while Plato and Kant conceive the sensible as an alternative to the intelligible...⁸⁹, for Guzzo reality is thoroughly experimental etc.

It is neither necessary nor proper to force any texts in St. Thomas in order to show the profound link between Guzzo's experimental theory of knowledge and traditional epistemology on the one hand, and his vision of the ideality of nature and reality of ideas and traditional metaphysics on the other; for at least two eminent Thomists have already spoken for us. In *La philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin*, A. D. Sertillanges reads St. Thomas aright when he insists on the fundamentally ideal structure of physical objects and the creative reality of ideas; and in the relatively

neglected *The desire of God*, J. E. O'Mahony restores to its central position the traditional vision of man as the grand mediator between nature and God, the high pontiff who, within the intimacy of his spirit, offers the whole of nature in rational homage, *obsequium rationale*, to the Creative Source.

The occasional convergence, out of the infinite range of theoretical possibilities, between the symbolic pattern and the physical event leads Guzzo to acknowledge, as an internal rational necessity, the existence of an "absolutely absolute" spirit which both causes and guarantees the harmony discovered. The volume on religion will undoubtedly throw additional light on this question. For the moment suffice it to say that the suggested solution is neither facile nor forced nor apologetic; and that, furthermore, both Kepler and Einstein, among others, discern the presence of the Absolute in the convergence between mind and nature. (There is an excellent discussion of this question in C. F. von Weizsäcker: *The World of Physics*.)

Presence of Many Themes

IN RECENT YEARS philosophers have claimed to subscribe to the ideal of philosophical pluralism, but not many have succeeded carrying out the programmatic intention. Pluralism has remained largely on a rhetorical level; at best some inroads have been made in breaking down barriers which should not have existed in the first place, such as the once widespread, and by no means fully conquered, positivistic mis-reading of the history of philosophy in sharp turns, twists and leaps, interpreted in a Manichean framework of sharp antitheses of obscurity (medieval obscurantism) and brilliance (the Enlightenment). A kind of philosophical co-existence has set in as a mutual tolerance,

and even respect among conflicting philosophies has gradually won out; but a convincing pluralism, internal to a given philosophical system, is still in the making. Since most "types of philosophy" have yet to overcome a doctrinal one-sidedness, we are still faced with such truncated visions as an intransigent thomism, an orthodox naturalism, a monistic idealism, and an absolute existentialism. W. H. Sheldon's notable effort in the direction of an internal pluralism is burdened, unfortunately, with an obtrusive, though not un-critical, eclecticism.

Although other philosophers may be singled out in this respect, we believe that Guzzo's philosophical vision is singularly rich with an internal pluralism, without ever bending to the eclectic temptation. Especially sensitive as he is to the manifold problems raised by philosophical systems in mutual strife, Guzzo is both severe and just in his critical examination of their conflicting claims.

To give a concrete illustration of this capacity of internal, unobtrusive, yet fully critical assimilation of conflicting philosophies, which involves working in, through and, if necessary, out of a given philosophical theory, we shall concentrate on a set of problems which have a direct bearing on Guzzo's central anthropological vision, and which will therefore help to round out our sketch of his system.

a) The nature of what Guzzo has called "the typically augustinian relation of an immanent transcendence," b) the problem of freedom and necessity, c) the role of finality in nature, d) and the nature of the finalism of philosophy may be counted among the persistent problems of philosophy. And since Guzzo has described his book on Spinoza as "the point of departure of my intellectual experience,"⁹⁰ we might expect to find some of these problems pitched in

a Spinozistic setting. Yet not all; for the important speculation concerning the nature of the self and its categorizing activity is governed by a meditated assimilation and re-construction of the whole kantian problematic, and the question of the finalism of philosophy follows an Augustinian problematic.

a) While fully accepting the immanence of nature in spirit, and of God in nature, Guzzo criticizes Spinoza for his failure to distinguish clearly, if not sharply, between the infinite nature engendering and the finite nature engendered, and for leaving unresolved, consequently, the precise way in which finite modes are produced, or caused, or engendered. The transition from the infinite to the finite is never really explained. The existence of a plurality of finite modes is simply and empirically acknowledged; nature as plurality (*natura naturata*) is given no satisfactory metaphysical justification.⁹¹

b) While acknowledging "the insuperable perfection" of Spinoza's phenomenological analysis of the causal origin and evolution of human sentiments, Guzzo rejects the analysis as empirically inadequate. Having produced an essentially accurate genealogy of human sentiments, he has neglected to consider the main character in the production and its animating force, the concrete individual person. Furthermore, it is *within* "the acute, secure and precise" analysis that Guzzo discovers "the incautious introduction of a link that breaks, once and for all, the continuity of the concatenated series." Having admitted the inexorable causal link between a hatred initiated and a hatred returned, Spinoza "incautiously" adds that a return of love for hatred is indeed possible, and that it is capable of destroying the original hatred: "Odium reciproco odio augetur, et amore contra deleri potest" (*Ethics*, Bk. III, Prop. VLIII). "It is hardly nec-

essary to note," Guzzo comments, "that the insertion of one single *potest* in the sphere of pure necessity suffices to break the inexorable consequence of the new from the old, and to show that necessity is not the only category into which reality may be fitted."⁹² This passage should remind us of the regulative import of the idea of the possible (also dominant in Cassirer's anthropology) and of the correlative vitality of a productive freedom in Guzzo's philosophy. We should also note that "a rigorous application of the concept of universal necessity excludes the inherence of 'action' and 'freedom' in a mode such as man,"⁹³ and that while Spinoza, throughout many oscillations, never deviates substantially from that necessitarian outlook which Guzzo persistently criticizes, he nevertheless finds great merit in Spinoza's insistence on that spiritual activity which constitutes the inner, animating source of the volitional and rational processes of the concrete human person. Although the argument supporting the following statement is complex, we should be able to connect it with earlier and relevant themes in our discussion: "... that act of the spirit which determines what we know in so far as it is either an affirmation or negation, i.e. action and will, is an act of the spirit precisely as we understand it today, i.e. as that profound inner freedom, which is the initiative and creation of our own being and life. And to derive from this concept of the spiritual act the concept of reality as wholly ("tutta quanta") freedom and creation has been and continues to be the task of modern philosophy, which is to be executed not against Spinoza, but following his glorious path."⁹⁴ This is the exact task to which Guzzo has been devoting his whole philosophical effort, and to some aspects of which we have been introduced.

c) The problem of freedom and nec-

essity is shifted to a new plane as the discussion turns to finality. The modern attack on the principle of finality, initiated by a gradual awareness of the uselessness of such a principle for the calculation and prediction of inter-connected physical events, reached a philosophical climax in Spinoza's celebrated Appendix. In his commentary on this passage, which we are urged to "read many times, and meditate attentively," Guzzo distinguishes sharply between the polemical motivation of the attack and the positive upshot, and shows how Spinoza's objections are restricted, and hence relevant solely to a particular conception of finality. If the movement of each finite mode in nature is to be explained by the fixation of an end extrinsic to its operative processes, that explanation must be rejected as utterly unsatisfactory, for nature is not reducible to an external collocation or, as Guzzo prefers to say "agglutination," of finite modes. The essential plasticity of nature can be explained most adequately by a principle of finality which conforms to the operative processes internal to nature, and out of which final ends are specifically engendered. No final end can be prescribed definitely in advance of its occurrence, for the finality lodged in nature is a tentative, flexible, irregular fermentation of proposals and projects, the final fulfilment of which is empirically unavailable. Whence the logical absurdity and moral impropriety of seeking refuge in foreign causes, and the correlative absurdity and impropriety of seeking an "asylum of ignorance" in an unredeemable, because absolute, contingency.⁹⁵

It is impossible to pursue our documentation of Guzzo's internal and unobtrusive assimilation of diverse philosophical exigencies, without filling out in detail what we have already sketched, and without adding to the burden of

our article. Let us simply call to mind Guzzo's own observation on methodology, cited at the beginning of our discussion, and conclude this section with a synoptic re-statement of that vision: "According to Spinoza, error is incomplete, inadequate knowledge and understanding. Now, that which is insufficient and inadequate is not 'false,' in the current meaning of the word: it simply does not suffice. To say that Spinozism is not sufficient for modern thought does not mean that modern thought can prescind from it or, and this amounts to the same thing, that it can reject and forget it."⁹⁶

d) Guided by his joint insistence on man as a singular vocation to the true, and on truth as a universal value by which individual things and concrete historical situations are judged to be certain, Guzzo accepts both pursuit and possession—*philo-sophia* and *sophia*—as indispensable and co-relative phases of the philosophical enterprise, and raises at once and sharply the crucial question as to whether or not the uncommitted attitude of many contemporary philosophers necessitates a radical *desperatio veri et boni et pulchri*. Since the early writings on St. Augustine, this question has been one of Guzzo's dominant and pervasive preoccupations, expressing as it does a profoundly ethical motivation. In the programmatic work *La filosofia e l'esperienza*, Guzzo has concentrated the substance of his thinking in the chapter on religious experience. In a relatively few pages he presents a precise phenomenological analysis of that spirit of philosophizing which insists on identifying philosophy with inquiry and inquiry with endless quest, and isolates two convictions as the undeniable "possession" of "the consciousness of modern man: [the conviction] that inquiry ("ricerca") constitutes the value and dignity of human life, in

every field; and that such an inquiry can never cease." Far from discerning an attitude of despair in this disposition of mind, Guzzo discovers "a joy of acting, of fulfilling, of creating, an intense animation and profound passion for work."⁹⁷

Moreover, he argues that pursuit and possession are unredeemably intertwined in a precarious yet certain unity, wherein discovery neither excludes nor negates quest. Indeed, Guzzo insists that the human search for the true presupposes the very existence and availability of truth: "If a man seeks not only in order to find but also because he has found and wishes to confirm anew what he has found, this is the best proof that he is made for truth, and that truth is available to him; yet man can never discover truth without personal activity and initiative, because he must always discover it freshly, and to discover it freshly he must test and verify it *ex novo*."⁹⁸ And so it is that Guzzo himself has meditated again and again on the perennial problems of philosophy throughout a life-long practise of thinking and deepening and revising his own philosophical discoveries.⁹⁹

Conclusions

ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS we have felt obliged to apologize for an unavoidable inadequacy in presenting Guzzo's complex philosophy, and have sought to sketch some of his main philosophical interests, without being able to provide all the necessary, and available arguments in their support; for a precise development of specific problems, we must refer the reader to the original text. Our task has been simply preparatory, and as such we wish it to be understood. Yet, before concluding the substantive part of our discussion, we should like to call attention to a capital insight into Guzzo's mind achieved by Luigi Pareyson in his article on Guzzo's ethics.

Pareyson has discerned a "hidden clef," to borrow a phrase from J. Pieper, which gives Guzzo's ethics, and consequently his whole philosophy, a peculiar dynamism. The clef is the virtue of courage. Although no extensive work is devoted to the problem of courage,¹⁰⁰ its energizing presence throughout Guzzo's writings is unmistakable, and the form which it takes is implied by what we have already learned. Given the inaccessibility of a total and fixed body of truth, the unavailability of a self-generating set of abstract and pre-arranged duties, and the impossibility of any substitution for personal decision, since in the act of interpreting one's duty "everyone may help a person but nobody can take his place," given this complexus of conditions, "it necessarily takes an act of courage" to persevere in that singular dedication to the good which assumes the difficult form of "inventing" one's own truth and task by having the courage to define and present them clearly, thereby risking confutation and reprobation, and of having confidence in the truth that has been searched for and the good which has been willed... Resting his observation on over a dozen documented references Pareyson sketches the vital phases in this ethics of courage: "In sum, courage in defining the true; courage in assuming it as the guide of our conduct; courage in defining our duty concretely and precisely; courage in preferring this courage to the cowardice (*viltà*) of withdrawing from our responsibility and duty of a personal account by restricting ourselves to a spirit of conformism or to simple, good intentions."¹⁰¹

FOOTNOTES

* Since the full titles of the principal books under discussion are listed at the head of this essay, we take the liberty of not repeating the information in subsequent footnotes.

¹ Motivated by the belief that "the non-tech-

nical public does not want single monographs but a synoptic presentation of the ideas which a philosopher professes," and encouraged by the response to the systematic writings of Croce, Guzzo attempted "to gather together" his own synoptic vision of philosophy in the form of "a plan for the six volumes of the systematic work which was conceived and published in 1943, under the title 'L'uomo,' in *Filosofi italiani contemporanei*, Como, Marzorati, 1944; see A. Guzzo, "Cenno autobiografico," in *Augusto Guzzo*, pp. 2-3.

2 "Dopo la filosofia dell'esistenza," *Germinale*, p. 106.

3 *La filosofia e l'esperienza*, p. 133; the manifold modes of experience are systematically unfolded in this fundamental programmatic study. Cf. especially Ch. VIII, "L'esperienza, la riflessione e la filosofia."

4 "Esame del concetto di immanenza," p. 104, and "Parola 'di' Dio e ricerca 'su' Dio," p. 256, both in *Parerga*; for a discussion of "analogia hominis," see "Ragione e irrazionalismo," in *Parerga*, and ch. I, "Il soggetto," in the Third Part of *L'io e la ragione*.

5 In the programmatic outline "L'uomo," p. 252, Guzzo writes: "HUMANISM. Philosophy is, therefore, a rigorous humanism; but this deprives it neither of nature nor of God, for it finds the one in experience and science, and the other in the religious conscience; and it is incapable of asking itself how the act whereby I am born to myself is possible, without accepting the testimony which this act bears of nature and God."

6 *La filosofia e l'esperienza*, pp. 129-132.

7 "Dopo la filosofia dell'esperienza," *Germinale*, p. 101.

8 "Egologia," *Parerga*, p. 210.

9 *La filosofia e l'esperienza*, pp. 175-176; the italics are Guzzo's.

10 *ibid.*, p. 133.

12 *Ricostruzione metafisica*, Padova, Editoria Liviana, 1949, p. 20.

12 *ibid.*, p. 260.

13 "Compiti della filosofia," *Parerga*, p. 21.

14 "Che cos'è metafisica?," *Giornale di Metafisica*, 1947, V-VI, and "la struttura della metafisica," in *Ricostruzione metafisica*, pp. 259-264. In the somewhat accelerated series of studies, *Studi sul neospiritualismo*, Roma, Bocca, 1953, Franco P. Alessio gives his chapter on Guzzo the revealing title: "La filosofia come ermeneutica della esperienza: A. Guzzo."

15 "Esame del concetto di immanenza," *Parerga*, p. 104.

16 In a recent letter to us, dated October 16,

1957, Guzzo writes of his friendship with, and visits to, "one of Royce's students, Santayana."

17 *Il pensiero di Spinoza*, Firenze, Vallecchi, 1924. A. E. Taylor had projected an English translation of this book, which he reviewed in *Mind*, April 1925, with these opening words: "Dr. Guzzo has given us a study of Spinoza's philosophy which I can heartily recommend for lucidity and incisiveness to all students of his thought." p. 253.

18 "Spinoza," *Enciclopedia Italiana*, Roma, 1936, v. XXXII, p. 384.

19 *Les Études philosophiques*, April-June 1953; see the same article in Italian, *Parerga*.

20 *La philosophie de demain*, préface de R. LeSenne, p. 11.

21 *La filosofia e l'esperienza*, p. 168 of the dense study, "Perché Idealismo?"

22 Guzzo is so precise in explaining the meaning of his "absolute idealism" that he dissociates himself (theoretically) from a movement—known as "Christian spiritualism"—with which he is frequently linked—despite his friendly protestations—and with which he does nonetheless share some *problematic* motives. In a polemical clarification of his thought, Guzzo explains his position briefly as a rigorous idealism which insists on the irreducibility of "the Augustinian spiritual itinerary as an experience," and warns against transcribing that "experience into an objectivistic metaphysics since that would not only distort its nature but would fail to grasp its distinctive meaning and value." See *Michele Federici Sciacca*, scritti di A. Guzzo, R. Crippa, F. Arata, Edizioni di "Filosofia," Torino, 1951, p. 6.

23 Six years earlier, in 1936, Guzzo had written a history of idealism in order to exhibit and illustrate its deepest exigencies; see especially the study "Idealismo e Cristianesimo," which is the concluding section in the volume by the same title: *Idealismo e Cristianesimo*, Polemiche e programmi, 2 volumi, Napoli, 1936.

24 "Messianesimo, dialettismo e gnoseologia scettica nella storiografia filosofica," in *Concetto e saggi di storia della filosofia*, Firenze, F. LeMonnier, 1940, pp. 15-16.

25 "Il concetto di 'attualità' dei filosofi classici," *Germinale*, p. 86. This article should be read as a general pedagogical message and specific methodological advice for an integral reading of philosophical writings, which we are urged to approach with that historical-mindedness and imaginative though accurate reconstruction of events and ideas upon which H. I. Marrou has insisted in his recent writings. On

p. 89 of the article cited we read: "By refusing or denying human sympathy—and to limit it is a mode of denial—we deliberately restrict our horizon, for what obstructs our understanding is not a deficiency in intelligence but a state of aridity which, if not willed, is certainly accepted passively. Such a state of indolence, of spiritual lethargy is undoubtedly a failure in solidarity which, if not a fault, is at least a defect—at times grave—in those who profess to be philosophers. When we are in a state of frigidity, we read only that which confirms what we already believe."

26 *La moralità*, p. 447.

27 For an understanding of the joint utilization and criticism of Croce's philosophy of the spirit, cf. the three essays on Croce in *Parerga*, and the important "digression," "Forze, forme e attività dello spirito," in *La moralità*, pp. 396-463. Contemporary Italian philosophy is conditioned by a long and productive history of the problem of the human spirit, in both its humanistic and activist manifestations; while acknowledging the substantial reality of the spirit Guzzo prefers to identify it with act. See *L'io e la ragione*, ch. I of the Third Part, "Il soggetto," and the highly significant appendix, "Le categorie nella 'Critica della Ragione Pura,'" pp. 252-289.

28 *La philosophie de demain*, pp. 30-31.

29 *L'io e la ragione*, p. 9.

30 *ibid.*, p. 43.

31 *ibid.*, ch. II of the First Part, "Iniziativa e consapevolezza," pp. 6-11.

32 *ibid.*, ch. IV of the Second Part, "Il vero implicito nel conoscere," pp. 74-85.

33 *ibid.*, p. 53.

34 *ibid.*, pp. 80-81.

35 *ibid.*, p. XVII, outline of ch. III, "Relatività e immutabilità del vero."

36 *ibid.*, p. 63.

37 Guzzo writes, in the letter mentioned in n. 16, that *Veritas mater temporis* is his own inverted construction of Francis Bacon's *Veritas filia temporis*. The meaning and implications of this formula are discussed in detail in the fundamental article, "Problema morale e verità," now in *Parerga*; originally published in 1930 as the preface to *Agostino e il sistema della grazia*, it was re-issued in 1934 under the title *Agostino contro Pelagio*, Torino, Edizioni de "L'Erma."

38 *L'io e la ragione*, p. 60.

39 *ibid.*, p. 301.

40 *ibid.*, *passim*. The term "negative" is to be understood as an epistemological rather than ontological context. Moreover, it should be in-

terpreted as an analogue of that inescapable approximative, though true, character of human knowledge which philosophers such as Joseph Pieper (*Philosophia Negativa*) and Auguste Brunner (*La connaissance humaine*) have been accentuating in recent years, and which Guzzo discusses specifically under the form of what he calls "the modal inadequation" (of our creaturely knowledge) in "L'astrazione tomistica e le possibilità d'una nuova gnoseologia," *Filosofia e Cristianesimo*, Milano, Marzorati, 1947; this article may also be found in *Parerga*.

41 *La filosofia e l'esperienza*, p. 192; the italics are Guzzo's.

42 *ibid.*, p. 188.

43 This idea is encountered throughout Guzzo's writings.

44 "L'astrazione tomistica e le possibilità d'una nuova gnoseologia," *Parerga*, p. 78.

45 *ibid.*, p. 79.

46 *L'io e la ragione*, p. 129.

47 For a further discussion of the relationship between *conceptus* and *conceptum*, *ibid.*, pp. 131-133.

48 This quotation is one of the many which Guzzo utilizes in his twin studies of Rosmini, "Lume naturale e 'forma della verità,'" in v. I of the indispensable Rosminian sourcebook *Atti del Congresso Internazionale Antonio Rosmini*, edited by M. F. Sciacca, Firenze, G. C. Sansoni, 1957, and the extended version of this study in *Filosofia*, April 1956, "Lume naturale, forma della verità e idea dell'essere in Rosmini."

49 *L'io e la ragione*, p. 97.

50 *La moralità*, p. 182.

51 *ibid.*, p. 117.

52 For an elaboration of the questions raised in the body of this paragraph, *ibid.*, pp. 142-153.

53 For a more thorough treatment of the substance of the foregoing paragraph, read carefully the short but dense "discussion," "Autorità e moralità," in *La moralità*, pp. 388-391.

54 See *La philosophie de demain*, p. 96: "...existentialism and idealism: the literature of the finitude of man and the literature on his infinity. This is precisely the pascalian moment of philosophy, in which neither the misery nor the grandeur of man is ignored."

55 *La moralità*, p. 319.

56 *ibid.*, p. 116.

57 This is the title of section VI in the Second Part of *L'io e la ragione*.

58 This expression is used, though incidentally, in "Ragione e irrazionalismo," *Parerga*.

⁵⁹ The connexity between the searching conscience and the discovered law is one manifestation, central though it be, of that "*congenèrità*, *synghèneia* of the mind which investigates and that which is investigated; it does not signify identity but otherness, an otherness, however, which is essentially and constitutively a communion." *La filosofia e l'esperienza*, p. 12.

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, p. 42.

⁶¹ *L'io e la ragione*, pp. 181-186.

⁶² *La moralità*, p. 153.

⁶³ *La filosofia e l'esperienza*, p. 43.

⁶⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 142-153; for an understanding of the wider context of the problems raised, see "Affermazione di diritti e posizione di leggi," pp. 154-199.

⁶⁵ For a comprehensive formulation of this problem, see *L'io e la ragione*, "Relatività e immutabilità del vero," especially p. 71; also *La philosophie de demain*, "Connaissance et relation" and "La relativité," pp. 55-62.

⁶⁶ Luigi Pareyson, "L'etica di Augusto Guzzo," in *Augusto Guzzo*, p. 69.

⁶⁷ See Guzzo's short but trenchant analysis of the concept of freedom in the article "Libertà" in the *Enciclopedia Italiana*, v. XX, p. 49.

⁶⁸ *La moralità*, pp. 221-231.

⁶⁹ Vittorio Mathieu, "Guzzo, Carlini e Sciacca," *Giornale di Metafisica*, March-April 1955, p. 232.

⁷⁰ *ibid.*, p. 234.

⁷¹ "... This way of posing the problem, tending as it does to avoid hypostatization of the universal on the one hand and enclosure within the particular on the other, is so typical, that we may assert any given doctrine in Guzzo's philosophy to be an exemplification of it." *Ibid.*, p. 235.

⁷² *La filosofia e l'esperienza*, p. 39, n.1.

⁷³ *La moralità*, p. 132.

⁷⁴ *ibid.*, p. 135.

^{74a} See Vladimir Solov'yev, *Lectures on Godmanhood*, New York, International University Press, 1944.

⁷⁵ *ibid.*, p. 379.

⁷⁶ *Germinale*, pp. 122-162.

⁷⁷ For an extensive and morally inspiring development of the highly contracted substance of this paragraph, see the concluding chapters, "Moralità e religione," and "Moralità Religiosa" in *La moralità*, pp. 339-382.

⁷⁸ This is the theme of Maurice Blondel's book, *Le Problème de la philosophie catholique*.

⁷⁹ "Compiti della filosofia," in *Parerga*, p. 22.

⁸⁰ Preface to *La scienza*, p. XIII.

⁸¹ *ibid.*, p. XI.

^{81a} The impossibility of discovering total truth pertains to the natural order of philosophy, which Guzzo distinguishes firmly from religion; his warning is directed explicitly against the philosophical conception of "... a substantive, reified truth which is held to be universal not because it is universally valid but rather because it is *imagined* to be the whole of truth." Cf. "Il concetto di 'attualità' dei filosofi classici," in *Germinale*, p. 87.

⁸² *ibid.*, p. CVIII.

⁸³ For the substance of this paragraph, see the long and fundamental introduction, "La scienza e le scienze," *La scienza*, pp. LXIII-CXLII.

⁸⁴ See the chapter "Euclide," pp. 15-60, *ibid.*, and the revealing study, "Come ho scritto il libro 'La Scienza,'" in *Parerga*, pp. 221-228.

⁸⁵ *Le point de départ de la métaphysique*, cahier III, *La critique de Kant*, Bruxelles-Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1944.

⁸⁶ In distinguishing between normative (formal) and concrete (substantive) judgments, both of which are the inescapable task and work of man, Guzzo observes that "the exigency of judging is one with the very nature of the mind; to put it at once more simply and more rigorously, it is intellect innate in itself, of which Leibniz spoke, i.e. the mind itself as activity and initiative." *La filosofia e l'esperienza*, p. 199.

⁸⁷ *L'io e la ragione*, p. 159.

⁸⁸ *La scienza*, p. 423.

⁸⁹ *ibid.*, p. 402.

^{89a} Since Guzzo has shown a certain sympathy to Santayana, his attitude towards another major American philosopher may be worth recording. Upon reading the paragraph appended, Guzzo wrote, in the letter cited in n.16: "I have (and always have had) great admiration for Dewey, despite the diversity of [our] conclusions."

The comprehensive scope of Guzzo's vindication of the great positive value of human experience that is expressed in transcendental and actualistic idealism, and his belief in the central though not exhaustive reality of the human spirit should serve as an encouragement for some philosopher to re-construct Dewey's heavily unilateral constructions in *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, by situating them in a more comprehensive and more solidly rational setting. Because of an early joint phase of Hegelian influence, it would be instructive to study in detail which of the two philosophers has suc-

ceeded in resolving the internal contradictions of dialectical idealism.

⁹⁰ "Crisi e perennità dell'uomo," in *Parerga*.

⁹¹ See the section "La metafisica spinoziana," in Ch. V of *Il pensiero di Spinoza*.

⁹² *ibid.*, p. 291.

⁹³ *ibid.*, p. 292.

⁹⁴ Benedetto Spinoza, *Ethica*, a cura di A. Guzzo, Firenze, Vallecchi, 1924, p. 28.

⁹⁵ For Guzzo's own treatment of the problem of finality, see *La Philosophie de demain*, "Contingence et finalisme," and "Finalisme et Nature," pp. 85-94.

⁹⁶ B. Spinoza, *op.cit.*, p. 23.

⁹⁷ *La filosofia e l'esperienza*, pp. 73-74.

⁹⁸ *ibid.*, p. 46.

⁹⁹ In an appreciative essay, "La scuola di Augusto Guzzo," in *Augusto Guzzo*, Emilio Arlandi, a former student who does not share Guzzo's philosophical outlook, observes that "...Guzzo does not find peace until he has

tormented himself with all possible objections, as did Plato, his most beloved philosopher for many, many reasons of kinship." (p. 113) This reference to Plato is neither rhetorical nor restrictive (i.e. Guzzo is not charged with being a 'Platonizer'). The very fact that, in writing this article, we have been obliged to utilize *converging* sources in order to explain specific phases of Guzzo's philosophy, is *indirect* testimony of his Platonic method, while his own construction and unfolding of manifold hypotheses is a *direct* confirmation of that Platonic *skepsis* which has been so beautifully and incisively presented and practised by the late Luigi Stefanini, in those sections of the Introduction to his monumental *Platone*, which were published in *Cross Currents* (Summer 1952) under the title, "The mystery that is Plato."

¹⁰⁰ One study, though brief, is explicitly devoted to the problem of courage, "La paura e il coraggio," *Parerga*, pp. 3-16.

¹⁰¹ Luigi Pareyson, *op.cit.*, pp. 79-80.

Notes on metaphysics (Concluded from page 346)

which should decide the question. Are they capable of building a theory of knowledge? Do they even deserve to be listened to?

Let us speak frankly. Once the essential composition of human nature is admitted, the whole positive doctrine of Kant's Transcendental Analytic must be accepted. It is but the analytical development, pushed to its ultimate modali-

ties, of the theory of potency and of act as applied to human knowledge. But Kantism contains, besides a theory of sensitivo-rational knowledge, an agnostic theory of metaphysical knowledge. These notes will at least have the advantage of showing with what firmness and conviction the latter must be rejected.

Translated by JOSEPH DONCEEL, S.J.

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connection and 'effect-connection' which persists through 'past,' 'present,' and 'future' with the past, herein, enjoying no especial precedence." (See *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 378-9). Bultmann similarly distinguishes the "historical" (*historisch*), which refers to an object of scientific investigation, from the "historic" (*geschichtlich*), which refers to what, although of the past, makes continuous impact upon present experience. Thus, for him, the Resurrection of the Lord is not "historical" but eminently "historic."

³² The emphasis is Bultmann's own.

³³ Ethelbert Stauffer, *New Testament Theology* (New York: Macmillan, 1956), pp. 373, \$4.50.

³⁴ Oscar Cullman, *The State in the New Testament* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956), pp. xii-123, \$2.50.

³⁵ Oscar Cullman, *The Early Church, Studies in Early History and Theology* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1956), pp. xii-217, \$4.50.

³⁶ Of especial interest, perhaps, are papers on the origin of Christmas, the Kingship of Christ, the plurality of the Gospels. Those aware of the friendly controversy on the nature of tradi-

tion in which Prof. Cullman has been involved these last years (see CROSS CURRENTS, III [1952-53], 262-277 and 373-374) will read with appropriate interest the extended re-statement of his position in the face of Fr. Daniélou's strictures, "The Tradition."

³⁷ Better than average instances of the philological approach are W. David Stacey's *The Pauline View of Man* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956, pp. xv-253, \$5.75) and C. A. Pierce's *Conscience in the New Testament* (Naperville, Illinois: Allenson, 1955, pp. 151, \$1.50). Of the theological, John Burnaby's *Christian Words and Christian Meanings* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955, pp. 160, \$2.50). Only limitations of space prevent their being accorded due attention in this survey.

³⁸ Bruce Vawter, C.M., *A Path Through Genesis* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1956), pp. ix-308, \$4.00.

³⁹ John L. McKenzie, S.J., *The Two-Edged Sword, An Interpretation of the Old Testament* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1956), pp. 317, \$4.50.

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